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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
A. The Problem of the Dissertation 
The problem of this dissertation will be the investigation of 
the perspectives of Hermann Diem concerning biblical hermeneutics 
and the contribution which this approach makes to the contemporary 
dilemmas of biblical interpretation. After the backgrounds of the 
modern situation have been indicated, the hermeneutical alterna-
tives of Rudolf Bultmann and Karl Barth will be discussed, together 
with Diem's response to both, his own hermeneutical thought, and 
his attempt to reopen creative conversation between exegesis and 
theology. 
B. Definitions 
The term "existentialist ex!3gesis11 denotes the hermeneutics of 
those New Testament scholars and theologians who combine a Fo~ 
critical methodology 1-r.i th the p·erspectives of nineteenth- and twen-
tieth-century existentialism. For the purpose of this discussion, 
Rudolf Bultmann has been selected as the representative of this 
school. V"Jh:ile some more recent interpreters can claim to be more 
thoroughly consistent in their existentialism, Bultmann neverthel~ss 
has been one of the first representatives of this modern synthesis and 
may still claim to be the most widely influential of its exponents. 
2 
The term 11dogmatic theology" first of all denotes the task of the 
theologian in explicating the given faith of the Church in contemporar,y 
terms and w.i. th the aid of the doctrines of the Church. As such, the 
word 11dogmatic" is here used 'Without the popular pejorative connota-
tions; it simply refers to this branch of theology, in contrast to the 
other disciplines of apologetic, practical, or historical theology. 
The dogmatic theology of continental Protestantism, in its currently 
influential forms, is primarily Lutheran or Barthian.1 Ho-vrever, 
since contemporary Lutheran dogmatics is only rarely mentioned by 
Hermann Diem, this school of theology will not be explicitly considered 
in this dissertation. Thus, lldogmatic theo],pgy11 in this dissertation 
vrill have not only the primar,y definition given above, but will also 
refer generally to the Barthian perspective on dogmatics. Karl Barth 
himself will thus be discussed as the leading representative of dog-
matic theology. 
"Historicism" is a term widely used in modern theology, although 
it is basically ambiguous. It will here den0te any form of historical 
criticism which operates on the presuppositions drawn from a naturalis-
tic ontology. Characteristic here are the concepts of cumulative de-
velopment,,detached observation, and causal continuity. Especially 
the latter, through the principles of analogy and correlation, seems 
to require a continuum of human knowledge which may imply a closed 
1. ·.To be noted also, however; are the existentialist systematic theol-
ogies of G. Ebeling and F. Gogarten. These and related thinkers · 
are now corning to exert considerable influence in German theology. 
universe, with no room for unique events such as the Christian revela-
tion describes. 
For the purposes of this dissertation, the terms "doctrine" and 
11dogma11 will be used interchangeably. Similarly, the word 11theology,n 
if unqualified, will be used interchangeably 1d th II dogmatics. tt This 
permits more flexi.bili ty in literary style and, it is to be hoped, may 
also indirectly contribute to the removal of the popular stigma from 
the word 11dogma11 and its derivatives. 
c. Limitations 
The scope of hermeneutical discussion here will be limited to 
German-speaking Protestantism. This does not imply that creative de-
velopments have not taken place in Roman Catholic hermeneutics or out-
side of German-speaking Europe, but rather that the most influential 
discussions on biblical interpretation in the last century or so have 
occurred within Germanic Protestanti~. 
The discussions of existentialist exegesis and dogmatic theology 
will further be limited to the positions of Rudolf Bultmann and Karl 
Barth, respectively. Even though the basic contribution of these two 
men has been made over two decades ago, their influence still has 
remained decisive for the continuing discussions of their disciples. 
The appearance of a new theological generation, and especially of the 
post-Bul trnannian ferment, has not fundamentally changed the issues at 
stake between the two factions. 
Also, the theology of Hermann Diem is discussed here only insofar 
as it pertains to hermeneutics, and the related areas of the Church, 
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dogma, and theology. However, it may be pointed out in passing that 
Diem has written widely on other themes, notably the contributions of 
Kierkegaard, the polity and legal bases of the Church, the life of the 
congregation, and the relation of theology and philosoppy. 
D. Previous Research in the Field 
No study has yet been written about either the hermeneutics of 
Hermann Diem or his theology in general. One of Diem 1 s doctoral 
students, Lothar Steiger,1 has written an investigation of the back-
ground and present dilemmas of the existentialist hermeneutics. 
Although this work reflects Diem's influence to a large extent, it 
does not discuss Diem directly and in fact rarely mentions him. More-
over, Steiger employs an immanental critique in w·hich the self-contra-
dictions of Bultmannian exegesis are discussed; this approach moves be-
yond Diem's own extrinsic critique, whereby existentialism is measured 
by its inadequate treatment of God's revelation and of the doctrinal 
response of the Church. The existentialist tendencies of Steiger him-
self, together vT.ith the lack of positive suggestions for hermeneutics, 
make his vmrk of little direct value for a study of Diem 1 s o-vm herme-
neutical discussions. Another recent TUbingen dissertation2 discusses 
incidentally and briefly Diem Is doctrine of the T-.cini ty and its her-
1. Die Hermeneutik als dogmat~sches Problem (Gfttersloh: Glitersloher 
Verlagshaus Gerd Moh.n, 1961). 
2. H. Geisser, II Die Trini t!ttslehre unter den Problem en und in den 
Prolegomena christlicher Theologie 11 (unpublished dissertation, 
University of TU.bingen, 1962). 
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meneutical perspective, in contrast to Barth's doctrine, but makes 
little reference to further hermeneutical implications. 
E. The Method of the Dissertation 
-------- -----~-------
First, a historical survey of the impact of historical criticism 
upon biblical interpretation will set the background for the contem-
porary crisis in hermeneutics. The reactions to this situation by 
existentialist exegesis (in the person of Rudolf Bultmann) and dog-
matic theology (in the person of Karl Barth) will then be noted. 
Thus, the second chapter will expound Bultmann 1s hermeneutics a~d 
~dll close ~dth Diem's criticisms of this position. The next 
chapter vull present the corresponding hermeneutical approach of 
Barth; together with Diem's criticisms and relations to it; here vdll 
also be presented Diem's view of the relationships and current stale-
mate between these tvJo schools of thought. The succeeding chapter 
will discuss Diem's own hermeneutics in detail. A concluding chapter 
will evaluate Diem's hermeneutical thought, ·with special attention to 
the extent to which it may offer a promising perspective on the prob-
lems posed to theology by historical criticism, and also to whether 
a conversation has after all been renewed be~reen Barthian dogmatics 
and Bultmannian exegesis. 
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CHAPTER II 
BACKGROUNDS FOR THE CRISIS IN HERMENEUTICS 
A. The Development of the Crisis 
The uncertainties and conflicts of modern interpretation of Scrip-
ture m~ be seen to a large extent as due to its inconsistent assimi-
lation of historical criticism. This ambiguity may be traced to the 
pressures of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, which led Protes-
tant orthodoxy to reject the nascent biblical cri ticis.m. The latter 
discipline then fell under the influence of secular presuppositions. 
Thus, when historical criticism was reincorporated into Protestant 
theology in the nineteenth century, the problem of "historicism, 1} of 
how a now essentially naturalistic discipline could study a historical 
revelation, became an acute difficulty. 
1. The First Stage: Protestant Scholasticism 
a. Reformation Hermeneutics 
Luther's contribution was that through his efforts the Scriptures 
were allowed to stand as the self-attesting authority over the Church, 
instead of being subject to the decisions of the Church. No consist-
ently elaborated hermeneutical norms resulted from his work, and indeed 
he only gradually broke aw~ from the extravagant allegorical prac-
tices current in medieval exegesis. But, by 1520, in his statement 
7 
of ~ scriptura, 1 the exclusive claim of the 11 sola11 already had the 
force of a hermeneutical principle, namely, that Scripture expounds 
itself without the imposition of exterior nor.ms or tradition. Yet this 
self -evident sovereignty of the Word of God w.L thin the -written word was 
precisely in that freedom destined to elude explicit formulation and 
thus unwittingly to be sacrificed by the more analytic subsequent gen-
erations. 
NeY.er.theless, Luther did not leave hermeneutic questions unanswered. 
Scripture illuminates Scripture; thus, in obscure places, the exegete 
is instructed: 
~ingen eynen andern ort erzu, der klerer ist, und 
alsso schrifft mit schrifft erleuchten und ausslegen. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Und das ist auch die .;rechte kunst, das man die schrifft 
recht una wol ~usamen trage.2 
This procedure is possible because the true understanding of Scripture 
comes only through the single sensus li tteralis of the words in the 
text, in contradistinction to the medieval fourfold meanings which 
dominated the Church since the rise of Alexandrian exegesis in antiq-
ui ty. The texts were to be interpreted according to their natural 
meanings and original relevance, and for this reason Luther could 
endorse a scholarly examination of Scripture: 11Et moneo vos, quanta 
1. Martin Luther, Werke: kritische Gesa.mm.tausgabe (Weimar: H. Boehlaus, 
1897), VII, 95-101. Hereafter referred to as ~TA. Cf. also G. 
Ebeling, 11Hermeneutik, 11 Religion in Geschichtelind Gegenwart 
(Jrd ed.; Tftbingen: J. c. B. Mohr, 1957-61), III, 251. 
2. WA, VII, 639 !quoted according to the original German).. 
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possum studio, ut in Historiis aestimandis velitis d.iligentes esse.u1 
Yet in the emphasis upon the literal meanings, Luther vras c~eful 
not tp equate all texts as equally authoritative. The creative flex-
ibility of his hermeneutic was implemented by the distinction of "Law11 
and "Gospel," which permeates the entire Bible. li'lithin each Testa-
ment and each book, the 11Law11 embodies God's demand upon human exist-
ence, w·hich restrains sin and leads to Christ, and the "Gospel 11 reveals 
the good news of God's justifying grace. By this functional distinc-
tion, the theological unity of Scripture is maintained while its factu-
al diversity is recognized. The hermeneutical task is further to be 
guided by the requisite that Christ is the punctus.mathematicus of the 
text and the telos towards which it moves, even to the detriment of 
the apparently literal meaning. An implicitly critical approach to 
Scripture, which subjects the texts to the scrutiny of the Word of God, 
may thus be ascribed to Luther. In fact, it may be said of him that 
he foreshadowed in outline all the creative developments of Protestant 
hermeneutics, as well·as many of its contradictory tendencies. 
John Calvin built largely upon Luther's foundation. Here the 
general tenets of the latter's hermeneutic were developed into a doc-
trine of 11Word and Spirit, 11 whereby both flexibility and structure were 
maintained in the exegetical task, as the Word tests the Spirit and the 
Spirit attests the Word. 2 The 1vord of God contained "Within the -written 
1. Ibid., XLII, 377. 
2. John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, ed. J. T. 
McNeill, trans. F. L. Battles (2 vols.; Philadelphia: t-Testminster, 
196o), I. ix. 1-3 (pp. 93-96). Cf. Luther, WA, XVIII, 653. 
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Word is, negatively speaking, the "prescribed" and sole source of the 
knowledge of God, and, positively speaking, it is quite trustworthy in 
l 
its clear presentation of such knowledge. The Holy Spirit's function 
is in two noetic 11offices, 11 guaranteeing to the believer that God is 
the Author of the true Word "t-rithin Scripture, and also guiding the 
believer in his reading of the w.ri tten word by the testimonium §piri tus 
Sancti. 
Calvin brought his vast scholarship to bear upon the language and 
background of the Bible, as the great wealth of his many commentaries 
evidences. As did Luther, he firmly rejected allegorical or non-literal 
meanings in exegesis, with the exception of a restrained use of typol-
ogy cormnon to all the Reformers. But, on the other hand, he was by no 
means the rigid literalist portrayed by later Calvinism. Despite the 
appearance of several passages in the Institutes, 2 his commentaries 
indicate that the characteristic affirmation of Calvin was that the 
Word of God is God's self-cormnunication and not merely the letter of 
Scripture. The historical setting of the biblical authors must be 
3 
examined, and indeed minor errors in Scripture are apparent. The 
resources of humanistic scholarship in language, rhetoric, and histor-
1. Institutes, I. vi. 4, 1 (pp. 73774, 69-71). _____ ,,,_ 
2. I. vii. 5; IV. viii. 9 (pp. 80, ll57). Cf. J. T. McNeill, "History 
of the Interpretation of the Bible: II. Medieval and Reformation 
Period,u The Interpreter's Bible (New York: Abingdon- Cokesbury, 
1952), I, 125. 
3. Cf •. Corpus Reformatorum, Volumen LIX: Ioannie Calvini, Opera Quae 
Supersunt Omnia, ed. G. Baum et al. (Brunsvigal: c. A. Schwetschke 
et Filium, 1887), XXXI, 92. For other references, cf. McNeill, 
op. cit., pp. 124-25. 
- -~ 
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ical data are important to the exegete, and in addition he must have 
the personal qualities of clearness, brevity, and conscientiousness in 
exhibiting the spirit of the writer. With Calvin, the dialectic of 
Word and Spirit enabled scholarly researches concerning the vJri tten 
words to remain compatible with the authority of God 1 s Word that is 
disclosed therein. 
b. Protestant Scholastic Hermeneutics 
However, this dialectical tension could not long be maintained 
under the historical pressures and travail of the newly-born Reforma-
tion movement. A tentative openness to historical criticism may be de-
tected in Luther's attentiveness to the literal meaning intended by the 
text and Calvin's willingness to consider the historical process in 
the formation of Scripture. But the struggles, controversies, and 
finally wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries soon shut all 
partially-opened theological doors. Further, the qualified acceptance 
of humanistic learning brought with it not only valuable philological 
skills but also a readiness to reintroduce Aristotelian structures into 
theological reflection, as may be detected already in the erudite 
Melanchthon. The theologians and exegetes of the second-generation 
Reformation churches thereby reentered the main stream of analytic 
speculation and controversies dating from the revival of Greek learning 
in the High Middle Ages, thus earning for themselves the title of 
11scholastics.u 
The sovereignty of the Word of God within the text tended to dis-
appear, as Lutheran and Reformed theologians were forced to define more 
11 
explicitly the locus and boundaries of authority. For two opposing 
forces threatened the orthodox Reformation. On the one side, post-
Tridentine Catholicism opportunely could afford to detract from the 
divine authority in Scripture, since the organic Tradition of the Roman 
Church provided a second locus of authority, to be reverted to at 1~11 
in polemical maneuvers. On the other side, the radical Reformation, 
by appealing to the authority of right reason1 or of the Inner Light, 
could adopt a critical or even indifferent attitude toward Scripture. 
But orthodox Protestantism had in principle already rejected the refuge 
of extra-canonical norms and, under the pressures of the sixteenth 
century, could not afford therefore the luxury of a critical view 
toward its only source of authority. In the ensuing controversies, 
Lutheran and Reformed Protestantism could only maintain the battle 
lines already sketched out by its founders, and the sole defense ap-
peared to be in shoring up industriously the available foundations of 
scriptural authority. A few contributions to hermeneutics were made, 
but in general the creative dialectics of the· Reformers were unwit-
tingly abandoned in favor of analysis and precision of definition. 
Thus, the 11Law11 often seemed to engulf the 11 Gospelll too, and the 
"Wordll overshadowed the 11Spirit.ll 
The characteristic Protestant scholastic approach m~ be indicated 
by the qualities attributed to Scripture. The Reformation affirmation 
1. Cf. The Racovian Catechism (trans. T. Rees [London: Longman, Hurst, 
Rees, Orme, and Bro~-Jn, 1818]), Chap. 2, which extols the authority 
of Scripture and then adds that right reason is necessary to nper-
cei ve i~ th certainty the authority of the sacred wri tingsll and to 
understand them (p. 15). 
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of the "sufficiencyn of Scripture, "'that the Scriptures fully and 
perfectly instruct us concerning all things necessary to salvation r" 
(J. Gerhard), 1 was continued and elaborated. The Church may witness 
to Scripture, but cannot thereby be the source of Scripture's author-
i ty. Scripture remains " 1 the judging Judge, or the Judge ad quem (to 
whom there is appeal), and the Church the Judge to be judged, or the 
Judge §!:. quo (from whom there is an appeal). rrr 2 
To the "suffi ciency11 of Scripture, however, 1..ras added its 11per-
spicuity. 11 Since Scripture alone contains what is necessary for sal-
vation, it must be self-evident and comprehensible to every man. 
The Reformation respect for the plain and literal meaning of the text 
was thus retained, but the needed guidance of the Holy Spirit was, in 
effect~ taken increasingly for granted. The distinction between the 
VJri tten words and the Word of God steadily faded, and the prima facie 
clarity of scriptural testimony was flattened into a polemical sword. 
The result was a grovdng assertion of literal inerrancy and the uni-
form authority of all texts. Gerhard wrote of the biblical authors as 
"the instrumental causes of Holy Scripture" whom 
1we properly call the amanuenses of God, the hand of 
Christ, ~ the scribes of the Holy spiri :r,-si"'iCS they 
neither spoke nor wrote by their own human will, but 
1. Quoted by H. Schmid, in his compilation of sixteenth- and seven-
teenth-century authorities, entitled: The Doctrinal Theology of the 
Evangelical Lutheran Church, trans. c. A. Hay and H. E. Jacobs 
(Brd ed., rev.; Minneapolis: Augsburg, [1875] 1961), p. 64. For 
the purposes of this dissertation, this-volume 1·ras a useful source 
of access to the words of the Protestant scholastics themselves. 
2. Quenstedt, quoted by ibid., p. 62. 
-;'1 ... 
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••• were acted upon, led, driven, inspired, and 
governed by the Holy Spirit.' 1 
Scripture was supernaturally communicated to passive pens, which 
made historical influences irrelevant. No longer was Christ the sole 
telos and criterion within Scripture. Holla:zius went so far as to 
claim that 
•there are contained in Scripture historical, chrono-
logical, genealogical, astronomical, natural-histor-
ical, and political matters, which, although the 
knowledge of them is not necess~ to salvation, are 
nevertheless divinely revealed.' 
Thus the inspiration of Scripture was extended to the most minute de-
tails, even to the choice of words by the biblical writers.3 
Other attributes listed by some theologians included the 1tnecessi-
ty11 of Scripture, that is, the need of the Word of God to enter a 
written form; its 11integri ty and perpetu.i ty, 11 in that the text of the 
Bible has been and will be forever preserved entire; and the 11puri ty 
and uncorrupted state of its sources 11 in all the text of its ~opies. 4 
But basically the resort to the attribute of 1!perspicui ty11 and the 
pressures evident in ~ts elaboration provided the impetus for the de-
velopment of the 11biblicism11 of later Protestant scholasticism. Her-
meneutics in this period consisted largely of selecting proof-texts to 
support the positions already exegetically derived by the first gener-
ation of Reformers. Exegesis no longer guided dogmatics, but was 
instead predetermined by dogmatics. Moreover, the texts could be 
1. Ibid.,.pp. 42-43. 2. Ibid.,.' p. 46. 
3. Ibid., pp. 47-48. 4. Ibid~, p. 53. _ ... ~. 
isolated from their sources without the restraining benefit of an 
effective theological criterion within Scripture itself, since all 
Scripture was now ·held to be uniformly inerrant •1 With the sole source 
of orthodox Protestant authority thus defensively circumscribed, there 
tended to be little sympathy with contemporary movements of critical 
.investigation which might erode the one foundation so carefully pre-
served. Yet such false concepts of scriptural perfection actually 
betrayed the ~ scriptura principle and in effect provided a qog-
matized Protestant counterpart to the Roman Catholic framework of 
Church Tradition.2 "The Reformation had broken the leaden sceptre 
of the old Scholasticism, but the Protestant Churches introduced a 
netv Scholasticism -vrhose rod was of iron.u3· 
c. The Challe:q.ge of Historical Criticism 
However, the doctrinaire hermeneutics of Protestant scholasticism 
could not long remain unchallenged. For -vrlth the reintroduction of 
Greek learning into medieval civilization, a renewed critical spirit 
had begun a ferment which inevitably -vrould erode the bonds of confes-
sionalism. In subsequent centuries the Church has tended to evade, 
repress.; or ameliorate the impact of this ferment, while the exponents 
of historical-critical investigation have indulged in their Oim series 
1. "'No error, even· in unimportant matters, no defect of memory, not 
to say untruth, can have any place in all the Holy Scriptures rtt 
(Calovius, ibid., p. 49). 
2. Cf. Ebeling, 11Hermeneutik,n pp. 252-53. 
3. F. 'tv. Farrar, History of Interpretation (London: Macmillan, 1886), 
p. 358. 
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of successive orthodoxies, but it would appear that no satisfactory or 
stable accOIIlllPdation of the Church to the use of historical criticism 
has yet been made. 
Historical criticism originated to a great extent in the era of 
the Renaissance, although it was never fully dormant in preceding 
centuries. In reviving study of the documents of antiquity, the human-
ist scholars developed critical literary methods which were certain to 
have Widespread effects upon biblical i~terpretation. Lorenzo Valla's 
. . 
scholarly exposure, On th~ Donation of Constantine (1440), showed that 
a wealth of information could be extracted by textual criticism from 
. . 
otherwise mute records. The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries saw 
many crit~cal advances: the unreliability of the Hebrew consonantal 
text was demonstrated, and editions of the Greek New Testament now 
raised the problem of textual variants. Within the Church, the tradi-
tion of Renaissance literary criticism was continued by suCh scholars 
as Richard Simon (1678), 11the true father of biblical criticism, n1 
Richard Bentley (1699), who rigorously used the method of internal 
evidence, and Jean Astruc (1779), who first distinguished multiple 
sources within the Pentateuch. 
A second impetus of biblical criticism was more directly initiated 
by the Reformation. Luther and Calvin, as has been noted, were more 
receptive to historical criticism than their successors. Basically 
the sola scriptura principle meant that exegesis was always potential~ 
1. s. Terrien, 11History of the Interpretation of the Bible: III. 
JYiodern Period, 11 The Interpreter 1 s Bible, I, 130. 
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ready to break thrqugh,its confessional servitude. The acknowledgment 
of' the self-attesting pow·er of Scripture w-ould .sooner or .later neces-
sitate a freer penetration of' its implications into methodology as well 
as content.1 Furthermore, the very rigidity of Protestant scholastic 
hermeneutics prepared the way for the reactions of pietism and other 
movements vJhich encouraged careful biblical study. 
A third source, which subsequently to the Reformation proved to be 
the most influential of all, was the philosophic i'eJ;'!Tlent that was both 
reflected and established by Descartes. Here the rationalistic prin-
ciple of' interpretation found a classic formulation through his crite-
rion of' truth as 11 clear and distinct ideasll ·(1637). 2 This sophis-
ticated epistemology went' far beyond the merely··li terary .criticism of' 
the Renaissance and was to determine the battlefields of'.hermeneutics 
Tor the next two penturies. All exegetical results were here to be 
submitted to the arbitration of' a powerful secular philosophy whqse 
epistemic ideal was avo-vredly mathematical precision. The mechanistic 
consequences later drawn, first by rationa.:J.ieyn and then by naturalism, 
. . 
have henceforth continued to burden biblical criticism. Nevertheless 
the Cartesians formulated some valuable exegetical procedures at a 
tiffie ivhen such investigation -vras unwelcome in its rightful locus, the 
Church. 
The creativity in seventeenth-century hermeneutics. therefore 
came largely from secular philosophers. Thomas Hobbes, in his Levia-
1. Ebeling, op. cit., p. 253. 
2. Descartes, Discourse on Method, pt. II; cf. application in pt. IV. 
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than (1651), discussed the Bible as the Word of God only insofar as it 
1:-l'as written by inspired men and as a document never finally contrary to 
reason. But Spinoza 1s famous Tractatus Theologico-Politicus -vras even 
more influential. With restraint and insight, he insisted on the lit-
eral sense of Scripture, as opposed to all allegorizing, and asserted 
the supremacy of natural reason and private judgment in interpreting 
the Bible as the. document of pious living for ordinary. folk. 
Assuming as we do that the.supreme right to interpret 
the Bible belongs to every'one individually, we con-
clude that the standard of interpretation should be 
nothing but the natural light or understanding which 
is common to all, and no~ aQY supernatural light, nor 
any extrinsic authority.I 
The Cartesian influence was strong in Spinoza J s exposition. The 
"clear and distinct idean to be found in Scripture was a rather abstract 
monotheism, and from this general foundation he proceeded n step by step 
to other less general laws.n2 The Reformation procedure of allowing 
the clear portions of Scripture to illuminate the obscure was thereby 
retained, but radically shifted to the foundation of a general theism 
and regimented by the Cartesian n geometric method .n The contentious-
ness of theologians -vms condemned, and the ominous naturalism of sub-
sequent centuries of rationalistic hermeneutics 1:vas disclosed: "I say 
that the proper method of interpreting Scripture does not differ from 
the proper method of interpreting nature, but agrees with it in almost 
every particular .n3 Theology was relegated to the realm of piety and 
1. Tractatus Theologico-Politicus (London: T.rftbner, [1670] 1862), 
p. 16&; cf. pp. 324-53. 
. . 
2. Ibid., pp. 149-50; cf. p. 161. 3. Ibid., pp. 143-44. 
18 
obedience~ lithe sphere of reason being truth and lmovr1edge.n1 Never-
-· .theless, exegesis was given wholesome practical guidance through 
Spinoza's emphases on investigation of the properties and us~ges of 
the Hebre1v language, on topical comparisons of phrases and meanings, 
and examination of the historical circumstances both of the biblical 
authors and o.f._the transmission df the text. 2 
. The principles of Spinoza and others helped to clear away some of 
the ~octrinaire entanglements obscuring Scripture and also confirmed 
essential procedures of literary analysis. But rationalism did little 
to fo~.;rard the actual historical understanding of Scripture and its 
implications. It was not until the nineteenth and twentieth centuries 
that historical processes ~~sitatingly and unevenly began tq be distin-
. . . 
guished from processes of nature. Since the days of Greek Eleaticism, 
history had been viewed as the realm of ephemeral· appearances which is 
. 
only to _be brushed aside in man,' s struggle to glimpse eternal veri ties. 
This ancient attitude was not affected by the scientific and philosoph-
ical revolutions of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries,· and indeed 
was reinforced in the eighteenth-century Enlighte~ent. For instance, 
the disrespect for history in French mechanistic philosophy of that 
era is reflected in d 1.Alembert 1s wish that 111 all record whatever of 
past events could be blotted o~t. ,u3. The English deists -viere not so 
anti-clerical, but used the tllight of reason11 to -reinterpret ·histor-
l. Ibid.' p. 264. 2. Ibid., pp. 145-48. 
3. Quoted by A. Richardson, The·Bible fn the Age of Science (Phil-
adelphia: Westminster, 1961), pp. 39-40. 
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ical revelation in Christ as mere instruction in universal truths. The 
characteristic ideal of 11nature11 which reflects the trans-historical 
realm of the eternal is seen in the title of Matthew Tindal's influ-
ential book, Christianity as Old as the Creation, or the Gospel a 
Republication of the Religion of Nature (1730). In such an atmosphere, 
exegesis could only be as mechanical and predetermined as under the 
most doctrinaire of the scholastics. 
The effect of rationalism in retarding the development of histor-
ical criticism during the Enlightenment is clearly seen in G. E. Less-
ing. He sought to distinguish Christianity from the Bible, so that 
the former could be more easily stated in universal, deistic terms. 
For such weighty matters as eternal salvation must not be made to 
depend upon the slender thread of apostolic testimony. 
Wenn keine historische Wahrhei t demonstrieret 1-verden 
kann, so kann auch Nichts durch historisChe Wahrheiten 
demonstrieret werd~. Das ist: zufHllige Geschichts-
wahrheiten kBnnen der Beweis von nothwendigen Vernunfts-
wahrhei ten nie werd9rl.l -
This succinctly stated the Greek bifurcation of the historical and the 
eternal, disclosing a distrust of the former which has continued to 
remain influential until the present century. 
Within the Church, however, biblical criticism was also develop-
ing to some degree, although largely ignoring the presence of natural-
istic presuppositions in the methods borrowed from Cartesian rational-
ism. The first step in this development was the reaction to Prates-
1. G. E. Lessing, 1'IIeber den Beweis des Geistes und der Kraft" (1777), 
Werke, ed. H. Kurz (Leipzig: Verlag des Bibliographischen Insti-
tuts, n.d.), V, 253. 
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tant scholastic biblicism, by criticism which still remained w.i thin 
the context of the Church; .Arminius and Calix.tus were examples. The 
growing movement of pietism in the late seven-t.eenth century did much 
to liberalize exegesis and encourage biblical investigation, although 
many doctrinaire elements remained. Names such as J. A. Bengel and 
Johann Semler recall the fact that in the eighteenth century Christian 
scholarship was able to combine a conservative exegesis with the new 
spirit of criticism, although the results were of uneven quality. 
An indication of the development of historical perspective in her-
meneutics was the rise of the concept of 11biblical theology. 11 The term 
-
was first used by M. K. Haymann in bis Biblische Theologie (1708) and, 
more clearly, by Busching in 1757.1 Bengal and other pietists wanted a 
theology more biblical in orientation. Finally the concept 1-ras defined 
in terms of historical method by J. P. Gabler, De justo discrimine 
biblicae et dogmaticae (1787). Thus, biblical theology became a dis-
tinct discipline in proportion to the contrast felt between the doc-
trines of the Church and the concepts of the biblical authors them-
selves, and this distinction in turn implied the impetus toward a bis-
torical criticism in grasping a past era in its own terms. With this 
development, the right of historical criticism to exist at least as an 
aid to interpretation was no longer seriously questioned by the main 
stream of Protestantism. 
1. Cf. C. T. Craig·, "Biblical Theology and the Rise of Historicism," 
JBL, LX:II (1943), 281. Cf • .A. N. Wilder, 11New Testament Theology 
in Transit:i.on, 11 The Stud o.f the Bible Toda and Tomorrow,_ ed. 
H. R. Willoughpy Chicago~ University of Chicago Press, 1947), 
pp. 419-21. 
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2.- The Second Stage: The Triumph of Historicism 
a. The Alliance of Theology and Historical Criticism 
The nineteenth century saw a development far beyond a mere accept-
ance of historical criticism as one among several servants of exegesis. 
In fact, the radical scope of the challenge of historical methods 
became apparent as soon as a major alliance between European Protes-
tantism and the new criticism had been acclaimed. The new interest in 
history had already arisen in romanticism, which began to free the 
historical from its Grecian identification'with the ephemeral, although 
not from its association with metaphysical naturalism. It was both the 
genius and the weakness of nineteenth-century theology that it grasped 
the importance of this innovation and staked its own future upon a 
partnership with historical criticism. Tbis revolution~ alliance 
"makes the nineteenth century no less important in the history of 
Christian thought than the fourth, the thirteenth or the sixteenth. n1 
The dominant figure of this innovation was Friedrich Scbleiermach-
er. The situation is graphically appraised by Alan Richardson, who 
endorses F. Lichtenberger's statement that 
1 Schleiermacher, ~r.ith that intuiti~~ which genius 
gives, understandsthe revolution which this renova-
tion of science will necessarily effect in theology. 
Criticism [as practised by the rationalists] has been 
till now the enemy of Christianity; it has talc en 
pleasure in unveiling her weaknesses, in sneering at 
her miracles and her dogmas; but in the future it 
l. Richardson, op. cit., p. 79. Similar judgments are made by Ebeling 
("Hermeneutik, 11 p. 2:53) a.TJ.d J. L. Mays (Ex:egesis as a Theological 
Discipline [Richmond: Union Theological Seminary, 1960], p. 11). 
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will ~e the guardian of the sanctuary, the most 1 faithful and the most valiant auxiliary of the faith. 1 
Actually, Schleiermacher vras not receptive to the dynamic contin-
gencies of a truly historical perspective, but was so diligent in 
fitting all data into the framework of his dialectics that Schweitzer 
classified him as one of the last rationalists. 2 Nevertheless, he 
negotiated the momentous alliance of theology and general criticism 
which later was to issue in more historical forms. For by restricting 
theology to the analysis of the human experience and reflection of the 
divine, he implicitly gave all empirical research (together with its 
accumulated presuppositions) a claim to sit in judgment upon biblical 
interpretation. The religious self-consciousness of man was said to 
be the :origin of all theological statements, and 11revelationll could 
only be collectively indicated as that unique event which initiated a 
religious communit.y.3 Christ was the supreme embodiment of God-con-
sciousness, and the Holy Spirit motivated the biblical writers to 
record this instance for future edification, that the new ~tream of 
religious awareness might be realized and.fulfilled throughout the 
human race. Since even theology 'tvas restricted to this transcendental, 
anthropocentric realm, biblical criticism was not only freely encour-
1. Richardson, op. cit., p. 79. 
2. A. Schweitzer, The Quest of the Historical Jesus, trans. W. Mont-
gomery (New York: Macmillan, [1910] 1959), pp. ~2-67. 
3. F. Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith; trans. of 2nd German edi-
tion, ed. H. R. Mackintosh and J. S. Stewart (Edinburgh: T. & T. 
Clark, 1928), pp. 81, 47-52. 
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aged but destined to become of~the highest influence.l 
Schleier.macher had the additional distinction of raising hermeneu-
tics from merely a literary technique to a philosophic discipline. 
Hermeneutics from that time forth would deal with the entire problem 
. ' 
of human understanding, for it is the Kunstlehre des Verstehens, the 
11art of correctly understanding the speech of another, 112 which arises 
- . 
from the very conditions and structures of human comprehension. Two 
methods are to be used in exegesis. First, a thorough study of the 
historical-grammatical meaning of the text and its background must be 
made. Secondly (and this was Schleier.macher 1s contribution)~ the 
"psychological method11 must be used, the "art" of going beyond the 
technical rules to reproduce intuitively the inner consciousness of 
. the original writer, 11 1 to understand the text just as well as and then 
better than the author himself understood it.rn3 For both these tasks, 
hermeneutics has no special character just because it is dealing with 
sacred texts, for the methods are the same for all literature as 
grasped by the reader 1 s mind. 
b. Historical Skepticism 
It was the hope of the nineteenth century that Protestant theology 
might be immeasurably enriched by embracing historical criticism as 
1. of. ibid., pp. 6o5-6o6. 
2. R. R. Niebuhr, nschleiermacher on Language and Feeling, 11 ThToday, 
XVII (196o), 156; cf. the following pages of this article, and 
also Ebeling, op. cit., p. 244. 
3. Quoted by Niebuhr, ~· cit., pp. 156-5?. 
applied to Scripture. Indeed it was; However, there were already 
signs that such methods might also have an explosive effect upon theol-
ogy, that historical criticism could erode away the very foundations of 
traditional belief. As a consequence, the aJ.liance soon took on more 
the appearance of an uneasy balance of power, with neither side fully 
aware of what essentials· it was .abandoning. 
The unsettling effects of the new historically-oriented criticism 
were first to be noted in the posthumously published fragments from 
Hermann S~uel Reimarus, a deistic historian who wrote the first crit-
ical "life of Jesus, 11 and who sharply outlined the apocalyptic setting 
of the gospel sources. However, the product of such research certainly 
did not correspond to the domesticated results which the nineteenth 
century hoped for in associating theology with historical criticism, 
and Reimarus attracted little attention. 
A great storm of controversy, however, was raised by David Fried-
rich Strauss in the first edition of his Leben Jesu (1835). He was the 
first to grasp the extent to which mythological presentation of reli-
gious ideas in historical garb has infiltrated the New Testament. He 
thus challenged the common assumption of both the orthodox and the 
rationalists that, regardless of the dispute over the extent of the 
supernatural in the gospel narratives, a historical conception of 
Jesus was somehow available through the text. As· a convinced Hegeli-
an, Strauss went beyond the preliminary states of orthodoxy versus 
rationalism, or supernatural textual inspiration versus naturalistic 
causation, to the 11 synthesis11 of his mythological interpretation. The 
creative activity of legend is to be seen ~n the gospel texts, partie-
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ularly in miracles, developing multiple narratives from perhaps one 
healing by Jesus. The New Testament was written down at a relatively 
late date, so mytho-poetic influences from Old Testament motif's had 
opportunity to operate. Such a radical re-evaluation of the nature of 
Scripture as an object of historical research brought great calumny 
upon Strauss and his work, as lithe reductio ad 'horribile of current 
scepticism.n1 Actually_, Strau~s could afford to be quite skeptical 
concerning the records of a historical revelation, since Hegelian 
dialectic taught him that no idea is ever perfectly realized in his-
tory, but rather must merely enter the developing stream of mankind's 
consciousness. 
Bruno Bauer continued the work of Strauss, using the literary 
method rather than the historical. Current criticism of the Fourth 
Gospel was used to show that a gospel as such, even the earliest, may 
have a purely literary origin. The four gospels show a literary devel-
opment, but what evidence is there of historic factuality behind the 
original source? Bauer's conclusion increasingly was that the Gospel 
of Mark v.ras the 11reflection11 of a single author, not a vague "myth" 
compiled by both fact and tradition, as Strauss had maintained. 
Ghristiani ty at its source was a 1i terary invention. By 1850) Bauer 
even claimed that the historical Jesus had never existed. 
The effect of such skepticism vms not only to create unrest con-
1. Farrar, History of Interpretation, p. 413. In light of the modern 
controversies concerning mythology in Scripture, it is ironic 
that Farrar, writing in 1885, rejoiced that Strauss 1 work was 
already nearly forgotten (p. 416)! 
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cerning the alliance of theology with historical criticism, but to 
display openly the logical development of historical-critical methods 
if left unchecked by any theological considerations. A major dilemma 
became evident: if theology arbitrarily set limits upon historical 
criticism, the latter would be reduced to insincere subservience, while 
if no such limits vrere set, critical methods i-muld undermine the his-
torical revelation to which the Scriptures attest. The nineteenth 
century evaded this dilemma by retreating to various arbitrary pre-
suppositions concerning the historical revelation. The ttv-entieth cen-
tur,r has been forced at least to recognize this· dilemma, although her-
meneutics has as yet found no generally accepted and stable solution. 
c. The Quest of the Historical Jesus 
Albert Schweitzer's famous book showed how the nineteenth-century 
evasions of the problems raised by historical criticism, as dramatical-
ly exemplified by the skeptics, are most flagrantly to be seen in the 
so-called lfquest of the .historical Jesus. 111 Initiated by the Enlight-
enment 1s effort to escape the bonds of dogma as well as by the new in-
terest in history, this quest now, in reacting against Strauss, dis-
closed the extent to which historical studies were both equivocally 
received and allowed to remain under the influence of the physical 
sciences or of idealistic presuppositions. 
C. H. Weiss (1838), the originator of the momentous "Marean hy-
1. Or more properly, lithe quest of the historian's Jesus," i.e., ~ ""-""' 
Jesus insofar as scientific historical methods can portray him. 
Cf. J. M. Robinson, A New Quest of the Historical Jesus (Naper-
ville, Ill.: Allenson, 1959), p. 31. 
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pothesis," spiritualized the eschatology of the gospels (which the 
earlier skeptics had at least recognized), in a misguided effort to 
defend the 11originality11 of Jesus. This opened the way for a whole 
host of "liber?-111 lives of Jesus in the latter part of the nineteenth 
. 
century, beginning with Ernest Renan (1863) and his noble Jesus of 
idyllic Galilee. Sentimentality often replaced attention to even the 
fruitful results of historical scholarship then available. A 11psychol-
ogizing 11 school modernized the gospel narratives by inserting an 
abundance of fictitious information, all in the attempt to explain 
Jesus by 11natural11 psychology. The final result of this endeavor was 
that liberalism's naturalistic explanation of J~sus collapsed of its 
o1m accumulated 't.veight. 
This collapse was confirmed by the superior historical scholar-
ship of the skeptical and the eschatological schools of New Testament 
criticism. Both saw the subjectivism involved in treating Scripture 
as an ordinary resource for a biography of Jesus. Johann Weiss (1900) 
and Albert Schvreitzer (1901) rediscovered the doctrinal influence of 
a permeating eschatology in the gospels. William Wrede (1901) con-
tinued the sk~pticism of Bruno Bauer, by seeing the Marean IIMessianic 
secret11 as a definite literary device. He· realized more fully than 
Schweitzer the inevitable subjectivity within any historical criti-
1 
cism. Consequently, for all scholarly purposes, the nquest of the 
1. Schweitzer rightly claims that his eschatological view compels 
11modern theology, which is so much preoccupied with history, to 
reveal what is its own as its own. Eschatology makes it impossible 
to at·liri bute modern ideas to Jesus m d then by way of 'New Testa-
ment Theology' take them back from Him as a loan" (Schweitzer, op. 
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historical Jesus 11 was then suspended, because the gospel sources do 
not permit normal biographical research. 
d. Historical Criticism and Historicism 
Although the specifically biographical research proved fruitless, 
general historical criticism did find creative means of enriching her-
meneutics. By the end of the nineteenth century, much enduring infor-
mation concerning the environmental influences on the biblical writings 
- -
had been collected. This was the great era of biblical commentaries, 
grannnars, and dictionarll:!s. New meaning could now be seen in many 
formerly obscure texts. As valuable as these researches 't-Jere, however, 
they were not able to resolve the basic dilemma of the proper relation-
ship of theology and historical studies. Indeed, the final recognition 
of the problem of historicism was made all the more inevitable by what 
mature biblical criticism chose to emphasize and what to neglect. 
One prominent emphasis in late nineteenth-century criticism was 
the motif of 11development." The Hegelians, as illustrated by the 
Tfibingen school of F. c. Baur and D. F. Strauss, early pointed out 
(although in stereotyped form) the cumulative process of historical 
phenomena. In Old Testament criticism, the documentary theory of the 
Hexateuch's compo~ition was impressively established by Karl Graf 
(1866) and Julius Wellhausen (1885). According to the influential 
cit., p. 251). ~Trede's penetrating judgment, however, is even more 
noteworthy: urrt finally comes to this, that each critic retains 
whatever portion of the traditional sayings can be fitted into his 
construction of the facts and his conception of historical·possi-
bility and rejects the rest 111 (quoted by Schweitzer, ~., p. 333). 
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Wellhausen school, the pinnacle of Old Testament religion was the 
purified ethical monotheism of the Exile, which was reached only after 
centuries of Israel's struggle idth its animistic past. By this evo-
lutionary schema uvellhausen gave a unity to the Old Testament writings, 
as well as·expression to their cultural contact ruth other Near-Eastern 
religions. Such contributions should not be minimized; nevertheless, 
the concept of "evolution11 (not to mention many forms of accompanying 
religious socia.i optimismi) is far less compatible with the scriptural 
narratives than with the popularized science of the late nineteenth 
century. The influence of the physical sciences upon the historical 
is once more to be noted here • 
.A second prominent idea was that of llcontinuity.n The continuity 
of all phenomena is a necessary postulate for natural science, which 
depends upon causal inferences and repeatable occurrences, but it is 
questionable to what extent it actually is feasible in dealing with his-
torical events, not to mention historical revelation. That biblical 
critics in the nineteenth century, from Strauss to Schweitzer, were al-
most unanimous in agreeing that historical causation must be viewed as 
invariably non-supernatural and therefore as 1d thin the fixed causal 
nexus of 11natural11 f'orces, is to be seen from the spiritualized, Ubi-
formly unscriptural explanations usually offered concerning Christts 
1. Cf. S. F. Driver, The Book of Genesis (2nd ed.; London: Metheun, 
1904), p. 56: 11 Progress: gradual advance from lower to higher, from 
the less perfect to the more perfect, is the law which is stamped 
upon the entire range of organic nature, as 1vell as upon the his-
tory of the civilization and education of the human race." 
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resurrection.1 No disruptions must be admitted into the orderly realm 
of nature, and therefore of history. 
The theme of II continui ty11 is best exemplified in the religions-
geschichtliche Schule. Hermapn Gunkel, who corrected some of the 
imbalance of Wellhausen's literary method and evolutionary idealism, 
insisted that 
it is simply impossible for an historian to permit 
fundamental except~ons within the entire course of 
history. He cannot dissect the history of religion 
into a part that is revealed and a part that is of 
man. Were it really the case that sometimes, and no 
one can say how often, the continuity of Nature is 
suspended and replaced by something else, there 
would be an end to all science. 2 
With all historical events "leveled off, n so to speak, to the compre-
hension of continuities by scientific reason, revelation could.~e bnly 
spoken of in an idealized sense as something potential in all of his-
tory.3 The phenomenological method, characteristic of the nineteenth 
centur.r since Schleiermacher, was carried to its fullest extent by the 
history-of-religions school in its effort to shed light upon the en-
vironment and associations of scriptural-narration and concepts. For 
this purpose, there may be a defined utility to the postulate that 
1. Cf. R. R. Niebuhr's very significant book, Resurrection aild Histor-
ical Reason (New York: Scribner 1s, 1957) 3 especially Chap. 1. 
2. H. Gunkel, "The 1Historical Movement' in the Study of Religion3 " 
ElcpT, XXXVIII (1926-27), 536. 
3. 1~erever a heart has been uplifted to God, however inadequate the 
forms, in Israel or anywhere else in the world3 God has never been 
far off" (i~id.). 
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"all religions constitute an essential unit, 111 but if it is left un-
supplemented the result is that the scriptural records as well as a 
historical revelation remain basically cultural phenomena. 
The iron grip which the motif of ll_continuityll has held upon his-
torical criticism is most vigorously illustrated by Ernst Troeltsch. 
The great scholar of the religionsgeschichtliche Schule attempted to 
burst the bonds of historicism by making a distinction bett.reen natural 
and historical causation: 
The causality of natural science implies the absolutely 
necessary principle that events are bound together by a 
changeless, all-pervading, and, in all particular cases, 
identical law of reciprocity •••• Historical causation 
is something entirely different, bei~ almost exclusively 
a matter of psychological motivation. 
Historical science deals with the qualitative, the contingent, and even 
with incalculable elements. This would appear to be a most promising 
distinction. However, Troeltsch was limited by nineteenth-century 
idealism, for he distinguished strictly between llprinciple11 and 11per-
son," between the religious idea of Christianity and its illustrative 
historical facts and symbols. Thus he c~uld abandon theology itself 
to historical criticism, since Christianity's cultic principle was 
above empirical history. Furthermore, Troeltsch -vras after all greatly 
influen9ed by the regularities of physical science in his historical 
method: 
1. :O:id., p. 535. 
2'. E. Troeltsch, '"Historiography, n Ency:cl_o_pedia of Religion· and· 
Ethics, ed. J. Hastings (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1914), VI, 719. 
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Die Analogie des vor unseren Augen Geschehenden und in uns· 
sich Begebenden ist der Schl~ssel zur I~itik. T~uschungen, 
Verschiebungen, My-thenbildu.b.ge_n, Betrug, Parteisucht, die 
wir vor unseren Augen sehen, sind die.Mittel derartiges 
auch in- dem liberlief~rten zu erkennen. Die tTherein-
stimmiing mit normalen, gewBhnlichen oder doch mehrfach 
bezeugten Vo~gangsweisen und Zustfulden, wie vdr sie 
kennen, ist das Kennzeichen der Wahrscheinlichkeit fUr 
die ltorgfulge, die die Kritik als Wirklich geschehen 
anerkennen oder ilbrig lassen kann. Die 'Beobachtung von 
Analogien z1ilschen gleichartigen Vorgfulgen der Vergangen-
heit gibt die MBglichkeit, ihnen Wabrscheinlichkeit 
zuzuschreiben und das Unbekanftte des einen aus dem Be-
kannten des anderen zu deuten. Diese Allmacht der 
Analogie schliesst aber die prinzifielle Gleichartigkeit 
alles historisChen Geschehens ein: . 
H. R. Mackintosh commented on such anti-supernaturalistic relativism, 
saying that God's self-revelation 11 can nq more be put in a universe 
like this than lightning in a match-box.n 2 
Finally, a third ideal of criticism in the late nineteenth centu-
ry was a detachment of the scholar from his material, an 11 objectivity." 
Theological liberalism had always had a commendable passion for the 
unity of-all truth,3 and there was a great attraction in the possi-
bility that the faith might be investigated by the same empirical meth-
ads used to such gr~t advantage by the natural sciences. However, the 
1. E. Troeltsch, Gesammelte Scbriften (2nd ed.; Tftbingen: J. c. B. 
Mohr, 1922), II, 732. -
2. H. R. Mackintosh, "Does the Historical Study of Religion Yield a 
Dogmatic Theology?!} The American Journal of Theology, XIII (1909), 
511. ·-
3. F. J. A •. Hart (The lvay, the Truth, the Life: The Hulsean Lectures 
for 1871. [Cambridge; Macmillan, 1893], p. 85) reflects this key-
note: nc~ist 1 s wordi,: 1I am the Truth,' ••• marks every truth 
which seems alien to Cb+ist as a sign that the time is come for a 
better knowledge of Chr.ist, since no truth can be alien to him vJho 
is the Trut):l. u 
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concentration given exclusively to the phenomenological realm by 
Schleiermacher and by Ritschl 1s Kantian revival i-Jas noi-r carried to an 
unforeseen extreme within the discipline of biblical criticism: a theo-
logical commitment appeared to be a hindrance to unbiased scholarship. 
In the sciences, empirical procedure appeared to require a disciplined 
detachment of the observer from his data. So the word ttrevelationll al-
most disappeared from theological vocabulary, and the word llreligion,n 
as empirically investigable, increasingly took its place. In short, it 
seemed that historical criticism must free itself from theology in or-
der to obtain more scientifically objective results. Typ~l:cal of this 
atmosphere of detached "objectivity11 was the action of Wellhausen in 
1882 in transferring from the theological to the philosophical faculty 
at Griefswald in order to be freed from theological responsibility in 
pursuing dispassionate biblical research.1 Theology, which at the 
beginning of the nineteenth century deigned to enrich itself by an 
alliance with historical criticism, ended that same century. in some 
danger of being declared hermeneutically irrelevant and displaced with-
in biblical studies by an analytic empirical criticism. 
B. The Modern Predicament of Hermeneutics 
1. Theology versus History 
The background for the twentieth-century crisis in hermeneutics 
1. Cf. J. D. Smart, The Interpretation of Scripture (Philadelphia: 
~iestminster, 1961), p. 4o. 
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thus is formed by the still unresolved problem of the proper relation-
ship between theological method and historical criticism. 
a. The Bifurcation 2£ Faith ~ Gri ticism 
When the inherent instability of the nineteenth-century synthesis 
was recognized, the only two alternatives apparent were to yield in-
creasingly to the pressing claims of a naturalistic historical method, 
or to stratify history and theology into complementary but isolated 
realms corresponding respectively to the Kantian critiques of pure and 
- ..._ . " 
practical reason. Thus, Troeltsch and Schweitzer opened the gates of 
the t"t-ventieth century in hermeneutics. 11Troeltschian11 historicism 
reduced theology to a cultic phenomenon subject to the relativities 
of a pervasive historical method that was itself dominated by natu-
z .. .. , 
ralistic presuppositions. This option, however, reached its logical 
conclusion in Troeltsch and the history-of-religions movement and 
subsequently has diminished in influence. The other alternative was 
the security seemingly afforded by an explicit bifurcation of theol-
. . 
ogy and historical criticism. This separation, which has come to 
dominate modern hermeneutics, may be noted clearly in Schweitzer, who 
concluded his famous work by advocating an idealistic theology far 
different from what he admittedly found in the eschatologically ex-
pectant Jesus, and who ope~ stated: 
It is not Jesus as historically known, but Jesus as 
spiritually arisen within men, 'who is significant for 
our time and can help it •••• The abiding and eternal 
in Jesus is absolutely independent of historical know-
ledge and can only be understood by contact with His 
spirit i-J"hich is still at work in the world. In propor-
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tion as we have the Spirit of Jesus -vre have the true 
knowledge of Jesus.l 
In either alternative, relatively free rein was given to a nat-
uralistic historical criticism 1-rhich disavowed, at least in effect, 
theological responsibilities. The result was that biblical criticism 
became the exclusive domain of the scholars, 2 while theological expo-
sition was relegated to the preachers (a bifurcation still obvious in 
the very format of ~e Interpreter•s Bible). Specialized disciplines 
fragmented Scripture into the object of archaeology, philology, econom-
ic history, cultic ~alysis, and many other interests. The Old Testa-
ment was separated from the New, the prophets from the priests, Jesus 
from Paul, at the sacrifice 'of any theological unity of perspective. 
Commentaries were erudite~ but abstract and largely irrelevant to all 
but fellow scholars. Reconstruction of a distant era seemed more im-
portant than letting Scripture speak its own judgment on the present 
age. Moreover, as the reconstructions emerged into sharper focus, the 
strange world of Israel and the early Church seemed farther and fa+ther 
removed from the modern world. It is thus understandable that some 
conservative groups within the Church wished to resist historical 
scholarship. But such opposition was only a futile delaying action, 
and twentieth-century Protestantism was confronted with the exacting 
1. Schweitzer, The Quest of the Historical Jesus, p. 401 (italics 
are added by the present -writer) • 
2. Cf. J. D. Wood, The Interpretation of the Bible (London: Duckworth, 
1958), pp. 143-48; the title page states that this book is an 11un-
corrected proof •11 Cf. also J. D. Smart, "Beyond Historical Inter-
pretation, u New Directions in .Biblical Thought, ed. M. E. Marty 
(New Yor~:.Association Press, 1960), pp. 113-24. 
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task of developing a hermeneutic that might allow to both theology and 
historical criticism their proper functions. 
b. The Reaction of Zvr.ischen den Zei ten 
The bifurcation of theological and historical methods ·that flour-
ished at the turn of the century was no solution, but only an ossifi-
cation of the problem. A~eaction to the fragmentation of biblical 
studies was thus already fermenting. One of the roots of the twentieth-
century r·eaction to historicism is to be traced into the preceding cen-
tury, to the lonely figure of S~ren IG.erkegaard.1 Kierkegaard gained 
a contemporary reputation of anti-clericalism and agnosticism, but actu-
ally he had deeply ~heological interests. He never attacked the doc-
trine as such of the Church (indeed, he approved it), but caustically 
assailed the superficial appropriation and communication of it to a · 
supposedly Christian society. He announced the locus of theological 
interpretation as being solely between the past revelation and the 
present preaching of the Church, and the theological task is to aliow 
the dialectics of the former to guide the latter. The preacher or 
interpreter must not only present the paradoxical content of the un-
fathomable appearance' of God 1dthin history, but must bring the paradox 
·into his very method of communication so that the hearer himself is 
placed in the situation of a decision of faith. 
1. Of. the many esseys 't>Jri tten about Kierkegaard by H. Diem, most 
notably here IIIG.erkegaards Hinterlassenschaft ·an die Theologie, tt 
Antwort (Zollikon-Ztlrich: Evangelischer Verlag, 1956), pp. 472-89, 
and the prize-winning book Die Existenzdialektik von SBren IG.erke-
gaard (Zollikon-Ztlrich: Evangelischer Verlag, 1950). 
3.7 
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The historical questions of how a past event can have significance 
for faith or can overcome the temporal gap and become contemporaneous 
w.i th a modern hearer were given a single answer by Kierkegaard: the 
dialectical presentation must place man in such a position of skandalon 
before the Christian message that he must decide petween offense and 
faith, and in this very process become a contemporary·of the original 
~~tness. Historical criticism was thus in effect largely circumvented, 
insofar as it fails to clarify the sole need for a leap of faith in the 
present moment. Yet the historical nature itself of the revelation was 
not igncr ed, for the historical contingency of the Incarnation, which 
then determines the paradoxical means of its communication, cannot be 
undialectically dissolved in a mere analysis of the structure cf human 
existence. In brief, the task of the ChurCh should be to present the 
message of God's appearance within time in such a manner that the very 
existence of its hearers is confronted and challenged to become an ex-
istence in faith. 
Such existential insights were congenial to those of another 
development in the early twentieth century, the formgeschichtliche 
Schule, a school of refined historical criticism which found the basic 
influence on the present biblical texts to be the pre-literary period 
of oral transmission. The fundamental character of the New Testament 
in particular was seen to be not in historical narrative or proposi-
tional statement, but in bearing itltness and the missionary preaching 
(the 11kerygma11 ). The present texts were selected, compiled, and organ-
ized by the early Church for this very purpose. The character and 
usages of the early Church then are the primary objects attainable 
by study of the texts; all else can only be indirectly estimated. 
Proclamation, therefore, is the original purpose and continuing goal 
of all scriptural documents, and the transmission of this proclamation 
is the object of form-critical research. 
Shortly after lvorld War I, these two elements were incorporated 
by a new theolog~cal generation in the vigorous movement labeled var-
iously as llcrisistheology11 or ttdialectical theoiogy. 11 Its emphasis 
was upon faithful obedience to the Word of God, as heard through Scrip-
ture and 'Within the context of the Church. Dogmatics and biblical 
interpretation were rescued from their mutual 1.splat1'o11 and the pres-
sures of a falsely c~nceived 11 objectivity, 11 and were brought into a 
unity through the theological or kerygmatic intention detected within 
Scripture itself. The first impact of this new approach was the cun-
1 
troversy aroused by Karl Barth's R8merbrief, the first edition ap-
pearing in 1918. Supporters as well as opponerrGs hurried to the new 
battle lines. In the new-movement, which found printed expression in 
the periodical Zwischen den Zeiten (1923-33), the early nineteenth-
century ;!;approchement of theology and criticism gave some pr0mise 
o:f being renewed in a new form, under the combined stimuli of Kierke-
gaard and Form-criticism, thereby. transcending the dilemma brought on 
by historicism. Indeed, this movement has set the boundaries and 
defined the keynotes for the twentieth-century discussion in herme-
neutics. However, the new synthesis itself did not last, but soon 1-vas 
1. The istle of the Romans, trans. E. c. Hoskyns (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1933 • 
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divided into a new generation of factions, as the disagreements between 
the followers of Barth and those of Rudolf Bultmann and Friedrich 
Gogarten became increasingly apparent.1 
2. Dogmatics versus Exegesis 
The context of the ~~entieth-century predicament in hermeneutics 
continues to be Characterized by the unreconciled opposition of theol-
ogy and history, that is, of traditional theologic~ methods and the 
. . 
pressing exegetical challenge presented by the historical method. But 
the foreground of the present situation is occupied by two alternative 
responses to the problem of historical criticism, namely dogmatic 
theology and existentialist exegesis, which have arisen since the 
decline of the Zwischen den Zei ten movement. Indeed, these two schools 
of thought are the products of two factions incipient within the for-
mer ZwisChen den Zeiten associates. Since that time, exegesis has 
sought a stable basis by turning increasingly to an existentialist 
(and thereby anti-doctrinal) orientation, while do grnatic.s has continued 
to foreshorten the rigpr of the exegetical task and has added a SUsPi-
cion of the latter 1s reliance on existentialism. Of course, existential-
ist exegesis claims to be preserving the true concerns of exegesis, and 
dogmatic·theology asserts-its protection of the legitimate function of 
. . 
theology. But neither alternative has been able to reconcile its 
1. F. Gogarten (!!Karl Earths Dogrnatik, 11 Thlt, N. F., I [1928], 80) 
and K. Barth (11Abschied, 11 ZdZ, XI [1933], 537) both cite the appar-
ently w.Tidespread epigram that in. the late 1920 1 s the leaders qf 
dialectical theology were as disunited as the political generals 
of China at that time. 
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concerns with the proper function of the other. Thus, theology and 
exegesis seem as widely separated now as they did at the turn of the 
century. 
One point common to both of these responses is the conscious 
rejection of 11 Troeltschian11 historicism, but they have been ·unable to 
avoid the other horn of that dilennna, the persisting nschweitzerian" 
bifurcation of history and theology, which remains the underlying 
equivocation that constitutes a basic instab11ity in the entire her-
meneutical scene. Within the frame'Work of existentialist exegesis, 
the embarrassments of radical criticism are deflected and turned into 
profit by allowing all the more emphasis to fall upon the indispensa-
bility of a fundament~l decision of faith~ upon accepting a new self-
understanding and an openness to the future. The response of dogmatic 
. -
theology, on the other hand, has been to restrict or evade in some 
manner the scope of historical criticism, so that an inner citadel of 
theological truth may at all costs be preserved. These t1-vo responses 
thus not only continue the basic segregation of theology and history, 
but have compounded the division by themselves hardening into two mu-
tually exclusive responses to this prior bifurcation. 
A dangerous isolation thus exists between these two disciplines, 
leading to the suspicion of 1-1hether theologian and exegete may be 
1 
reading two quite different New Testaments. Furthermore, the creative 
1. Cf. W. Ja:nnasch, 11 Karl Barth und die praktische Theologie," TbL:Z, 
LXXVI (1951), 5. Also, E. Iilisemann, ttProbleme der neutestaiiieiit-
lichen Arbeit in Deutschland, 11 Die Freiheit des Evangeliums und.· die 
Ordnung-der Gesellschaft (Beitr~ge zur evangelischen Theologie, 
Vol. rl, ed. E. Wolf; Mtlnchen: Kaiser Verlag, 1952), p. 138. 
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discussion between the two, ifhich prevailed during the early part of 
the Zwischen den Zeiten decade, has declined until now there is little 
communication apart from occasional polemical broadsides. The danger 
is apparent that both existentialist exegesis and dogmatic theology 
may forfeit the respect of the emerging generation of the Church, as 
well as introduce a hopelessly biased motive into current biblical 
interpretation. 
In this antagonistic situation, the figure of Hermann Diem repre-
sents an attempt to renew at least a creative dialogue once more be-
tween exegesis and theology. Diem is fully aware of the difficulties 
of the task and warns against the over-optimistic view that a 11media-
tionll or via media may be possible between the schools of Barthian and 
Bult~an thought.1 But he is convinced that within the context of 
the basic presuppositions of the previous Zwischen den Zeiten movement, 
which formerly united the pr~sent chief antagonists, a new basis for 
. . . 
cooperation and mutual responsibility can b~ elicited. In search of 
this perspective, then, the positions of existentialist exegesis and 
dogmatic theology, together ivith Diem's response to each, may be exam-
ined. 
1. H. m..em, -nvorwort,n Theologie als kirchliche Wissenschaft, Band II: 
Dogmatik, Thr ~veg zwischen Historismus ·und E:ristentialismus (.3rd 
ed.; Miinchen: Kaiser Verlag, 1960), pp. 5-6. Hereafter referre¢1. 
to as Dogmatik~ Also, H·. Diem, 11Theologie zwischen Text u.hd 
Predigt, 11 FArB, JX (1955), 404; hereafter referred ·.to as 11Theologie 
zwischen.u-
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CHAPTER III 
THE RESPONSE OF EXISTENTIALIST EXEGESIS 
A. The Hermeneutics of Rudolf Bultmann 
1. Introduction 
Rudolf Bultmann is the major representative of that existentialist 
synthesis with historical criticism which is the alternative increas-
ingly selected by modern exegesis. A past contributor to Zwischen den 
Zei ten, he has been a significant scholar in Formgeschichte and main-
tains a great indebtedness to nineteenth-century liberalism.1 But his 
hermeneutics is basically influenced by existentialism, especially 
after the publication in 1927 of Sein und Zeit by the philosopher 
Martin Heidegger. Also, a tenet of the Zwischen den Zeiten movement, 
the llinfinite qualitative distinction" between the realms of time and 
eternity, 2 has remained the fundamental dialectic in both the method 
1. 11 I have endeavored throughout my entire work to carry further the 
tradition of historical-critical research as it was practiced by 
the 'liberal' i{heology and to make our more recent theological 
knowledge fruitful for it11 (Elcistence and Faith, ed. s. M. Ogden 
[Nevr York: Meridian, 1960], p. 288). To be noted are Bultmann's 
many appreciative references to his former teacher, W. Hermann 
(e. g., Jesus Christ and Mythology [Net-v York: Scribner's, 1958], 
pp. 72-73), and also to other influences from the liberal tradition 
(cf. Theology of the New Testament, trans. K. Grobel [2 vols.; 
Scribner's, 1931-55], II, 241-51). ~ 
2. This Kierkegaardian phrase t-ras first made notable by K. Barth in 
1921 (Epistle to the Romans, p. 10). 
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and the position of Bultmann. -
Bultmann 1s efforts are prompted by concern over the fact that 
critical biblical research, in rediscovering the first-centuryWelt-
anschauung of the gospels, and in refuting liberalism's attempt to 
modernize Jesus, had in fact also succeeded in alienating the New Tes-
ta.ment from contemporary man. Historical verisimilitude had been 
purchased at the price of modern credibility. 
It is impossible to use electric light and the wireless 
and to avail ourselves of modern medical and surgical 
discoveries, and at the same time to believe in the New 
Testament world of spirit and miracles. We may think 
we can manage it in our own lives, but to expect others 
to do so is to make the Christian faith unintelligible 
and unacceptable to the'modernworld.l 
Studies in the religions and culture of the ancient world show 
clearly,that the cosmology of the New Testament is merely the one 
shared by its surrounding environment. Moreover, this world-view com-
mon to antiquity has become hopelessly outdated by modern science, 
which posits a unified nature of man and an organic universe bound by 
causal continuities. It cannot be denied that the New Testament docu-
ments are thoroughly eschatological in their setting; yet the twentieth 
century can no longer accept a belief in an impending cosmic catastro-
phe, much less in demonic possession or miraculous interventions in the 
natural order. To put it graphically, the impossibility of the Weltan-
schauung of the New Testament was demonstrated by the fact that the 
history of the world continued its flow, since the expected Parousia 
1. R. Bultmann, Kerygma and Myth, ed. H. W. Bartsch, trans. R. H. 
Fuller (New York: Harper, ll95 3] 1961), p. 5. 
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of Christ never occurred.l The exegete therefore must find an approach 
enabling him to cope with this obvious strangeness of Scripture to its 
modern readers. 
2. Historical Criticism 
Bultmann faces this situation with full confidence in the tools 
of historical ·criticism. In accordance with Form-criticism, he main-
tains that the only object accessible in the biblical texts is the 
message and practices of the early Church itself. He rejects the 
"theological exegesis" of the Barthian wing of the former Zwischen den 
Zeiten associates; "dialectical theology" does not bring a new method 
of research, but instead deepens the older historical method with the 
awareness of the dialectic within human existence. 11FU.r die neutesta-
mentliche Wissenschaft kann es nur ~Methode geben, die histor-
ische.112 Here Bultmann remains true to his own primary field of study: 
New Testament scholarship. 
a. The Modern and MYthological World-views 
The historical method must be essentially critical of the world-
view of the New Testament. For this method presupposes that history is 
a unity, a closed organic system which permits no rupture of supernatu-
1. Ibid. 
2. R. Bultmann, Glauben und Verstehen (3 vols.; TUbingen: J. c. B. 
Mohr, 1933-6o), I, 11:5. Hereafter this important collection of 
essays will be designated by the widely-used symbol GV. Cf. also 
GV, III, 143. -
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ral interventions; Gesetzm~ssigkeit is an integral aspect of the con-
cept of nature.l Details of this modern world-view may change, says 
Bultmann, but its basic structure of natural causation is a permanent 
contribution of critical thought. It is thus impossible for man today 
to accept the cosmology found within Scripture, for no one by his own 
volition can adopt a world-view other than that given him by his contem-
porary era, nor is there anything intrinsically Christian about a pre-
scientific Weltanschauung.. "Therefore, modern man acknowledges as 
reality only such phenomena or events as are comprehensible within the 
framework of the rational order of the universe.u2 
The New Testament world-vie1.v must therefore be identified as myth-
ological. Butlrnann defines myth as 11the use of imagery to express the 
other vwrldly in terms of this world and the divine in terms of human 
life, the other side in terms of this side. 113 11Myths give to the 
transcendent reality an immanent, this-worlcUy ~bjectivity.n4 The 
pre-scientific mind projects worldly images onto the screen of the 
infinite, making the divine only quantitatively different from the human, 
which is an illegitimate procedure in view of the 11infinite qualitative 
distinction" between time and eternity. While this irrational mixture 
of the immanent and the transcendent seems to be Bultmann 1 s most care-
ful definition,· it may be noted that he often seems to use 11myth11 
1. ~' I, 215; GV, III, 144-45. 
2. Jesus Christ and Mythology, p. 37. Cf. GV, III, 84. 
3. Ker;y:gma and Myth, p. 10, n. 2. 
4. Jesus Christ and Mythology, p. 19. 
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simply in the sense of whatever is contrar.y to the modern naturalistic 
. 1 
world-VJ.e"tv. 
The pervasiveness of mythical language i~ the New Testament has 
been recognized since the researches of D. F. Strauss, but it has never 
been dealt v-r.i. th adequately. The solution, says Bultmann, certainly is 
not to eliminate myth entirely, as did the older liberalism, for this 
also allowed the central kerygma to dissipate, permitting the exegete's 
own ideas to fill the resulting vacuum.2 Nor is the solution arbitrar-
ily to retain only those aspects of mythology which suit one's theolog-
ical purpose, as does K. Barth; honesty demands that 11the mythical view 
of the world must be accepted or rejected in its entirety. u3 :MY-tho-
logical statements must neither be eliminated nor uncritically accepted, 
but must·instead be interpreted in order to reach their deeper meaning. 
For mythological thinki:r;1g betrays its qwn genuine intention by naively 
objectifying the "unobjectifiable. 11 
b. De~ythologizing 
It is the function of critical interpretation, not simply to 
reproduce the expressions of the New Testament, but to release them 
from their mythological conceptuality. The title given by Bultmann to 
1. Ibid., p.l5; Kerygma and Myth, p. 43; GV, III, 84. Cf. R. R. 
Nieb~, Resurrection and Historical Reason, p. 54. 
-
2. R. Bultmann, "A Chapter in the Problem of Demythologizing,n New 
Testament. Sidelights, ed. H. K. McArthur (Hartford: Hartford Sem-
inary Foundation Press, 1960), p. 1. Hereafter referred to as 
"Chapter in the Problem.n Cf. also Kerygma and :tYiyth, pp. 12-15; 
GV, I, 316. 
3. Kerygma and :Myth, p. 9; concerning Barth, cf. GV, II, 235. 
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this program is Entmythologisf'erung. 11By •Demythologizing 1 I under-
stand a hermeneutical procedure that inquires about the reality re-
ferred to by mythological statements of texts. 111 ';;,:- criterion to be 
used in applying this principle is of course the modern scientific 
world-view, but it must be understood that the object of this critique 
is not the message itself of the New Testament, but only the enveloping 
world-view of antiquity. The assumption is that myth indeed speaks of 
a reality, but only in a very inadequate, objectivizing manner. Fur-
thermore, this obscured reality is what the New Testament has to say 
about human existence. 
Hence the importance of the New Testament mythology lies 
not in its imagery but in the understanding of existence 
which it enshrines. The real question is whether this 
understanding of existence is true. Faith claims that 
it is, and faith ought not to be tied down to the im-
agery of New Testament mythology.2 
The interpretation of New Testament statements must seek to dis-
cover what conception of human existence is expressed therein. The 
scriptural descriptions of the transcendent power which controls the 
world must be reformulated in modern concepts of existence which can be 
grasped by contemporary man. This means that the exegete must not only 
understand the distant conceptual world of the New Testament on its 
own terms, but must be able to elicit its underlying view of the possi-
bilities of Dasein, of human existence. However much this 11 translation11 
1. R. Bultmann, 110n the Problem of Dernythologizing, 11 JR, XLII (1962), 
96. Hereafter referred to as 11Problem of DemytholQgizing • 11 Cf. 
GV, I, 315. 
2. Kerygma and Myth, p. ll. Cf. 11Chapter in the Problem, 11 p. 4. 
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of myth may be inadequate or Su.per.seded by the insights of future 
exegesis, it can never be called a new 11mythology, 11 for it does not 
objectivize unworldly powers into worldly ones. Furthermore, only 
when the texts are thus translated out of their exotic imagery can 
Scripture be truly seen as proclamation and witness.l Modern man can 
not be required to sacrifice his intellect by assenting to a primitive 
Weltanschauung; the interpreter must remove these external and false 
skandala, so that man will be confronted directly with the only 11of-
fense" intended by the Gospel, the paradoxical existence under grace. 
Demythologizing, then, is the disclosure of the existentiel12 
significance intended within mythical statements. Such ventures are 
not new to the history of the Church, but began as soon as the delay 
of the Parousia was evident. Even within the canon, the letters of 
Paul indicate that the decisive event has already occurred in the 
preaching of Ghrist, however delayed the Second Coming may be; and in 
the Gospel of John the Resurrection, Pentecost, and the Parousia are 
compressed :i,nto the Incarnation of the Word.3 The early Church soon 
lldemytholog~ed" its eschatological hopes into the promise offered 
1. GV, III, 145 •. 
2. In German, existential is the technical term denoting 'the philo-
sophical analysis of the phenomenology of existence as such, while 
existentiell refers to the uniquely personal, ineffable self-under-
standing of the responsibilities and demands of one's ow.n individ-
ual existence. Bultmann often complains that his critics confuse 
these two meanings, but he himself is not always free from this 
error. In this dissertation, existentiell will be ±etained without 
translation, while the more common, English word "existential" will 
refer to the more formal attempts of existentialism. 
3. Theology of the New Testament, I, 306-307; II, 58; GV, III, 89. 
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-vri. thin the instituted sacraments. The legitimate meaning behind the 
mythological hopes of the New Testament, expressed in modern terms, is 
the dialectic of man's personal existence between the bonds of his past 
and the openness of faith in God's future.1 IIEschatologicalll properly 
designates not an apocalyptic cosmology, but the quality of the pres-
ent moment in which God encounters the expectation of faith. 2 Dem,r-
thologi~ing thereby shows itself to be a legitimate concern of the 
exegesis of the Church. 
Spme.examples of the Christological results bf. this program maybe 
noted) The IIGod-figure" of Christ (Phil. 2:6) does not concern any 
metaphysical substance in the man Jesus, but expresses the fact thai in 
him is encountered the decisive event of existence. The doctrine of 
Christ's Pre-existence is intended to prevent any evasion of the con-
frontation of the Word through Jesus by attributing his message to his 
earthly environment. The cross of Christ is not merely a past event, 
but a present reality as it caJ.ls the believer to undergo crucifixion 
himself through the dennoch of faith. The Resurrection is not a mirac-
ulcus proof of Christ's significance, but corresponds to Christ's self-
attestation in ~he present and to the rising pf the believer in faith 
1. Q!, III, 89--90. 
2. Bultmann 1s usage of 11eschatological11 thus is characteristically 
associated with the event of existentiell faith. Cf. R. BuJ:~mann, 
The Presence of Eternity (New York: Harper., 1957), p. 155: urn 
every moment slumbers the possibility of being the eschatological 
moment. You must awaken it." 
3. The following examples are' found in ·Kerygma and Myth, pp. 35-43, 
and tiChapter in the Problem," pp. 6-9. 
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in the redemptive meaning of the cross. Finally, the Exaltation of 
Christ should encourage no literal picture of his ascension into the 
sky, but signifies the continuing presence of the Lord in the word of 
preaching. 
c. ~ Existential Interpretation of History 
By acknov1ledging the presence of mythology within Scripture and 
attempting to interpret its proper intention, demythologizing is part 
of a larger corrective to the older historical criticism. Bultmann 
affirms the critique of historicism made by the ZVJ'ischen den Zeiten 
movement. It is a hopeless task to attempt to use scriptural texts as 
normal historical sources for the reconstruction of a past era. Also, 
according to historicism, all historical phenomena are only relative 
entities, 11nur Grtlssen innerhalb eines gross en Relationszusanunenhangs, rr1 
which results in a II pantheism of history" that borrows its concepts 
from an implicit 11 pantheism of nature. 112 Finally, historicism supposed 
that the objectivity of its efforts would be aided by a detached and 
neutral observation modeled after the natural sciences. 
In contrast to this latter point is the approach of an existential 
interpretation of history, which is endorsed not only by Bultmann but 
by many who disagree vii th the more explicit program of demythologizing. 
Existential interpretation has corrected the older historicial criticism 
by pointing out that to perceive history is itself a historical act by 
an interpreter.who cannot detach himself from the demands and ambigui-
ties of the historical process. The true meaning of a 11istorical 
1. GV, I, 4. 2. Ibid., p. 5. Of. QY, III, 113. 
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event cannot become apparent until its proper 11future 11 has arrived, 
that is, at the end of history; but since this viewpoint is unattain-
able ~dthin history, it can only be foreshadowed in the concrete deci-
sions of the interpreter. 11Redend, das heisst ihr \'lesen erschliessend, 
wird die Geschichte erst fUr den, der selbst in der Geschichte steht 
und an ihr beteiligt ist.n1 
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Therefore, there can be no 11neutra3.11 historical investigation of 
ti:what is tli.er·e," in the sense possible in the natural sciences, but the 
interpreter is directed by certain perspectives and by his own existen-
tial questioning. The exposition of a text is always accompanied by a 
self-exposition of the exegete, who, as himself a part of the flow of 
history, cannot tall<: about any historical possibility which is not also 
a possibility of his personal existence.2 So the interpreter must not 
be asked to 11lose" his subjectivity. For, provided the interpretation 
is consistently carried through to results suitable to the object; the 
~ost 11subjective 11 interpretation is also the most 11objective, n that is, 
the most appropriate to the hist~rical sUbject matter.3 
3. The Eristential Self -understanding 
With the concept of "existential interpretation," Bul tmann' s use 
of the historical method merges into his underlying philosophical-
1. GV, III, ll3. 
2. Cf. R. Bul tma.nn, 11Das Problem einer theologischen Exegese des 
Neuen Testaments , 11 ZdZ, III (1925), 341-42. 
3. ,GV, II, 229-30. 
theological position. Indeed;' his historical criticism is enabled to 
be so radical by this very position. 
~ criterion is the asking what can be understood as 
existentially relevant •••• We must ask for what'is 
said in the biblical sayings about human existence, and 
for what can be heard in these sayings about our ow 
existence .1 
The only bond that unifies the first century and the twentieth century, 
thus providing a fulcrum for sweeping reinterpretation, is man's funda-
mental self-understanding of what it means for him to exist. Regard-
less of contemporary cosmologies and languages, each historical era is 
rooted concretely in an underlying understanding of Dasein. Since the 
delimitations of living in the sequence of time, the forms and problems 
of existing as a historical creature (which form the condition of 
Geschichtlichkeit2} are always the existentiell concern of man, the 
interpreter inevitably has this prior relation to his historical sub-
ject matter. 
History is the field of human decisions. It is understood 
when it is seen as such, that is, when one recognizes that 
what is at work in it is the possibilities of human self-
understanding--possibilities that are also the possibil-
ities of self-understanding in the present and that can · 
only be perceived in unity with present self-understanding.3 
1. "Chapter in the Problem,n p. 4. Bultmann is greatly influenced 
by W. Dilthey' s definition of hermeneutics as 11Frage nach dem· 
Verstitndnis singularen geschichtlichen Daseins11 (GV, II, 224), 
modifying it only by his own emphasis on detection-of the possi-
bilities of historical existence within the source material. 
2. The influence of M. Heidegger 's analysis of human existence is to 
be noted·in terms such as Geschichtlichkeit and eigentliche EKist-
enz. Cf. Sein·und Zeit (Tftbingen: Niemeyer Verlag, [1927] 1960), 
especially Par. 76 (pp. 392-97). 
3. 11Problem of Demythologizing, 11 P• 97. 
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The presupposition is that man inevitably is engaged in an often 
- . 
unconscious search for llauthentic existence, 11 an existence in responsi-
bility and .freedom within the stream of time. This personal existence 
is not something statically present and visible, but an occurrence, an 
. . 
event happening from time to time in the decision of the moment.1 But 
man already has a dim awareness of authentic existence, -v;rhich acts as a 
guide for his queries. As a Christian, Bultmann adds that this search 
is actually a relation to God. 11Man 1s life is moved by the search for 
God because it is aJ:t.vays moved, consciously or unconsciously, by the 
que:s.tion about his own personal existence. The question of God and the 
. . 
question of myself are identical. 112 In this abrupt statement Bultmann 
expresses the implication of the 11infinite qualitative distinctionrr of 
,.. ~ . -.. 
eternity and time, for since God can never be known as an objectifiable 
entity among other· objects at one r s disposal, God can only be humanly 
spoken of as that reality which determines one's ovm existence) To 
receive authentic .existence is to receive the revelation of God, and the 
latter can only be spoken of through the former. 
a. The Kerygma and Jesus 
However, Christian faith cannot be reduced to a religious philos-
1. Cf. QY, III, 117 •. It may be noted that although personal decision 
is made possible by the grace of God, human choice and divine 
grace are:so closely associated as to be virtually indistinguish-
able (e.g., cf. ibid., p. 74). 
2. Jesus Christ and Mytliology, p. 53. Cf. GV, IT, 233. 
3. Q:!, I, 32; 11Problem einer theologischen Ex:egese; 11 p. · 353; cf. "Die 
Frage der 'dialektischen Theologie,"' ZdZ, IV (1926), 59. 
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ophy of existence, even a philosophy which grants that Jesus of Naza-
reth is the finest example of the possibility of authentic existence.l 
For Bultmann maintains that such fulfillment is not a result of man's 
general existential groping, but solely a response to a specific event, 
the proclamation of God 1 s act in Christ. Man remains determined by his 
past until he is granted freedom for the future, God's future, as a 
gift of grace. This eschatological freedom is given only in and through 
the Christian proclamation, which in turn is founded upon the histori-
cal coming of Jes~s as.the Word of God. In this event, the interests 
of Bultmann as a historical scholar and as a Christian existentialist 
coincide and show their typical interrelationship. 
In what way is the Christian new self-understanding based upon the 
historical occurrence of Jesus Christ? ~1e revelation certainly cannot 
be grounded in the historical personality or actions of Jesus of Naza-
reth, for Formgeschichte has shown that no "historical Jesus11 can be 
reconstructed from the sources, and furthermore any incidents of the 
past such as miracles (even if genuine) could have no relevance for 
present faith. Nor can the attempt to detect an "existential dialec-
tic11 in the formal structure of the sayings of Je~us be successful. 2 
1. Significant here is Bultmann 1s rejection of the charge of incon-
sistency made by same of the more radical existentialists, who 
allo1·r Jesus merely just such an exemplary role within the stream of 
human existence. Of. R. Bultmann, revievr of Christ without Myth, 
by S. M. Ogden, ~' XLII (1962), 226. 
2. R. Bultmann, Das VerhUtnis der urchristlichen Christusbotschaft 
zum historischen Jesus (Heidelberg: Winter Universitgtsverlag, 
1962), p. 23, n. 72. Hereafter referred to as Das VerhUtnis. 
This point is in refutation of J. M. Robinson (cf •.. .A New Quest 
of the Historical Jesus, pp. lll-25). 
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For the paradox of Christology is that historical research can never 
' . 
verify or even establish a credibility that God has acted in Christ. 
The very fact that the New Testament uses mythological terms to de-
scribe Christ shows at least that he must not be interpreted by his 
context in world history.1 
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The subject matter for the historical study of the New Testament, 
then, as Form-criticism indicates, cannot be the historical figure of 
Jesus, but is instead the kerygma of the early Church. In the text at 
hand, the kerygma is directly p:-'esent, but the pers:>nage of Jesus is 
only quite indirectly reflected. Insofar as the historical Jesus is 
detectable, he seems to have been a Jewish eschatological prophet of 
the Kingdom of God, who probably awaited the Son of Man as a person 
distinct from himself. 2 However, the post-Easter faith of the Church 
formed the kerygma in the belj_ef that God had decisively acted in this 
Je.sus, creating a ne.w possibility of human existence under i'orgiving 
grace. It is this kerygma,·and not an earthly figure out of the past, 
which is present today, not only to the scholar, but to the believing 
hearer of the word of preacbi~g. In the present proclamation, the 
hearer receives God's revelatory Word; the hearer learns not that some 
ancient Galileans were loved, but that he himself is at this concrete 
moment loved by God. 
. The kerygma, then, and not. the effi.thly figure of Jesus, is God's 
revelation to man's existence. But the historical existence of Jesus 
1. Kerygma and MYth, pp. 207-208. 
2. Theology of the New Testament, I, 9, 26-32. Of. GV, I, 200-201. 
is not denie.d, however little may be known about him; indeed, the fact 
that God is reveaied by means of this figure is the factor that saves 
Christianity from being a general philosophy of existence. But Bultmann 
insists that it is neither possible nor legitimate to go beyond the 
sheer Dass of the revelation in Jesus, that is, to spe&c of the Was and 
Wie of the revelation. It is not possible to go beyond this Dass, 
because the gospe.l sources par.mit no such reconstructions, and it is 
not legitimate, because such a reconstruction would obscure the paradox 
of the transcendent God as present among finite men. The two theolo-
gians of the New Testament, Paul and John, both show by their indiffer-
ence to any biographi~al details about Jesus that the decisive aspect 
1 
of the revelation in Christ is simply the Dass. The fact that the 
Jesus mentioned by the kerygma·actually lived can be verified by his-
torical criticism, but no further details may be sought, lest the 
legitimacy of the kerygma be somehow demonstrated apart from the be-
liever 's existentiell faith. The real Christ is. not the earthly Jesus 
subject t~ historical controversies, but is the Christ proclaimed by 
2 
the kerygma who encounters the present hearer. 
Since the revelation in Christ is inseparable from the kerygma of 
~he Church, BuJtmann chooses to use the comprehensive term "Christ-
event" to refer to this historical object of faith. In contrast to 
1. GV, III, 23; Das Verh[ltnis, p. 9. 
2. In this sense Bultmann grants the charge that in his interpretation 
Jesus has been resurrected into the kerygma. For the kerygma it-
self is an eschatological event, in which Jesus as tl:+e Word contin-
ues to be present. Cf .• Das Verh[ltnis, p. 27. 
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apocalyptic hopes, Bul tmann holds that. Christ is the eschatological 
occurrence, the end of history which nonetheless is within history. 
The personal address of Christian proclamation continues this eschato-
logical event~ in which Christ becomes concretely present and affects 
the existence· of the hearer.1 
Not only is the historical profile of the earthly Jesus unattain-
able, but it is also impossible to speak of the metaphysical nature of 
Christ. For this reason, Bultmann is critical of the Christological 
confession of the World Council of Churches. 
Vor allem ist zu fragen ••• : Soll mit der Bezeichnung 
Christi als •Gottes• seine Natur bezeichnet werden, sein 
metaphysisches Wesen oder seine Bedeutsamkeit? Hat die 
Aussage soteriologischen oder kosmologischen Charakter 
oder beides?2 
Do the titles bestowed upon Christ apply to his nature in and of itself, 
as Chalcedom states, or to the meaningfulness of the Christus pro me? 
The former alternative is untenable, because the divine nature is 
qualitatively distinct from finite reality and cannot be directly spo-
ken of without confusing it with this-worldly, objectifiable entities. 
Christ is kno~om only insofar as he affects a concrete human existence. 
In reply to the question: 11Hilft er mir, weil er der Sohn Gottes ist, 
oder ist er der Sohn Gotte~, ~oreil er mir hilft?, 113 Bultmann states: 
"The saving efficacy of the cross is not derived from the fact that it 
is the cross of Christ: it is the cross of Christ because it has this 
1. UProblem of Demythologizing," pp. 101-102; GV, III, 22-23. 
2. GV, II, 247-48. 3. ~., p. 252. 
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saving efficacy .n1 This reversal of the traditional sequence is 
simply a result of this affirma~ion being not a statement of empiric~ 
fact, but a confession of faith. 2 Because of such misunderstandings, 
it is better to avoid the usual Christological titles that have onto-
logical implications, and to be content to say that Jesus is the bearer 
of the Word of God, the event in Hhich God has acted.3 
b. God and the World 
In view of the necessity to demythologize all objectivizing state-
ments and to speak only through the mediation of existential concerns, 
it may be asked whether to speak of an 11act of God11 is not to retain a 
remnant of mythology. Certainly God is not an objectifiable process 
"Within the world, or an interference with natural causation by vJhat in 
effect would be only a "higherll natural power, in the hybrid manner 
portrayed by mythical thinking. God's acting is not 11upon11 natural 
events, but llwithin11 them, in a hidden way that leaves the web of 
natural causation undisturbed. The biblical 11miracles 11 are largely 
mythical and in ~ case could never be used objectively to establish 
1. Kerygma and Myth, p. 41. Of. S. P. Schilling, "Continental 
Theo1logy Today, 11 Nexus~ 10 (1960), 36-37. 
2. Kerygma and My-th, p. 207, n. 2. A further clarification is given 
by c. MichaLl:rccn ( 11A Misunderstanding of Bultmann,u Intp, XV 
[1961], 494), who rejects "the traditional procedure of saying, 
'assuming it really happened this way, what does it mean? r Bul t-
mann instead asks, 'considering that this is the meaning, what is 
it that really happened.[sic] 1 That is, Bultmann requires the 
question of the meaning of the faith to enter into the specification 
of its reality.n 
- . 
3. GV, II, 258. 
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the presence of God.1 "It is precisely i-ts innnunity from proof which 
secures the Christian proclamation against the charge of being mytho-
logical.n2 The only true "miracle" is not an irrational act of inter-
vention, but is rather. the revelatory event of God 1s forgiveness, which 
is a Wunder because it is inconceivable that the gracious God should 
in his Word encounter the godless. 
God and his actions therefore can only be spoken of insofar as 
they affect human existence. "Soli die Theologie nicht iiber Gott 
spekulieren, vom Gottesbegr.iff reden, sondern vom wirklichen Gott, so 
muss sie, indem sie von Gott redet, ·zugleich vom Menschen reden.u3 
This is not to reduce theology to anthropology, but simply to recognize 
the peculiar indirection which is man1s only possibility of speaking 
4 
about the One qualitatively 11 other11 than he. Thereby God is spoken of, 
not mythologically or even merely symbolically, but "analogically, n by 
his effects on human existence, and in analogy to actions t~{ing place 
among men.5 To speak of God 1 s demands, love, and care is not to use 
poetic symbols, but to reflect real experiences of being affected here 
and now by experiences which have their origin in God. Thus, the 11 act 
of God" in Christ cannot be demythologized, but must be spoken of 
analogically and existentially. 
1. GV, I, 214-28, especially 220-21. 
2. Kerygma and Myth, p. 44. 3. GV, I, 117. 
4. Cf. K. Grabel, 11Bultmann 1s Problem of NT 1¥Jy.thology, '" JBL, 
LXX (1951), 102. 
5. Kerygma and Myth, pp. l96-97; Jesus Christ and Mythology, 
pp;. 68-69; "Problem of Demythologizing," pp. 100-101. 
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The acts of God are hidden within the closed nexus of natural 
causation and thereby cannot be directly observed. Bultmann emphasizes 
that history and nature are "profane," and that the Wunder of God is 
concealed and contrary to all appearances.1 The paradoxical identity 
of natural causation and God's action is the factor preventing this 
view from degenerating into a pantheistic Weltanschauung. 
When worldly happenings are viet..red as a closed series, as 
not only scientific understanding but even workaday life 
requires, there is certainly no room for any act of God. 
But· this .is just the paradox of faith: it understands an 
ascertainaqle event in its context in nature and history 
as the act of God. Faith cannot dispense with its 
1nevertheless. 1 2 
c. Faith, History,. and Demythologizing 
The dennoch of faith is the sole factor s~parating the Christian 
interpreter from the non-Christian. Faith can hear the personal ad-
dress, where unbelief can see only normal occurrences. This faith can 
never be aided, b~t only obscured, by attempts to support it with 
historical verification (for instance, the character of the historical 
Jesus) or idth mythological objectification (for instance, the myths 
of a physical Resurrection and Ascension of Christ). 
Faith is related to history insofar as it cannot dispense 1-Ji th the 
sheer~ of its historic inception in Christ, but present faith is 
not thereby legitimated. The results of historical study, furthermore, 
are always relative and open to further question. Even if historical 
1. GV, I, 220; Kerygma and Myth, p. 2ll. 
2. Kerygma and Myth, p. 199; cf. GV, I, 226; Jesus Christ and 
Mythology, p. 62. 
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certitude were possible, nothing can alleviate the paradox of faith in 
one's existence under the specific act of God's grace. Historical 
facts cannot prove articles of faith.1 
Faith is also related to demythologizing, since faith demands to 
be freed from the bonds of every world-view, whether ancient or modern. 
Bultmann maintains that freedom from objectifying knowledge is the log-
ical extension into epistemology of the Pauline and Lutheran view of 
justification apart from the -vrorks of the Law. 
Demythologizing is the radical application of the doctrine 
of justification by faith to the sphere of knowledge and 
thought. Like the doctrine of justification; demythol-
ogizing destroys every longing for security.2 
Demythologizing not only removes all false stumbling blocks, so that 
man is confronted with only the real paradox of faith, but it also re-
moves any legitimation man may wish t_o J:lave at his disposal in order 
to avoid a fully e:x:i..stentiell decision for faith. 
d. Understanding and Existentialism 
Together with 11faith, 11 though never supplanting it, is Bultmann's 
emphasis on "understanding.n3 The exegete must not only responsibly 
perceive the word of Scripture, but must understand it, which precisely 
is the problem of interpretation.4 Genuine understanding is to hear 
1. Theology of the New Testament, I, 26. 
2. Jesus Christ and Mythology, p •. 84; cf. Kerygma and Myth,~ pp. ~!.10-11. 
3. Note that the title of the volumes of Bultmann 1s collected essays 
is Glauben und Verstehen. 
4. GV, II, 235; this is pointedly directed at K. Barth. 
--
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the question placed and the claim encountered in the material studied. 
Thus, understanding is not an act prior to an existentiell response to 
the address heard id thin a text, for to understand is at the same time 
to· decide, to resolve to affirm or dissent, concerning the possibili-
ties of personal existence found in the docum~nt. 
This "resolute understanding11 emphasized by Bultmann is an aspect 
of his concern to make the actual meaning of the original 'kerygma in-
telligible to the twentieth century. In this attempt, he has relied 
heavily upon the analyses by existentialist philosophy of human es-
trangement and existence. This has led to the perhaps unfair charge 
that Bultmann is motiyated primarily by apologetic theology, that his 
approach may be parodied as "the Gospel according to Bult:mann for the 
l Intellectual German Scoffer of Today, 11 or an attempt to reach the 
well-educated classes that are estranged from ·the Church and are famil-
iar with the thought of Husserl, Jaspers, and Heid:egger. HmJever, this 
is at least not the primary intention of Bultmann, who considers him-
self a biblical scholar. But Bultmann readily states that ttevery 
theology is dependent for the clarification of its concepts upon a 
pretheological understanding of man that, as a rule, is determined by 
some philosophical tradition. 112 Since the exegete is dependent upon 
secular terminology, he must not accept it uncritically, but must 
consciously search for the 11right11 philosophy. 
1. K. Grabel, op. cit.!.' p. 99. The allusion implied is evidently 
Schleiermacher's Reden fiber die Religion an die Gebildeten unter 
ihren Ver~chtern (1799), suggesting Bultmann 1s parallel intention. 
2. Existence and Faith, p. 98; cf. Kerygma and Myth~. p. 193. 
Does this mean that the categories of existentialist philqsophy 
are arbitrarily imposed upon the New Testament? Bultmann replies that, 
to the contrary, existentialism is uniquely quali-fied to explicate 
Scripture. In fact: 11In der Exi.stenzphilosophie in gewisser Weise 
[ist] das christliche Daseinsverstl:l.ndnis siDrulari~iert. 111 The critics 
J 
11are blinding their eyes to the real problem. I mean, one should rath-
er be startled that philosophy is saying the same thing as the New Tes-
tament and saying it quite ·independently. 112 Such criticism would be 
justified only if modern existentialism pretended to be a definite 
philosophical system or to offer the actual content of an ideal of 
existence. This, however, is not the case. 
Existentialist philosophy does not say to me 'in such and 
such· a way you must exist 1 ; it says only 'you must exist. 1 
•••. Existentialist philosophy, while it gives no answer 
to the question of my personal existence, makes personal 
existence my Olin personal responsibility, and by doing so 
it helps to make me open to the word of the Bible.3 
Eldstentialism supplies only the 11formal analysis 11 of existence, which 
enables the New Testament message of a new existence to be elicited. 
4. The Kerygma of Scripture 
From the preceding summar,y, it may be seen that Bultmann has a 
double approach: historical criticism and existential self-understand-
ing. Both these aspects coincide in vie1ving the kerygma as the funda-
mental nature of Scripture. Here Farm-criticism and existentialism 
1. GV, III, 194. 2. Kerygma and Myth,, p. 25. 
3. Jesus Christ and MythologyJ, pp. 55-56. 
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agree. The post-Easter proclamation of the Church was the basis for 
transcribing the oral tradition into written documents, and this same 
proclamation today confronts man 1~th a new call to understand himself 
and thus his world in the iight of a decision to live under grace. 
The authority of Scripture, then, is not an hypothesis to be 
investigated by those still supposing the Bible to be an ordinary book, 
but is the authoritative claim upon the hearer's personal existence, to 
be encountered in a concrete moment. The Bible is not a treasure house 
of general spiritual ~ruth$ or doctrines. The Word of God has the same 
paradoxical hiddenness within Scripture that it does in world events; 
it cannot be proved or demonstrated, but only responded to in faith, as 
a Word addressed personally and on a sp!3cific occasion to the hearer •1 
a. The Old Testament 
However, this authority is not present m thin Scripture as a whole. 
The kerygma is the critical norm immanent within the texts. Kerygmatic 
statements are not uniformly to be found throughout Scripture, although 
Bul tmann is understandably relucta..."rJ.t to be so specific as to name which 
. 2 
verses are or are not genm.nely revelatory. Indicative, however, is 
Bultmann 's low evaluation of the Old Testament. In an essay published 
in 1933, his attitude on this issue was still ambiguous: the Old Testa-
ment is a preparatory aid to the understanding of Jesus the Word, and 
it is a valuable protection against Greek spiritualization of man's 
. 
1. Of. EKistence and Faith, pp. 160-70; Kerygma and Myth, pp. 201, 207. 
2. GV, III, 34. 
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Gescbichtlichkeit;1 on the other hand: "FUr den chl"~stlichen Glauben 
ist das Alte Testament nicht mehr Offenbarung •••• Israels Geschichte 
------ --- ~ 
ist nicht unsere Geschichte, und sofern Gott in jener Geschichte 
gn!l.dig gewal tet hat, gilt diese Gnade nicht uns. rr2 By 1949, Bul t-
mann's criticism was still more negative: the Old Testament can be 
considered a prophecy (to be fulfilled by the New Testament) only 
insofar as it presents a history of Sc~eitern; of breakdown because of 
its own internal contradictions.3 These contradictions are exemplary 
for the inner contradictions of human existence as such. For instance, 
Israel's attempt to combine the concept of an eschatological Gottes-
volk with an empirical nation was doomed to failure, becoming for the 
New Testament an example of a false way of salvation, that is, the 
"Law .tt The Church as more directly a non-empirical, eschatological 
community is in this sen·se a 11 fulfillm.ent11 of Israel's shattered 
llprornise." 
b. The Kerygma and Do ctr.ine 
Not only is the kerygma ult:j.mately missing from the Old Testament., 
but to a great extent it is only indirectly present in the New Tes-
tament. Not to mention its mythological framew·ork and questionable 
historical details, the New Testament contains doctrine as well as 
kerygma. This teaching of the early Church is not to be confused with 
its preaching, for the kerygma has little in common w:i th the :imparta-
1. GV, I, 335-36, 321. 2. Ibid., p. 333. _,_ 
3. GV~ II, 162-86, especially 183-86. 
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tion of intellectual knowledge.1 Doctrine does have a limited validity 
insofar as it can£acilitate genuine Verstehen of the existential 
possibilities in man's new self-understanding as existing under grace; 
but this happens only as an implication of the k~rygma itself. The 
kerygma is the direct address to man, v-rhile theology and doctrine are 
only an indirect addres~. Therefore, theology is charcacterized as a 
critical a.r;td polemical task, to be undertaken from time to time only 
2 in response to a contemporary danger. The kerygma, then, although 
not itself easily identified or isolated, remains the sole authorita-
tive aspect of Scripture. 
5. The Hermeneutical Perspective 
a. The Historical Method 
Bultmann 1 s specific method of exegesis remains to be examined. 
Basically, he has attained· an original and highly influential synthesis 
of existentialist presuppositions and a penetrating historical criti-
cism. It must first be remembered that Bultmann considers himself 
primarily as a New Testament scholar and is a pioneering authority in 
Form-criticism. Rigorous historical criticism of the sources is the 
indispensable foundation of exegesis. However, such criticism by it-
self might also obscure genuine interpretation, as happened in histor-
icism. The historical method therefore must be expanded and deepened 
by seeking for the understanding of human existence contained in the 
1. ~' III, 124. Also, GV, I, 178. 
2. GV, I, 153-87; Theology of the New TestamentJ.. II,. 237. 
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sources, and by an existentiell encounter·with such historical possi-
bilities of existence.l But both the existentialist and the objec-
tivist interpretations, which view the one reality of history according 
to two aspects, namely the double possibility of authentic or inau-
thentic existence, are needed, in order that both meaningfulness and 
factualness may be ascertained. 2 
With this is said nothing about biblical interpretation which does 
not apply equally to any literary document. There is no special Ubib-
lical n hermeneutic as contrasted to secular methodology. -The usual 
literary-historical methods apply, and the examination of Scripture is 
just as "profane," in a formal sense, as that of any historical science. 
The "sanctity11 of _biblical exegesis is acquired solely through its 
object, the witness of God's revelation, and not through any peculiar 
methods.3 
b. The Pre-understanding ~ the Exegete 
68 
Bultmann maintains that it is impossible for exegesis to be with-
out presuppositions, because the exegete can never be a detached ob-
server with a blank mind. Of course interpretation must not be 11pre-
supposed, n in the sense that the exegetical results become pre-determined. 
But the exegete, as a historical being, is inevitably led by definite 
1. GV, I, 119, 318; GV, II, 223; Das Verh~ltnis, p. 18. 
2. "Problem of Demythologizing, 11 pp. 98-99. 
3. GV, I, 133; GV, II, 231; Existence and Faith, P• 100. 
1 inquiring perspectives and preliminary notions. A text cannot 
even be read, much less genuinely understood, unless the 1nterpret-
er brings with him a presupP,osed line of questioning (Woraufhin) and a 
certain pre-understanding (Vorverst!indirl.s). 11Denn nur eine deutliche 
Frage wird eine deutliche Antwort h8ren. 112 Of course, the questioning 
must not be biased or one-sided, and the prior understanding must 
allow itself to be clarified and critically tested by the understanding 
of the encountered text. This simply means that human comprehension 
is never a closed understanding, but is continually grasped in renewed 
resolution; it does not mean that a prior understanding is necessarily 
a prejudice. 
Ohne solches Vorverst!indnis und die durch es gele1teten 
Fragen sind die Texte stunrrn. Es gilt nicht, das Vorver-
st!indnis zu eliminieren, sondern es ins Bewusstsein zu 
erheben, es im Verstehen des Textes kritisch zu prUfen, 
es aufs Spiel zu setzen, kurz es gilt: in der Befragung -
des Textes sich selbst durch den Text befragen zu lassen, 
seinen Anspruch zu h8ren.3 
< 
A basic pre-understanding in the interpreter, for instance, is the 
awareness of the causal continuities vuthin the world. Thereby, super-
natural interventions rupturing the fabric of natural order are assumed 
to be excluded. 11Ich [muss] allerdings ein Vorverst!indnis von den 
geschichtlichen MBglichkeiten haben •••• Ein Vorverst!indnis dessen, 
• • • was iiberhaupt Handeln Gottes heissen kann. 114 Interpretation 
works within a "hermeneutical circle, 11 in v-rhl_.ch single events illumi-
1. GV, III, 142, 146; Jesus Christ and MYthology, pp. 49-50. 
2. GV, III, 1. Cf. GV, I, 153; GV, II, 216-18. 
3. GV, II, 228. 4. GV; II, 231. 
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nate the whole context and the whole is to be understood through its 
individual aspects, bu·b nothing id thin this reciprocity can seriously 
challenge the basic under.standing of the world which guides the very 
activity of the interpreter.1 
A second presupposition, underlYing the VorverstHndnis and the 
W"oraufhin of hermeneutics, is the fundamental subjectivity of the exe-
gete. This does not mean a capricious indulgence on the part of the 
interpreter, but simply reflects the impossibility of a vorausset~ungs­
lose Ex:eg~se witJ:p.n the demands and anxieties of man's historical 
existence. It is thus meaningless to require the obliteration of the 
exegete's subjectivity in a vain quest for 11objective11 results, for the 
most subjective interpretation is the most objective. That is, true 
understanding requires a response to the existentiell demands 'Which 
the text makes upon the human subject. 11Das echte geschichtliche 
Verstehen setzt gerade die ~usserste Lebendigkeit des verstehenden 
1Subjekts 1 voraus, die mBglichst reiche Entfaltung seiner Individuali-
tM.t.n2 "Even our relation to an hist?rical event happens alvrays as 
an event in our o-vm existence. • • • Our personality is moved, struck, 
changed, reformed by the historical events.n3 The awareness of the 
insecurity of human existence, of the limitation of life by death, 
and of the inevitable human yearning for ultimate fulfillment (that 
is, God), forms the subjective urgency vrhich guides the exegete's Worauf-
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1. Ibid., pp. 213, 235. 2. GV, III, 115; cf. GV, II, 230. 
3. "Chapter in the Problem,ll p. 5. 
bin, his questioning of the text.1 
The Vorverstfuldnis is that of a basic Lebensverhntnis to the Sache 
of the text, w·hich the interpreter shares in common with the scriptural 
author. The life-involvement of the inquirer is the basis and the guide 
by which he addresses himself to the basic concern expressed directly 
or indirectly in the text. 2 It is taken for granted that, by the nature 
of human existence, the interpreter does indeed have a relation to this 
concern, that he is moved by the same existentiell problems that orig-
inally called forth the document being studied. Just as the situations 
of a child learning to speak or an adult learning a foreign language 
would presuppose a prior familiarity 1-rl.th the objects denoted by the new 
words, so an ancient life-relation -which 1-ras not also a present situation 
. . 
to the exegete would be both untranslatabl~ and unintelligible.3 Thus, 
false problems are excluded in advance from the attention of the inter-
preter. The exegete must not treat his text as a relic of the past, but 
must commit himself to a dialogue with its author. Thus the interpreter 
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must bring to consciousness the possibilities of his ovm relation to exist-
ence, so that his own Geschichtlichkeit m~ come to an existentiell encoun-
ter with Geschichte.4 11Geschichtliche Erkenntnis ist zugleich Selbst-
1. 11Pr'oblem einer theologischen Ex:egese, 11 p. 350; GV, I, 125; GV, nr, 
149. Bultmann is fond of quoting Augustine: .ttTilnos fecistiad 
Te, et cor nostrum inquietum est, donee requiascat in Te 11 (GV, n, 
· 232; Jesus Christ and Mythology, p. 52}. -
2. GV, II, 217, 227; g!, III, 146-47. 3. GV, II, 218. 
4. Implicit here, as well as in other aspects of Bultmarm 1s thought, is 
the co:rirrnon German distinction betv;reen Historie (the historian's re- · 
construction of objective events) and Geschichte· (the·inward meaning 
and connections of events·personally encountered~. Cf. Kerygma and 
Myth, pp. 37, 42; GV, II, 228; GV, III, 31-32, 110-11. 
-- -- -
er kenntnis. n1 
It may be noted that Bultmann vigorously refutes the charge that 
his emphasis on subjectivity and existence leads "t:o a reduction of all 
statements to the 11inner life of ·man.112 This would be a reduction of 
human existence to psychological consciousness, a failure to recognize 
that genuine Geschichtlichkeit consists not only of self-understanding 
but also of relations to objects ~ctually encountered. 
In his existence man is not isolated, not enclosed in' 
himself. He stands in relation to others, to persons, 
to history, to powers -vrhich thr.eaten him or support 
him, which can' annihilate him OJ:_' bl~ss him; and he 
stands, lastly, in relation to God. 
Ex~stential interpretatiQn merely studies man in his historical exist-
ence which is aroused to consciousness by his encounter v.ri th what is 
ttother" than himself. 
c •. The Continued Encounter with the Text 
.:;._---,-- ---- -- - -
Finally, Bul tmann points out that his method offers no hermeneu-
tical panacea, no timelessly valid conclusions. 11 The metJiod of exis-
tential interpretation is not a key whieh I can manipulate lightly, 
but ••• a method of asking, and perhaps in many cases I may be 
oblig.ed to wait in patience .u4 Furthermore' when a text does disclose 
its meaning, the resulting understanding is no more definitive and 
closed than -vrere the preceding Vorverstl!ndnis and Woraufhin. The 
1. GV, III, 147. 2. GV~ II, 233-34. 
3. ttcnapter in'the Problem,n p. 4. Of. Kerygma and Myth, 
pp. 199-200, 203. 
4. uchapter in the Problem, 11 p. 9. 
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meaning of Scripture is understoo9. only by the exegete's own openness 
and in the existentiell encounters which take place anew in every fu-
ture.1 True exegesis does not rely on past results, but seeks its 
answers in continually renewed events of understanding. 11 The Word of 
. . 
God never becomes our property. The test of whether we have heard it 
aright is whether we are prepared always to hear .it anew. 112 
B. ! Critique of Bultmann by Diem 
1. Some Areas of Agreement 
Hermann Diem has been a strong critic of Bultmann' s hermeneutical 
approach. How·ever, it should noted that this disagreement has taken 
place within decades of cordial friendship wit~ Bultmann himself and in 
expectation ·that their dialogue has by no means come to an end. Fur-
thermore, as former associates in the Zwischen den Zeiten movement, 
they retain a certai~ amount of common agreement on some broad issues. 
For instance, Diem and Bultmann both affirm that the Church and sacra-
ments are constituted by the kerygmatic word of proclamation, which 
itself completes and is an aspect of the revelation in Christ. They 
both strongly criticize the older historicism, stating that the crite-
rion for biblical criticism must be the intention of the text itself. 
They agree that the only revelation is in and through Christ, and that 
this revelation cannot be considered under the generic concept of 
"knowledge" in general, but is a personal address to the hearer. 
1. GV, III, 148-50. 2. Existence and Faith, p. 169. 
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Statements are found in both writers that the Word of God is not sub-
ject to moral tests or any extrinsic standard, but legitimates itself 
solely ~~thin the obedience of faith, in a direct address of the con-
crete moment. Furthermore, they agree that exegesis is impossible 
vdthout the presuppositions and profound concerns of the interpreter, 
and that there can be no question of defending any special llbiblicalll 
hermeneutic as contrasted to general literary interpretation, nor any 
requisite moral qualities or personal degree of inspiration on the 
part of the exegete. 
2. History and Geschichtliqhkeit 
a. The Historical Pre-understanding 
However, decisive areas of disagreement remain between Diem and 
Bultmann. One of these concerns BuJt mann 1 s perspective on the histori-
cal material vdih which an exegete has to deal. Diem criticizes the 
position that the exegete must have a Vorverst~ndnis of what historical 
possibilities are and thereby what an act of God can be. "Wenn der 
Interpret so die 1 geschichtlichen Jlie:lglichkeitenr im voraus kennt, dmm 
kann es kein eigentliches Novum und dami t keine echte Bedeutung der 
Geschichte mehr geben.nl The naturalistic presupposition of a "gap-
lessll or closed universe, ruled by unfailing analogy and the causal 
continuity of all events, excludes in advance the possibility of a 
unique occurrence in history. Thus, a perspective alien to the text is 
1. H. Diem, Theologie als kirchliche Wissenschaft [Vol. I] (Mtinchen: 
Kaiser Verlag, 1951), p. 101. Hereafter referred to as Theologie~ 
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set up as a criterion. To be sure, Bultmann insists that the inter-
preter 1 s pre-understanding is always being critically tested by being 
placed in question before the text, and Diem grants that in principle 
there is of course nothing to hinder this commendable openness. But in 
practice it is quite doubtful whether Bultmann really allows his basic 
idea of historical continuity to be challenged by the biblical text.1 
Diem's position here is that the Geschichte of God's action in Christ 
cannot be judged or verified by a Vorverst~dnis based on ordinary 
historical crit,icism. "Es kann vielmehr Schlicht und einfa_ch nur darum 
Geschichte sein, weil ~ ~ geschehen ~.n2 This event in its Ge-
schehensein is not exhausted by the aspects accessible to historical 
criticism as such. 
b. Geschichtlichkeit 
Diem dete:cts within Bul imann basically a negative attitude toward 
history. For the New Testament kerygma is reduced to a decision-incit-
ing address which is bracketed apart from all historical relations, 
except for the minimal historicity required for its very emergence. 
The result is a strong tendency toward a docetic Christology and 
1. In support of this misgiving may be noted Bultmann's criticisms of 
Barth and Diem in their concepts of Geschichte at the very point 
where that concept goes beyond the limits of orthodox historical 
c~iticism (GV, II, 234; Das Verh[ltnis, pp. 14-15, n. 27). 
2. H. Diem, Dogmatik, Ihr ~Teg zwischen Historismus und Ex:istential-
ismus, p. 247. The bibliographic information here has already been 
given in the previous chapter and will not be repeated; in ·such 
cases, how·ever, the .full title of sources will be repeated upon 
their first occurrence in each chapter. Cf. also H. Diem, Grund-
fragen der biblischen Hermeneutik (TJ?,Ex:, N. F. Nr. 24; Mtl.nchen: · 
Kaiser Verlag, 1950), p. 4o; hereafter referred to. as Grundfragen., 
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Ecclesiology •1 Or, to be more explicit, Bultmann has a double concept 
of history: the Geschichte of Jesus, which is the mere factuality 
(Dass) of his appearance in the world, and the Geschichtlichkeit· of the 
believer in his present resolute existence. 2 The latter is emphasized 
to the subordination of the former, just as the kerygma overshadows the 
historical fact of Jesus. Diem sees here a danger in the tendency, 
found among all those influenced by Heidegger, to reduce the actual 
occurrence and history of the Incarnation to a sheer qualification of 
the present believer's temporal existence and llhistory, 11 granting him 
an eternal significance, a true Geschichtlichkeit.3 The event of Jesus 
is concrete history only insofar as it is "! concrete history,n that 
is, insofar as it too took place v.Ji thin the general human situation of 
existence amid the ambiguities and demands of temporality, thereby 
qualifying this event to affect present existence. The event of rev-
elation is thereby allowed to evaporate into the general problem of 
Geschichtlichkeit. 
Alles beti chtete Geschehen als solches wird irrelevant 
und kann der radikalsten historischen Kritik preisgegeben 
werden. Theologische Relevanz hat nur die kerygmatische 
Bedeutsamkeit fUr meine eigene Geschichte. Dieser Ent-
historisierung gegenUber ist die Entmythologisierung, 
welche so viel Staub aufgevd4belt hat, ein vergleichs-
weise harmloses Unternehmen. 
This detached attitude toward historical events, perhaps curious 
1. H. Diem, 11Die historisch-kri tische Bibelwissenschaft und die 
Verktlndigungsaufgabe der K;irche, 11 KZ, XVI (1961), p. 79. Here-
after referred to as IIBibelwissenschaft_.n 
. 
• 
2. Dogmatik, pp. 118, 87, 98. 3. Ibid., pp. 234, 239, 220,l21. 
-
4. 11Bibelmssenschaft, n p. 78. 
76 
• 
for one so devoted to historical scholarship, is particularly striking 
in Bultmann' s attitude toward the Old Testament. For the cause of the 
Scheitern'of Israel's history is alleged to be the internal contra-
dictions of human existence as such, which would then make the Old Tes-
tament an accidental historical illus·t;ration of a universal essence of 
human existence.1 Diem insists, to the contrary, that the covenant is 
the basis of the Old Testament history, arrl this covenant is not a 
metaphysical truth or an example of some timeless principle of exist-
ence, but a unique event which actually occurred between God and man. 
Bultmann1s disdain for the Old Testament because of its empirical 
history and concerns is further reflected in his docetic Ecclesiology. 
The Church, profiting from the error of Israel, must be an eschatolog-
ical entity, which thus in effect plays a negligiple role in Bultmann's 
thought; Rudolf Sohm 1s theory of the "invisible and properly intangible" 
2 Church seems to be accepted without reservation. Diem thus claims 
that the remark that the destiny of every theology is decided by its 
position in regard to the Old Testament is especially relevant for the 
theology of Bul tmann. 3 
3. The Kerygma 
The reason behind Bultmann 1s basic indifference to historical 
matters is his conviction that the kerygma is the only enduringly valid 
aspect of Scripture; the remainer he willingly gives up to radical 
1. Theologie, pp. 78-79. 2. ~., pp. 77-81 
3. 11Bibelwissenschaft, 11 p. 79. 
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criticism. The duty. of the historian is to bring to consciousness the 
claim tua ~ agi tur vmich the kerygma still makes as an existentiell 
summons, and to this single purpose Bultmann devotes his energies as 
exegete, preacher, and philosopher.l In this effort, the kerygma comes 
very close to being identified vr.i th the Word of God itself. In fact, 
Bul tmann' s attempt to lift the kerygma out of its surrounding material 
may be called a mo.dern form ,o.f biblicism, seeking to preserve a time-
less Ucontent" by releasing it from its spurious "form.u2 
Diem objects that in freeing the kerygma from"its surrounding 
material, it is also "freed" from the self-interpretation of Scripture. 
Bultmann is unable to give any positive meaning to this scriptural 
context of t~e kerygma. Furthermore, Diem continues, the New Testament 
itself nowhere uses the term 11kerygman in the narrow sense which Bult-
mann attributes to it, namely as a direct and specific call to deci-
sion, apart from any mention of an event or doctrine.3 On the contra-
ry, the Gospel proclaims the Geschichte of Jesus, as a result of which 
the hearer is invited to participate in the event that has already 
occurred. 
1. Dogmatik, pp. 68-69. 
2. Grundfragen, pp. 37-38. H. Diem, Was heisst schriftgem!!ss? (Neu-
kirchem: Verlag der Buchhandlung des Erziehungsvereins, 1958), 
p. 10. The latter will hereafter be referred to as Was heisst. 
3. Dogmatik, p. 119; "Bibelwissenschaft, n p. 77. G. Ebeling (Theol-
ogie und Verk\lndigung [TU.bingen: J. c. B. Mohr, 1962], p. 35, 
n. 2) rejects Diem's argument here. Ebeling admits that the New 
Testament provides only the onset for what today's concept of 
"kerygma II means' but insists that one cannot rest content simply 
with taking over the original significance of scriptural concepts. 
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Bei Bultmann wird der H8rer durch das K~rygma aufgerufen, 
sich f'fli' C:tbe E:Lgentlicbkei t seiner ESCistenz zu ent-
seheiaenund dadurch Geschichte zu•bekommen.--rm~euen 
Testamentaagegen mrd dem Mrerverk\fudigt, dass mit 
dieser Geschichte Jesu ITnrist1 auch Uber seine-TiesCKichte 
sclion entsChieden rsr-una er deSlia!b-aufgerUfen is£ zur · 
Teilhabe ~ dieserschO'ilUber ~ gefallenen EntSChel:dilng.l 
a. The Kerygma and Jesus 
The preponderance of the kerygmatic message over its historical 
occasion is seen most clearly in Bultmann's attitude toward Jesus of 
Nazareth. For Bultmann 1s position is that the stark historic fact of 
Jesus is needed only to set the proclamation in motion. The histor-
ical study of Jesus 1 own preaching is irrelevant for faith, for the 
meaning of the kerygma owes nothing to its historical occasion.2 For 
Bultmann, the Dass and the Was of the revelation, that is, its factu-
ality and its significance, are fundamentally separable. In fact, the 
factual aspect of the event seems to become an obstacle to its existen-
tiell appropriation. The only factuality in which Bultmann is inter• 
ested is the perEonal GeschichtliChkeit of the believer, in the con-
. . 
c~etiori of whose existence Geschichte occurs in its authentic sense.3 
Diem protests strongly·against this dissociation of the factual 
occurrence of revelation from its significance. Certainly the biblical · 
authors did not distinguish between any such two factors vr.ithin the one 
truth; rather, it is precisely the 11happened-nessll of definite saving-
1. 11;Bibelwissenschaft, 11 p. 78. Cf. Dogmatik, p. ll8; Was heisst, 
p. 18. 
2. Dogmatik, pp. 80, 86. 3. Ibid.' pp. 60-63. 
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events which the early kerygma proclaimed.l Diem agrees -with Bultmann 
that the Dass of the revelatio~. is the pre-condition of the ability to 
- ··~ 
know its Was; but if this is the only function of the Dass, then Jesus 
was only the bearer of a message, the faceless catalyst for the occur-
renee of pure faith. Diem grants that no 11basis11 for faith behind the 
kerygma may be sought, but insists_ that the revelation in Christ is so 
fully conditioned by its factuality that any separation bet1:-reen its 
Dass and its Was is impossible. 2 11Hier kann keine .Rede mehr sein von 
jener Reduzierung auf das Dass der Begegnung, sondern alles kommt 
darauf an, ~ ~ns hier begegnet.n3 
Christ was not just the historical occasion for the entrance of a 
timeless truth. Rather, it is because the One who introduced the 
kerygma into history remains the One -who is ttthe Way, the Truth, and 
the Life" (Jn. 14:6), that this revelation in its historicity is pre-
served from becoming an impersonal principle. To be sure, the biblical 
writers have no independent interest in biography or historical facts 
as such, for their purpose is solely proclamation. Diem maintains, 
however, that Bultrnann is not justified in forcing upon Scripture the 
stark alternative of either historical reporting ~preaching; this way 
of putting the question is quite foreign to the biblical writers them-
selves, v-rho saw here no necessary contradiction. ttDarum sollte man 
1. 
2. 
3. 
Ibid.' pp. 60, 64-65' 82. 
"Bibelwissenschaft, 11 P• .79; Dogmatik, PP• 215, 247, 258, et passim. 
H. Diem, Der irdische Jesus und der Christus des Glaubens 
(TUbingen: J. c. B. Mohr, 1957), p. 16. Hereafter referred to 
as Irdischer Jesus. 
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den Verktlndigungscharakter des Textes nicht in einer Weise Uberspitzen, 
welc~e den Historiker in eine Nacht venTeist, in der alle Katzen grau 
sind. ul If a radical discontinuity is asserted between the given 
presence of the kerygma and its alleged initiator, then the histori-
cal figure of Jesus tends to fade into a mere mythical figure and the 
kerygma becomes only a timeless truth about existence in general. 
b. The Kerygma ~ 1\Vth 
Concerning the program of "demythologizing, II Diem states that it 
would be wrong for any discussion about Bultmann to center on this 
controversial term as such, for demythologizing is subordinate to the 
broader aim of eliciting the kerygma from Scripture, rather than being 
an end in itself.2 Diem also agrees that the exegete must within 
limits translate the kerygma +rom an ancient world-view into modern 
concepts~ -However, he detects within Bultmann the tendency all too 
quickly to declare a scriptural statement irrelevant when it presents 
difficulties to the modern mind, instead of considering the possibility 
that modern ·concepts may have no equivalent expression for the heart of 
~he matter intended by the text.3 Indeed, considering Bultmann 1s 
broad definition.of "myth" as portrayal of the transcendent in terms of 
the immanent, the amazing thing is not that he finds myth in the Bible, 
1. Dogmatik, p. 111; cf. pp. 107-14. 
2. H. Diem, 11 Theologie zwischen Text und Predigt,n p. 399. Bultmann 
has not aided thi'S clarification when he refers to demythologizing 
as a "hermeneutical principle" (GV, II, 235, n. 37). 
3. 11Theologie zwischen, 11 p. 403. 
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but that he still can maintain-a non-mythological happening within the 
New Testament!1 For human language has no other possibility than to 
use immanental concepts, since revelation has brought no new language 
into the world. Bul tmann is all too ready to abandon the metaphorical 
language of even his favorite Fourth Gospel, rather than seeing it as 
an attempt to describe a reality l~ich can be expressed in no other 
way.2 
Diem claims that Bultmann justifies this procedure by first unnec-
essarily objectivizing such terms as 11hell11 and 11 demons, 11 in order then 
to destroy them by demythologizing.3 This in turn calls forth a con-
servative reaction from many critics, who unwittingly play into the 
existentialists 1 hands by defending obsolete language as equivalent to 
the heart of the matter; thus the cycle continues of demythologizing 
and lire-mythologizing. 11 
In contrast to this, Diem affirms that the only theologically 
, legitimate means of demythologizing is that 11 exorcism11 which occurs in 
the event of proclamation and responding faith.4 Following Luther's 
acceptance of mythical imagery under the conditions of geschehen, 
geP£edigt, ~ geglaubt, Diem says that hell and the demonic forces 
of course must not be objectified into entities, but must be believed 
in only insofar as they impinge upon the existence of the believer, 
1. Theologie, pp. 103-104. 
2. Was heisst, pp. 44-45; Grundfragen, P• 26. 
3. Dogmatik, p. 285. 4. Ibid., p. 287. 
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that is, insofar as they are already overcome by Christ.l In the event 
of preaching and faith, the happened-ness of this victory over the evil 
powers is made known and o~curs again for the believer. Just how this 
is possible is a consideration which is inaccessible to speculation-or 
objectivizing thought, because this unique variant of lldemythologizing" 
does not take place 'Within human analysis (even existentialist analy-
~ . 
sis), but only within the triad of event, proclamation, and faith. No 
objective.reality can be assigned to the demonic forces in themselves, 
- . 
simply because for the believer they now have been overcome by Christ. 
Thus, the believer cannot ignore these powers as harmless, exotic 
images from the primitive· mind, but rather must greet them vr.i. th: Ji'adical 
. ' . 
unbelief, as forces now consigned to exist in nullity. In this way, 
the artificial alternatives posed by Bultmann 1s demythologizing are 
avoided and.the Sache of the text maintained. 
c. The Kerygma and Doctrine 
Bultmannrs attempt to extract the kerygma from the objectivizing 
dangers of mythology is paralleled by his attitude toward the kerygma 
and doctrine. Neither a mythical expression nor a "correct dogma11 must 
become the object of faith. The theological material in the text 
serves only as material for discussion in the ever-renewed~explication 
1. Ibid., pp. 283-87. H. Diem, "Dogma und Ex:istenz, 11 Unter·der Herr-
~t Chr.ist;i: Beitrl!ge zur evangelischen Theologie, ed. E. Wolf 
(Mftncheni I~ser Verlag, 1961), pp. 32-36 {hereafter referred to as 
"Dogma u. Eristenz"). This material is also paralleled in H. Diem, 
"Dogma und Ex:istenz .im theologischen Denken, 11 Philosophie uild 
christliche Existenz: Festschrift flir Heinrich Barth, ed. G. Huber 
(Basel: Helbing u. Lichtenhahn, 1960), pp. ll3-16.(hereafter 
referred to as 11Dogrna u. Eristenz im theol.n). 
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of the kerygma; while the former is indirect, abstract, and always sub-
ject to criticism, the latter suffers from none of these disabilities. 
From this Bultmann infers that the later, post-canonical doctrines and 
confessions are also of questionable value. 
Diem's objection is that Bultmann thereby evades ~he real problem 
of dogma, trying instead to reach the existentiell experience behind 
the text and rejecting in advance the many scriptural statements at-
tempt~ng to interpret such events 11dogmatically, 11 that is, according to 
the event's own self-understanding,. Diem asks whether there really is 
a need to be so suspicious of 11objectification, 11 even though it offends 
modern metaphysics.l He recognizes Bultmann's fear of a mere "objec-
tive truthtt replacing faith; however, 11pure faith 11 is not at one's OiiD 
disposal and cannot be guaranteed within any perspective of thought, 
even that of existentialism. 
Den Missbrauch des Dogmas durch eine falsche '0bjektivation' 
k~nnen wir jedenfalls nicht dadurch verhindern, dass wir 
die dogrnatische .Aussage ~ dem Erkenntnisvorgang tl.ber-
haupt eliminieren. Wir werden uns vielmehr gerade umge-
kehrt darum bemiihen mU.ssen, sie als Moment· in diesem Vor-
gang richtig zu verstehen und zu bestimmen.2 
The prevention of any misuse of doctrine is certainly not clari-
fied by Bultmann's recurring artif~\ alternative of metaphysics as 
contrasted to significance, which he mentions in regard to the confes-
sion of the World Council of Churches. Is it not possible, asks Diem, 
that the intention of a doctrine is something beyond either category? 
1. ~las heisst, pp. 26-27. Cf. H. Diem, Gott und die Metaphysik 
(ThSt, Heft 47; Zollikon-Ztlrich: Evangelischer Verlag, 195b). 
2. Was heisst, p. 28. 
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Vollends unm8glich w.ird das aber, wenn man w.ie Bultmann 
diese Fragen als ein Entweder-Oder stellt: entweder die 
Natur Christi oder der Christus pro me usw. Darauf' 
k6nnte man nur antworten: Weder noch und Sowohl-als-auch; 
denn beides ist gleich richtig und gleich falsch, weil 
beides einen Teilaspekt fUr das Ganze nimmt und damit 
die Sache verfehlt, auf' die es ankonnnt.l 
By posing these two categories as mutually exclusive, Bultmann presents 
a massive reductionism which threatens to flatten and level off all 
theological problems. Significantly, Bultmann gives no positive exam-
ple of a doctrinal statement which he considers valid, with the excep-
tion of the mention of .Jesus as 11the Word of God, 11 a phrase which is 
certainly as ambiguous and open to misunderstanding as any doctrine. 
Of course Diem grants that the intention of doctrinal statements 
is of great existentiell concern to the hearer; this indeed belongs to 
the very nature of doctrine. However, the question is whether the pres-
ent existentiell encounter and existential expli9ation should be ele-
vated to the criteria of the validity of a doct-rine'. 2 Bul tmann • s 
exis~ential interpretation disregards the very nature and origin of 
doctrinal statements, by approaChing the text with an extrinsic per-
spective instead of asking, as the intention of the text requires, 
wh~ther such statements adequately express the revelatory event in 
Christ. BUltmann should consider whether his own perspective is 
schriftgem~ss, rather than asking this about the theological statements 
. . 
in Scri'Pture itself!3 The existential interpretation of dogma is in 
1. Ibid., p. 26. Cf. Dogmatik, p. 72. 
2. 11Dogma u.·Etistenz,u p. 30; 11Dogma u. Etisten~ im theol.,u p. lll. 
3. Was heisst, p. ~5; 11Dogma u. Ex:istenz,n pp. 30-32. 
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danger of turning the irreversible incline between God's act of self-
disclosure and man's knowledge into an interchangeable, reciprocal 
relationship. Diem insists that a doctrinal statement can be judged 
only by reference to its object, namely God's unique revelation. Since 
it expresses this event, it most certainly af£ects the existence of the 
believer in the deepest sense, although it is not dependent for its 
authenticatio~ on his existence. Doctrinal truth thereby includes 
. . 
existentiell truth; but the converse is not true.1 
Diem traces Bultmann's negativ~ attitude· toward doctrine in part 
to a mistaken idea of the nature of dogmatics, which Bultmann considers 
merely a systematized £or.m of biblical theology with pretensions of 
being ultimately definitive. 2 Diem wonders where Bultmann obtained so 
primitive and arrogant a conception of dogmatics; certainly most thea-
logians would grant that their ~rk is just as much in need of repeated 
efforts and renewed struggles with its subject matter as is biblical 
theology. Bultmann thus £ights against a straw man, instead of viewing 
dogmatics as a legitimate, if separate, discipline which is dedicated 
to the reformulation o£ the revelation in Christ into ever contemporary 
ter.ms. As such, it is not merely an occasional, polemical activity, 
but a regular task continually to be pursued in the service of the 
. . 
proclamation.3 For theology, both within the canon and subsequent to 
1. Dogmatik, p. 251; "Dogma u. Ex:istenz im theol., n pp. 110, 117; 
11Dogma u. Existenz, 11 pp. 29, 31. 
2. Dogmatik, p. 67. Of. R. Bultmann, Theologz o£ the New Testament, 
II, 237. 
3. Dogmatik, PP• 73-74; Was heisst, p. 23. 
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it~ exists as a crcitical examination and guide for the proclamation. 
Thus it is not an obscuring covering for the kerygma, but a clarifica-
tion and critical extension of the kerygma, taking its place v1i thin 
the history of God r s self-disclosure. 
4. The Subjectivity of the 'Ex:egete 
a. Faith ~Historical Skepticism 
Diem approves of Bultmann 1s effort to rescue exegesis from the 
fooiish pursuit of an objectivity modeled after the natural sciences. 
BultmaDU is intent upon removing any possible, substitute for the ~­
tentiell faith of the exegete. Diem charges, however, that this effort 
is carried to the extreme that faith is in danger of being isolated 
from th~t in which the believer is to have faith. Does this faith of 
Bultmann's really presuppose the prior revelatory event? 
Aber der Glaube, mit welchem dieser sich fllr die Wahrheit 
des Kerygmas entscheidet, ~ nicht die EntscheidunJn fjg: 
die Teilhabe an der Geschichte des sich selbst ver dig-
EmCren Jesus GhriStUs, wie w.ir den Glaub en definiert 
haben, so:n,dern die Entscheiduni ~ ~ 'Geschichtlich-
~· seiner eigenen Existenz. . 
Far from protecting the ~ fide, this llpurism11 means that faith 
breaks through its own self-doubt by trusting in its own power of 
beliefJ Diem insists that true faith requires instead that the believ-
er trust in the fact that in Jesus a decision has been taken which 
personally affects the believer and his whole destiny, a decision in 
1. Dogmatik, p. 118. Gf. 11Bibelwissenschaft, 11 p. 79. The enigmatic 
reaction of Ebeling (Theologie und Verkllndigung, PP• 29-30, n. 4) 
to such statements is that he will 11leave it to the reader" to de-
cide how far such criticism is actually relevant. 
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wMch the believer is now invited to participate.1 
An interesting relationship is £ound between the radical emphasis 
on faith and Bul tmann' s historical skepticism. It might appear, in 
vieiv of the minute amount of reliable historical information in Scrip-
ture, that Bultmann attempts to make a virtue out of necessity. But 
Diem goes further: he asks whether Bultmann does not contradict himself 
by insisting that the events attested by Scripture not only cannot be 
scientifically verified, but (in the interests of pure faith) must not 
... ----:---
be so verified. 2 Bultmann goes far beyond mere skepticism when, after 
declaring the impossibility of seeking 11behindtt the kerygma, he proceeds 
to do precisely t~at in order to assure the discontinuity between the 
kerygma and JesusJ3 Since investigation ordinarily takes place only 
in order to approximate certainty, this seems to be a paradoxical at-
tempt to nguaranteell an 11insecurity.tt Thus Bultmann deliberately seeks 
negative historical results in order to make a radical decision of faith 
the only remaining possibility. 4 It is not the radicalness of histor-· 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
Ibid., pp. 113-14, 84. 
- .. 
Ibid., p. 62. It may be noted that in Bultmannts latest reply on 
the subject, he charges Diem and others Vii th serving a modern 
interest by seeking to legitimate the kerygma by historical re-
search, perhaps to give the believer a ngood conscience 11 about 
believing (Das Verhhltnis, p. 13). Thus it would appear that the 
illegitimacy of showing a continuity between Jesus and"the kerygma 
is more important than the question of its possibility. 
.. ~ ... .. . 
Dogmatik, p. 83; cf. p. 87. 
P. Althaus, who originally felt that Bultmann 1s negative historical 
resUlts were the cause and not the result of his existential theol-
ogy, now agrees with Diem in this criticism (The So-called Kerygma 
and the Jesus of History, trans. D. Cairns [Edinburgh: Oliver and 
Boyd, 1959], pp. 43-44). 
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icai criticism to which Diem objects; indeed, he defends Bultmann 
against those who would set limits to the freedom of such criticism.l 
But Diem objects to the fact that these historical results appear to 
be demanded by a prior, existentialist concept of faith. The contra-
dictions w.i.thin the present text should be clarified according to the 
self-understanding of the text itself, that is, of the Evangelists 
' 
themselves, rather than by the reconstruction of a Jesus radically 
contrary to everything but what Bultmann considers that the insecurity 
of faith demands. 
b. Self -understanding .~. the verbum· externum 
It is typical of the subjective approach that emphasis is laid 
upon the faith of the biblical authors as well as that of the present 
. . 
reader. However, Diem protests against the use of the term Glaub ens-
zeuge: 11Nicht seinen eigenen ffiauben w.i.ll der Apostel bezeugen--was 
wiirde mir das helfen?--, sondern er bezeugt mit allem, was er sagt, die 
'grossen Taten Gottes. 1112 The gracious action of God, and not the 
faith of its w.i. tnesses, is the heart of Scripture. Yet the objective 
reality of this revelation is unintentionally endangered by Bultmann 1 s 
subjective approach. Her~ Diem sees Bultmann as the culmination of 
a long tradition of German pietism, which has always emphasized the 
personal experience of salvation and preaching for decision. Bultmann-
ian existentialism has substituted 11decision of faithlt for Uconversionn 
1. Theo1ogie, p. 9. 
2. H. Diem, "Die Geburt der Gemeinde in der Predigt,n EvTh, JX 
(1949-50), 196. Hereafter referred to as 11Geburt derGemeinde.n 
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and llkerygmatic" fo~ 11 evangelistic, 11 but its basic approach and concern 
is the same as that of pietism.1 
Was die Bul tmannschen Theologen in dies em Punkt von den 
pietistischen Predigern unterscheidet, ist im wesentlichen 
nur das, dass sie mi. t 1dssenschaftlicher Methodik und 
Konsequenz das tun, was dort unmethodischer, willktlrlicher 
und primitiver geschieht.2 
Diem1 s basic criticism of the pietists then can also be applied 
to Bul tmann: the verbum externurn has been sacrificed. Bul tmann of 
course does not accept this criticism, but insists that the inward 
testimony of the Spirit is bound to the proclamation of the Word. 
However, Diem charges that Bultmannts verbum ex.ternum is external in 
the merely formal sense that has already been noted regarding the Dass, 
namely that a truth is proclaimed which may originate from outside of 
the believer, but after its appearance it is the believer's own exist-
ence that verifies it. Diem, on the contrary, says that this revela-
tory verbum is not merely a new truth communicated to and assimilated 
' 
by the believer, but a Geschichte of God 1s self-disclosure which has 
its validity prior to and apart from its reception by the believer.3 
The fact attested by the tangible proclamation of the Church in word and 
sacrament is precisely the fact that there is an irreversible incline 
(Gef§lle) between God's Word and man's faith. Yet the irreversible 
1. Tlieologie, p. 80; Was heisst, p. 52. H. Diem,- 11Der Theologe 
zwischen Text und Predigt," EvTh, XVIII (1958), 292 [hereafter 
referred to as 11Der Theologe~ 
2. IIBibelwissenschaft, 11 p. 77. 
3. Was heisst, "pp. · 48-49. H. Diem, Taufverktlndigung und· Taufordnung 
(ThEx, N. F. Nr. 98; ~chen: Kaiser Verlag, 1962), pp. 8-9. The 
latter will hereafter be referred to as Taufverktlndigung. 
relationship implied by the verbum externum is endangered by Bultmann. 
Auf diesen Punkt konzentriert sich das ganze Interesse 
der reformatorischen Theologie;:Qacfidem sie alle anderen 
sicherungen preisgegeben hat; denn ~ CB:esesicherung' 
durchgebrannt ist, dann kann man zwar innner noch meinen, 
das sola fide zu habeil,'" aber mit dem solus cbristus uhd· 
sola ---sbr'iptUra... ist es aus, und: niclits kann uns mehr diiV'or 
retten, dass die VerktlnCB:"gungzu einem "Cfe'Spr[ch der 
Kirche mit sich s·elber wird und der ::L Glaubende nur noch 
~ seine eigene Glliubigkei t glaubt. 
To put the matter differently, Bul tmann uses two "hermeneutical 
circles .n The first one is between the kerygma and the response of 
believing understanding; with this Diem agrees. 2 However, this first 
llcircle 11 is engulfed by a second, v1hich is the reciprocal movement of 
- . 
self-understanding and the understanding o£ Scripture. Thereby the 
' 
exegete's self -und~rstanding gains predominance' making the first 
. . 
"circle" illuso;ry. 3 Diem points out that the verbum externum can be 
prevented from evaporating only when the understanding subject remains 
subordinate to the sheer fact that revelation has been given from out-
side the perceiving subject. 
Diese Qrdnung ist bei Bul tmann umgekehrt: Ich befrage die 
Mitteilung, w!!hrend mir doch etwas mi tgeteil t 1-rird. Da-
durch biege ich jede Lebensliusserung, die mir ·mBglicher-
weise etwas Neues mitteilen will, von·vorneherein um in 
1. Dogmatik, p. 85. Cf. TaufverkU.ndigung, p. 9. 
2. W. Matthias (11 Ex:egese, Dogmatik, Verktindigung, 11 EvTh, XJX [1959], 
262) asserts that Diem actually does not agree even-with thts first 
circle, since Diem r s hermeneutical circle is within the proclama-
tion itself rather.than between the past kerygma and the present 
epistemological equipment of the exegete. Matthias is correct con-
cerning Diem 1 s own usage of 11hermeneutical circle; n but the point 
here is that iaem could accept a redefined'version of Bultmannts 
first circle if it were not for the second. Cf. Was neisst, p. 12. 
3. Was heisst, pp. ll-12; cf. p. 5o. 
91 
ein Ph~omen, das erst dadurch zum Reden kommen kann, 
dass ich ibm als ein Subjekt begegne.l 
Bultmann would protest that the externality of the Word is secured 
from being a mere function of the self-understanding because the origin 
and impetus of revelation is in the historical fact of Jesus. Diem r s 
reply is that Bultmann's argument is circular, because this sheer his-
torical fact itself can be neither relevant for faith nor the object of 
preaching until it first gains meaning through the kerygma.2 This is 
the motive behind Bultmann1s famous statement that 11the saving efficacy 
of the cross is ~ot derived from the fact that it is the cross of 
Christ: it is the cross of Christ because it has this saving efficacy.u3 
Die Frage ist, ob bei Bultmann nicht eine blos'se Wechsel-
wirkung .stattfindet zwischen dem Kerygma auf der einen 
Seite, das den Glauben und ein neues Selbstverst~dnis 
wirkt, und dem menschlichen Selbstverstfuldnis auf der 
anderen Seite, das im Kerygma den Ruf zur Entscheidung 
fUr seinen existentiellen Vollzug h8rt und darin das 
Kerygma als Kerygma erkennt. Das Kerygma kann ja als 
Handeln Gottes nichts anderes verkUndigen, als was dem 
menschlichen Vorverst~dnis von den geschichtlichen 
MBglichkeiten entspricht und kann nur insoweit als Er-
m6glichung eines neuen Selbstverst~ndnisses und damit 
als Kerygma verstanden werden, als es dem menschlichen 
Verstfuldnis vpn EKistenz zu seinem existentiellen Voll-
zug verhilft.4 
If Bultmann cannot preserve the indispensable priority of the Word 
over man's faith and self-understanding, then theology has after all 
been dissolved into anthropology.5 
1. Theologie, p. 101. 2. Dogmatik3 p. 86. 
3. R. Bul tmann, Kerygma and Jtrth, p. l.,l. 4. Dogmatik, p. 85. 
5. "Dogma u. EKistenz, 11 pp. 31-32. 
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5. The Hermeneuticai System 
Diem agrees that subjectivity has a proper place in exegesis, but 
the danger within Bultmann 1s approach is that this subjectivity has 
come to be based on rigid systematic principles which prevent the 
verbum externum even from regaining it~ dissipated priority. This pro-
pensity has always been present in Bultrnann, but not until the appear-
ance in 1927 of Heidegger 1s Sein und Zeit did Bultrnann 1s tendenc~es 
become hardened into a system. 
a. The Development toward EristentiaJ.ism 
In tracing this development, Diem finds it instructive to compare 
Bultmann 1s early article IIDas Problem einer theologischen EXegese des 
Neuen Testaments" (19.25), 1 1n th his more recent article IIDas Problem der 
. . 
Hermeneutikll (1950). 2 In the earlier essay, Bultrnann plead for a Sach-
kritik which would examine the extent that the Sache of the text has 
found adequate expression in the Gesagte, and which would renounce any 
attempt to prejudge the possibilities of the text. 11Die mit der 
Sachexegese geforderte Sachkritik kann ihren Massstab nur aus der durch 
den Text erschlossenen Sache, ftber die sie nicht vorher verftlgt, ge-
winnen. 113 IIDie rechte Befragung des Textes kann nur eine glaubende 
sein, d. h. eine i~ Gehorsam gegen die Autorit!!t der Schrift begrtind-
1. ZdZ, III (1925), 334-57. It may be significant that while many· of 
Bultrnann 1s early articles have been reprinted, this one has not. 
2. Reprinted in GV, II, 211-35. Diem makes this comparison in 
11Theologie zwischen,n pp. 401-404. 
3. 11Problem einer.theologischen EXegese,tt p. 340. 
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ete.nl Bultmann at that time -said that the possibilities of human 
existence cannot be predetermined, but stand ever open to'each concrete 
situation; 2 this is in contrast to his later Vorverst&ndnis of existen-
tiell possibilities. Bultmann in 1925 also attacked contemporary 
efforts to pre-define the historical possibilities within the text; 
yet in 1950 he showed no hesitation in requiring just this.3 In 1925 
" . 
~ultm.ann was sus:picious of any hermeneutipal principle, but by 1950 he 
was so no longer.4 In the earlier article he criticized those modern 
exegetes whose perspective resulted from the basic exposition of human 
- -
existence, but tbis later became the very framework of his own method.5 
Diem's comment on this development is that there are differences 
but also a continuity between the Bultmann of 1925 and the :Sultmann of 
1950. Probably he could not have simply remained with the openness of 
his 1925 position, but would have had to develop into some more system-
. . 
atic, stable position. 
1. 
3. 
-
4. 
Der 'Fortschritt 1 Bultmanns liegt darin, dass die richtige 
Auslegung, die· frfiher nur in der existentiellen Lebendig-
keit des Vollzugs Ereignis werden und durch keine Kriterien 
sich als solche ausweisen konnte, jetzt innerhalb eines 
w.i.ssenschaftlich gesicherten Begriffsgefliges nach eiper 
bestimmten Methode vor sich geht, bis hin zu der '~my­
thologisierung' als einem 'hermeneutischen Prinzip.' 
Ib~d., p. 352; cf. p. 344. 2. Ibid., P• 344. 
Gf. ibid., pp. 337, 339, 349, with GV, II, 231. 
Gf; "Problem einer · theologischen Ex:egese, 11 pp. 341, 349, with 
GV, II, 235, n. 37. 
5. "Problem einer theologischen Ex:egese, 11 p. 344, and Q!_, III, 147. 
. . 
6. H. Diem, "Theologie zwischen, 11 p. 403. 
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Buitmannts development is onecfrom existentiell openness and question-
ing to an existential system and pre-understanding. Thus, after 1927, 
all of the essays written by him can be closely correlated with one 
another. 
Bul tmann may reply that existentialism is only the logical expli-
cation of the structure of existence and therefore a legitimate aid to 
exegesis. Diem denies this, indicating that just such ~ assumption is 
responsible for the Widespread error of subsuming Kierkegaard 1 s Exist-
enzdialektik (which, rejecting every contemplative analysis,, viewed 
exist·ence as an action, as an existentiell task) under Heidegger 1:s 
philosophica,l examination of the structure of Dasein.1 liEs gibt kein 
- . 
Denken, in dem die Eldstenz unmittelbar als solche ausdrilcken 'Wftrde.u2 
Heideggerian existentialism is of questionable value in illuminating 
the exegete's existentiell commitment of faith, and such existential-
ism is also unable by "transcending i tself11 to become a substitute 
for theology.3 
1. 
2. 
3. 
Dogmatik, pp. 25, 33. Cf. Die Existenzdialektik von SBren Kierke-
gaard. Diem says that this error is further illustrated by the 
~that the first title proposed for the Englisli translation of 
this latter work.was The Existential Dialectic ••• ; but it was 
quickly changed to Kierkegaard's Dialectic of Existence (Edin-
burgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1959). 
H. Diem, Kritischer Idealismus in theologischer Sicht (MUnchen: 
Kaiser Verlag, 1934), pp. 8-9. Hereafter referred to as Kritischer 
Ideilismus. This work is a discussion v-rlth the existential philos-
ophy of Heinrich Barth and is therefore of some relevance here. 
-. . -
Ibid., pp. 91-100; Theologie, p. 45. 
95 
b. EOCegetical Consequences 
Bultmann, of course, would not admit that Heidegger's analysis of 
existence has assumed control over his own thought. By his own inten-
tion, Bultmann is a dedicated biblical theologian, seeking only to 
elicit the message already contained within Scripture. Indeed, it has 
been observed that in Bul tmann, all issues and problems are subsumed 
under the hermeneutical question.1 However, says Diem, the fact that 
Bultmann's attention and intention is focused on Scripture does not 
prevent a definite systematic conception from standing behind his exe-
. . . 
gesis. Of course every exegete has such prior conceptions; but the 
question is whether Bultmann1s presuppositions are open to criticism 
. . . 
or confirmation by Scripture itself. 2 
Here Diem finds cause to register his final and most serious crit-
icism, for he finds Bultmann entrenched w.i.thin an unassailable circle 
between exegetical results and s,ystematic presuppositions. One cannot 
argue with hiin exegetically, because of his recurring axiomatic themes, 
and one cannot discuss his systematic presuppositions because he always 
appeals to his exegetical results. nso macht ihn sein hermeneutischer 
Zirkel unangreifbar gegen jede Frage. • • • Nur innerhalb dieses Zir-
kels kann er mit sich reden lassen. 11 3 
Diem r s charge is that this circle does not allow Scripture: to 
--:-----~-....--.. 
1. Dogmatik, p. 33. H. Diem, 11Die Bibel als Norm der Theologie,n 
Wissenschaft una·verantwortung: Universit~tstage, 1962 (Berlin: 
De Gruy-ter & Co.,·1962), p. 40 lhereafter referred to as tiBibel'als 
Normu]. Cf. S. P. Schilling, 11 Continental Theology Today,n p. 37. 
... .. .., . .. 
2. Dogmatik, pp. 60, 217. 3. Ibid.' p. 218. 
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express its true content. Bui tmann 1 s 11 system11 does violence to the 
actual self -understanding of the scriptural witness. For Bul tmann 
peers 11behind11 the text, to establish a historical insecurity, and asks 
ltprior" to the text about the interpretive possibilities arising from 
one 1 s self-unde_rstanding, but fails to confront the text itself or to 
ask from the text "backll to the will of God attested by the canonical 
witness.l He has elevated the ease with which a scriptural statement 
can be translated into modern concepts and a personal existentiell 
encounter into the criterion of exeges:is • 2 Diem, to the contrary, 
l 
insists that the text itself must place the exegete 1s concepts criti-
cally in question. Not the interpreter's own self-understanding, but 
the self-understanding of the Scriptures themselves must be the basis 
of exegesis. 
Some examples are offered of the exegetical distortions caused by 
Bultmann's existential system. Bultmann is sure that the historical 
Jesus could not have proclaimed himself as Messiah; but Diem points out 
. t~at.~he ambiguities of the actual t6Kt at least leave this question 
open.3 Since authentic words actually deriving from Jesus are declared 
to be irrelevant or even dangerous to faith, it is no c0incidence that 
few such words accordingly are discovered.4 The Ascension narratives 
are said to be lacking in the oldest traditions: not just as a matter 
of fact, but necessarily lacking.5 finally, Bultmann detects in the 
1. Was heisst, p. 21; Grundfragen, p. 38. 
2. lfTheologie zwischen, 11 p. 403. 
4. Irdischer Jesus, p. 14. 
3. Dogmatik, p. 116; cf. p. 125. 
5. Dogmatik, p. 289. 
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New Testament two different views of the Holy Spirit, namel~ as super-
natural force and as the wonder of a human act of obedient decision; 
the choice between these two concepts is made on the basis of Bult-
mann 1s own systematic presupposition, and thereby is not discussable 
exegetically.l Diem comments that such arbitrary procedures would 
seem to indicate that existentialism in fact has substituted its own 
Theologumenon for the locus of the event itself that is attested by 
the text.2 
Diem's charge, then, is th'at although Bultmannrs primary intention 
is exegesis, one actually cannot discuss with him exegetically. The 
m~re Bultmann has developed and strengthened his hermeneutical method, 
the ~~ss he has been open to discussion with other exegetical opin-
ions.3 Every issue raised in his exegesis leads back to his systematic 
presuppositions, Which prevent a creative conversation with those who 
approach the same texts with different conceptions. Instead of con-
tributing to the common effort of all interpreters who encounter and 
must respond to the difficulties of the scriptural text and its self-
understanding, Bultmann evades these difficulties by f~ling back upon 
his Oim anthropological possibilities for significance.4 Diem's con-
elusion, then, is that while Bultmann has contributed some valuable 
1. Was heisst, pp. 56-60; Grundfragen, p. 37. 
2. Dogmatilc, p. 204. 
" . 
3. IITlieologie zwischen, 11 p. 404; cf. Was heisst, p. 57; Dogmatik, 
pp. 243, 269-70. 
4. Was heisst, pp. 58, 49. 
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emphases and scholarship in biblical research~ nevertheless his herme-
neutical system must be brought under the judgment of the self-under-
standing of Sc~~pture itself, so that genuine verification by exegesis 
may take place. 
Bultmann1 s response to the hermeneutical crisis thus is judged to 
be inadequate and generally misleading. The second currently influen-
tial herme~eutical alternative is that of the dogmatic theology of 
Karl Barth. May this perhaps prove to be more adequate? 
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CHAPTER TIT 
THE RESPONSE OF DOffifA.TIC THEOLOGY 
A. The Hermeneutics of ~1 Barth 
1. Introduction 
The appearance in 1918 of the first edition of Karl Barth's R8mer-
brief proved to be the catalyst for the coalescence of various elements 
into a new theological m•.ov:ement, whose activity was expressed in the 
creative, tumultuous decade of the publication of Zwischen den Zeiten • 
.AJ. though Barth remained perhaps the leading figure, he also maintained 
a certain detachment from some of the formative influences of Zwischen 
den Zeiten which w·ere more consistently expressed by the Gogarten-
Bultmann 'Wing of the movement. For instance, the insights of ~­
geschichte found a ready reception in Barth 1 s thought, insofar as they 
disclosed the given text as the sole datum of exegesis, rather than any 
reconstruction of prior events, and the pervasive influence of the 
Church in the composition and interpretation of Scripture. But Barth 
h;3.d little interest in the detailed labor of Form-criticism concerning 
each pericope on the solely historical level. Also, he increasingly 
rejected the strong influence of existentialism in Zwischen den Zeiten. 
The rubric which best characterized Barth in his aloofness from 
the existentialist wing of the movement ~as 11 theological exegesis. 11 
His protest was against the contemporary connnentaries on Scripture, 
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which with scholarly care reconstructed past eras, c~rected the trans-
mitted text, and gave precise equivalents for each phrase, but which 
renounced any theological penetration into the text as being beyond the 
realm of the scholar. Barth 1 s complaint was "that recent cormnentators 
confine themselves to an interpretation of the text which seems to me 
to be no commentary at all, but merely the first step towards a commen-
tary .nl The exegete 1 s task was not completed until he realized that 
Scripture was written with a pointedly theological purpose, namely the 
proclamation of God's Word in Christ, and until a correspondingly theo-
logical exegesis was undertaken which would clarify this Word of God 
in its impact on the present day. 
a. Some Early &phases 
Within Barth's theological exegesis, certain characteristic 
emphases soon became evident. One is that the exegete and his methods 
are subordinate to the awesome content of the canonical text. The 
investigator of Scripture finds that he himself has become the investi-
gated, the one placed in question and judged. 11 The question, What is 
within the Bible? has a mortifying way of converting itself into the 
opposing question, Well, "ivhat are you looking for, and who are you, 
pray, who make bold to lo0k?"2 If the exegete insists upon forcing his 
own issues and perspective upon the text, he may expect the implicit 
1. 
2. 
K. Barth, The Epistle to the Romans, p. 6. 
K. Barth, The Word of God and the Word of Man, trans. D. Horton 
(New York: Harper, [1928] 1957), p. 32. Hereafter referred to 
as Word of God and Man. 
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reply: 
'My dear sir, these are your problems: you must not ask me! 
••• If you do not care to enter upon~ questions, you--
may, to be sure, find in me all sorts of arguments and quasi-
arguments for one or another standpoint, but you will not 
then find what is really here.rl 
The Bible presents not man t s thoughts about God, but God r s thoughts 
about man; not the history of man, but the history of God. 2 
The dominating presence of the Word of God within Scripture means 
that the inadequacy of man is met by the adequacy of God, that the exe-
gete can only respond to the disclosure already initiated by God. The 
objectivity that finds expression within Scripture grasps and envelops.-
the subjectivity of the exegete, and not the converse. This emphasis 
was in sharp contrast to that of the existentialist wing of Zwischen den 
Zeiten. As early as the third edition of the R~merbrief in 1922, the 
controversy with Bultrnann was becoming evident,3 and in 1932 Barth 
completed the rewriting of the Prolegomena of his Dogmatics which made 
clear his break ,;.Ji th existentialism: 
In the [existentialist] undertaking I can only see 
a readoption of the line Schleiermacher-Ritschl-
Herrmann, and ••• in any thinkable continuation 
of this line I can only see the plain destruction
4 of Protestant theology and the Protestant Church. 
1. Ibid.' p. 43. 2. ~., pp. 43, 45. 
3. liThe Preface to the Third Edition, 11 The Epistle to the Romans, 
pp. 16-18. 
4. K. Barth, Church Dogmatics (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1936-62), 
I/1, x; cf. 21 [hereafter referred to by the widely used symbol 
CD]. Cf. also K. Barth, Rudolf Bul tmann: Ein Versuch, ihn .zu ver-
stehen (ThSt, Heft 34; Zollikon-ZUrich: Evangelischer Verlag, 1953), 
p. 53 [hereatter referred to as Bultmann: Versuch]. 
Barth sees the tradition of pietism and liberalism, id th all its 
anthropocentric implications, as continued by existentialism, which 
thereby sacrifices the sovereign objectiv.i.ty of the Word of God. 
Here too it is true that whoso would keep his life shall 
lose it; but whoso shall lose it for My sake shall gain 
his life. Whoso means to rescue and preserve the subjec-
tive element shall lose it; but whoso gives it up for the 
sake o£ the objective, shall save it.l 
Man 1 s proper subjectivity is granted him only when he submits to the 
objective Word of God, which is done by seeking to understand Scripture 
on its own terms. This affirmation of theological exegesis was and has 
remained a fundamental characteristic of Barth's thought .• 
A second early emphasis of Barth's has undergone a greater modifi-
cation in the course of the last four decades. Perhaps the greatest 
shock occas~oned by the R8merbrief, in its contrast to former commen-
taries, was the _presentation of God a-s "wholly other," as incompre-
hensible by finite human nature. The .Almighty is "not a thing among 
other things, but the Wholly Other. 112 This theological motif was 
pointedly directed at the liberal's approach of measuring God with 
cri~eria and conceptions drawn from human consciousness and values. 
The basis first chosen for this polemical emphasis was a concept 
expressed by Kierkegaard which had great influence in Zwischen den 
Zeiten, including Bultmann, and which vTas rooted deeply in e:P.stential-
ism: 
1. K. Barth, Dogmatics in Outline, trans. G. T. Thompson (New York: 
Harper, [1949] 19~9), p. 16. '' 
2. Word of God and Man, p. 74. 
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If I have a system, it is limited to recognition of 
what Kierkegaard called the 'infinite qualitative dis-
tinction 1 between time and eternity, and to my regard-
ing this as possessing negative as well as positive 
significance: 'God is in heaven, and thou art on earth. rl 
The Bible confronted man with a "strange new world" in which the 
realm of time was intersected by eternity, leaving a "crater," a void 
incomprehensible as history. Thus, the Bible was described as "non-
historical," "otherworldly," presenting a realm utterly beyond human 
thought and a judgment upon all human enterprises. At times, in 
Barth r s early writings, the relationship of God and man seemed to be 
overwhelmed by the crisis of the awesome dialectic between eternity 
and time. 2 
The emphasis on this incomprehensible "othernesstt of God, however, 
began to be modirfied from the moment that Barth came to reject its 
foundation, the dualism of time and eternity, in reaction to the exis-
tentialists. The 11 infinite qucill..itative distinction," Barth later 
admitted, was an early polemical emphasis which was lfonly partially in 
the right. n3 In contrast to the other associates of Zwischen den 
Zei ten, Barth by the mid-1920 1 s hardly mentioned the name of Kierke-
gaard. The early emphasis on the gulf between the inadequacy of man 
and the otherness of God increasingly was replaced by a Ohristological 
1. The Epistle to the Romans, p. 10. 
2. Ibid., p. 29; Word of God and Man, pp. 68-69, 73-74, 80. Of. the 
criticisms of F. Gogarten (11 Karl Barths Dogrnatik, n pp. 60-80, 
especially pp. 69-78), who char~dthat Barth posited only an 
abstract God and an abstract man in mutual isolation. 
3. K. Barth, The Humanity of God (Richmond: John Knox Press, 1960), 
p. 42. 
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eni'phasis upon the gracious reconciliation of man and God through the 
Incarnation. Some observers have therefore distinguished a 11new Barth" 
from the earlier Barth.1 Whether such a term is justified or not,; 
Barth readily admits that his insights have been corrected and deepened 
by the scriptural revelation itself, and that he has striven to free 
himself from the philosophical prejudgments of existentialism. The 
llotherness 11 of God and the estrangement of man have been basically over-
come in Christ, so that now neither one may be mentioned abstractly or 
in isolation from each other. Jesus Christ is God in his movement 
toward man, and man is the fellow-being with Christ. 2 In brief, while 
the early emphasis on the objective predominance of the text over the 
subjectivity of the exegete has remained character.istic of Barth, the 
accompanying emphasis upon the ttotherness11 of God has been greatly 
modified by a new awareness of the implications of the Incarnation for 
even the remotest aspects of theology. 
b. ~ Double Nature ~ Scripture 
Just as the Incarnation involved the paradoxical presence of God 
and man within Christ, so the scriptural record of this event combines 
a divine and a human aspect, says Barth. The Bible is the Word of God 
within the sign of human words which attest it. 
[Scripture] is neither divine only nor human only. Nor is 
it a mixture of the two nor a tertium guid between them. 
But in its own way and degree it is very God and very man, 
i. e., a witness of revelation which itself belongs to 
1. Cf. E. Brunner, IIDer neue Barth, 11 ZThK, XLVIII (1951), 89-100. 
2. CD, II/2, 3-14; CD, III/2, 132-52. 
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revelation, and historically a very human literary 
document.1 
Of course in Scripture there is no unity of person between the human 
writers and God, as there was in the Incarnation; nonetheless the sign 
of the Word of God is erected amidst those mortal witnesses. Thus the 
exegete must approach the Bible, prepared to take into account the 
human condi tionedness of the words and yet to hear there the Word of 
God itself. 
There is no direct connection between the Word of God and the 
Bible as such, no divine attribute inhering statically in the extant 
text. The Church can only say that it recollects that in this book it 
has heard the Word of God, and therefore it expects again to hear this 
Word in this book. 2 
The statement that the Bible is the Word of God cannot 
therefore say that the Word of God is tied to the Bible. 
On the contrary, what it must say is that the Bible is 
tied to the Word of God. But that means that in this 
statement we contemplate a free decision of God.3 
God does not thereby incur any obligation to man, either to the scrip-
tural authors or to the exegetes, but simply uses these written words 
from time to time to express his Word, just as he has on occasion 
stirred the waters of the pool of Bethesda. Upon this free decision of 
God the Church and its exegetes await. 
Another way of expressing this double nature of Scripture is by 
the concept of "witness • 11 Barth points out that as a witness, <the 
1. CD, I/2, 501. 
3. CD, I/2, 513. 
2. Ibid., p. 530. Of. CD, I/1, lll-13. 
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canon has both a limitation and a positive element.1 A witness is 
limited because it is thereby separate and distinguished from that 
which is attested. On the other hand there is a positive element, for 
a real witness sets the revelation before its hearers and is itself the 
revelation in that accomodating form which is accessible to the pres-
ent. The implications of this paradox may now be more fully examined. 
2. The Biblical Witness in its Humanity 
a. The Christ Attested 
The center of Scripture is the attestation of the Resurrection of 
Jesus Christ, in which God has disclosed his judgment and grace, and to 
which the Holy Spirit continues to attest. But this event is supra-
historical and beyond human comprehension. Thus Scripture cannot 
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contain the transcendent 11real time11 of God, the revelation itself, but 
can be only the record of those who have witnessed this event. The pres-
ent texts are all in one way or another oriented and qualified by this 
center-point. Even the creation stories of Gen. 1-2 speak 11figurative-
ly and prophetically11 of Christ. 2 For this reason, the Bible is not to 
be read legalistically as a code of precepts for correct belief or mor-
al living. Rather, as a witness the text points beyond itself and in 
the direction of the lilTing Christ, and for this purpose the text urges 
its cla:iln upon the Church. 3 The reliability of Scripture is founded 
upon the fact that its central focus is on Christ, as God's own self-
disclosure, and from this point its statements are to be interpreted. 
1. ~., p. 463. 2. CD, III/1, 23. 3. CD, IV/1, 723. 
The unity of the Old and New Testaments is derived from this com-
mon witness to Christ. The canonical authors are separated into two 
ranks or tiers, 11 the Time of Elcpectation" and ttthe Time of Recollec-
tion, 11 so that God's central self-disclosure is surrounded with antiph-
onal praise and attestation.1 The Old Testament guards the New against 
every form of docetism and ensures the particularity of the Incarnation 
into Jewish flesh; and on the other hand the New Testament illumines 
the proper interpretation of the Old. Both are equally Holy Scripture, 
and the only distinctions remaining are that each writer is an indi-
vidual with his own characteristics, and that some happened to have 
lived before Christ 1 s appearance and some afterward. 2 
b. The Human Attestation 
However, the human element and its unavoidable limitations must 
be recognized in the biblical witness. The error of biblicism is that 
it supposes Scripture to be a collection of oracles, a direct :i.mparta-
tion of truths, rather than genuine witnessing to the Word. But the 
canonical writers speak not as angels, but as men who use a concrete 
historical form of expression and are unable to escape the limitations 
of their conditioned perspectives and personal styles. Historical 
criticism makes possible the opportunity ot viewing Scripture as gen-
uine witnessing, Uein menschliches Dokument, mitten in der ganzen 
1. CD, I/2, 70-112·, 481-82; 2£, IV/1, 166-68, 323, 670-71. 
2. CD, I/2, 482. In a historical excursus on p. 485, Barth points out 
that in the past 11 the failure to recognise the unity of Scripture 
involved sooner or later, and inevitably, a failure to recognise 
that it is Holy Scripture." 
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Religionsgeschichte.u1 The biblical authors were holy men only by 
virtue of their divine commission, and not because of any extraordinary 
talents which made them religious geniuses or moral heroes. "At this 
level they are only like us and all men. Perhaps there have been much 
more pious men and cleverer and better men than these prophets and 
apostles. 11 2 Nonetheless, God chose and commissioned these men, because 
the revelation could be proclaimed to all generations only if it were 
first disclosed to a fei-r specific men, 1r1ho became the first witnesses 
and thereby made possible subsequent witnessing. 
The unmitigated humanity of these writers, however, means that 
their witness is both contingent and limited. The words of Scripture 
can only be a u sign," a witnessing finger pointing to the incarnate 
Word. The p:r-ophe'ts and apostles were fallible men, with an unconceal-
able capacity for error, which thereby excludes biblicistic notions of 
human inspiration and provides an occasion for God's grace. For the 
biblical teaching concerning man, which of course includes these 
writers, claims that 
they can be at fault in any word, and have been at fault 
in every word, and yet according to the same scriptural 
witness, being justified and sanctified by grace alone, 
they have still spoken the Word of God in their fallible 
and erring human word. 3 
Barth finds himself unable to penetrate beyond this paradoxical 
relationship, but can only delimit it further. 
1. K. Barth, Credo (Zollikon-Zftrich: Evangelischer Verlag, 1948), 
p. 162. Cf. CD, III/1, 93-94; CD, III/3, 200-204. 
-- --
2. CD, I/2, 491. 3. Ibid., p. 530; cf. p. 674. 
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For that reason every time we turn the Word of God into 
an infallible biblical word of man or the biblical word 
of man into an infallible Word of God we resist that 
which we ought never to resist, i. e., the truth of the 
miracle that here f~ible men speak the Word of God in 
fallible human words. 
These witnesses live by the object they attest, and the miracle is that 
God is not ashamed of making use of their limitations and conditioned-
ness, but continues to attest himself through them. 
It may be noted at this point that Barth vigorously affirms the 
historical revelation in Ghrist, but by 11historici ty11 he seems primari-
ly to mean concreteness within human life, rather than apprehensibil-
ity by the usual methods of the historian. 11Historical does not there-
fore have i t.s usual meaning of 'historical. 1112 Just as eye-witnesses 
to the original biblical events were often blind to any revelatory 
significance, so also today historical methods are incapable of grasping 
the presence of the Word of God within the words of the text. None-
theless, the very factuality and 11happenedness 11 of the revelation in 
history is the essence of its significance.3 The historicity of the 
revelation is the means by "tvhich the stream of human existence is 
grasped and confronted by the Word of God. 11 Geschichtlichkeit hiesse 
in unserem Zusammenhang: das Verhaftetsein der Zeugen an ihre konkrete 
Gescbichte, als Realit~t, der sie nicht entgehen kBnnen und die sicb in 
1. Ibid., p~ 529. 2. CD, I/1, 373; cf. 373-80. 
3. 'rt is at this point that Barth's concept of history and Geschicht-
lichkeit differs from that of Bultmann 1s, for in the latter's case 
the factuality seems to have only an introductory function. Gf. 
CD, IV/1, 223-24; Bultmann: Versuch, p. 21. 
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dem, was sie sagen, vielfM.l.tig spiegelt.ul 
3. The Biblical Witness as the Word of God 
a. The Threefold Form of the Word 
- ----
The authority of Scripture as the Word of God is founded upon the 
fact that Scripture is the concrete medium through which the Church 
recollects and has access to the past revelation in Ghrist, which in 
turn enables the Church to expect this same revelation in the future 
within the went of proclamation. Barth describes the Word of God as 
thus having a threefold form, three times or phases.2 The revealed 
Word of God itself appeared long ago in Jesus Christ, in the event of 
11 God with us. 11 As a past occurrence, however, this revelation is no 
longer accessible to the Church except through its 11 second form, 11 the 
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documents of the Bible, which recalls and confronts the Church ever anew 
with this event. The Bible ensures that the Church is not left alone 
in self-contemplation, but imposes itself upon the Church as being 11the 
-written Word of God. 11 As a result, the Church is empowered and commis-
sioned to present 11 the Word of God as preached, 11 the continued procla-
mation of the past event in which God himself speaks afresh to the 
present. 
These three aspects can all be considered as part of the one reve-
lation, in which the Word revealed in Christ continues to urge its 
1. G. Eichholz, "Der Ansatz Karl Earths in der Hermeneutik, 11 Antwort 
(Zollikon-ZUrich: Evangelischer Verlag, 1956), p. 59. 
2. en, I/1, 98-140. 
claim on the present generation. To be sure, the canon and the procla-
mation are not identical with the revealed Word itself, but only point 
beyond themselves and attest the Word. Thus, 11revelation is originally 
a.r:ld :i.mm.ediately, what the Bible and ChWch proclamation are derivative-
ly and mediately, God 1 s Word. 111 In the sovereign freedom of grace, the 
Word from time to time uses these -v1I'itten and preached forms, and only 
in the renewed event of God's self-disclosure do these media become 
anew the Word of God. Nonetheless, each of these three times of the 
Word are lmown only through the other tw·o. This unity and inter depend-
ence, which finds its only analogy in the Trinity itself, allows the 
Church in confident faith to expect the Word anew in the proclamation 
that is based upon the recollection of the same Word in Scripture. 
b. The Primacy of the Text 
- ---
Barth 1 s claim, then, is that God 1 s revelation may be found solely 
through the written phase of the Word. For this reason, the biblical 
text has an irreversible primacy over the exegete and his methods. 
We cannot have revelation 1in itself.' ••• In this ques-
tion of revelation we cannot, therefore, free ourselves 
from the texts in which its expectation and recollection 
is attested to us. We are tied to these texts. .And we 
can only ask about revelation when we surrender to the 
expectation and recollection attested in these texts. 2 
Thus Barth vigorously rejects any efforts to penetrate 11behind11 the 
given text or, by using these texts as mere 11 sources, 11 to reconstruct 
some previous happening which in fact comes to resemble the personal 
1. Ibid., p. 131. ' 2. CD, I/2, 492. 
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criteria of the interpreter.L Even Form-criticism is not free from a 
refined version of this foolish search. 2 .A truly 11historicalu inter-
pretation would focus its attention, not upon the circumstances and 
idiosyncrasies of the biblical expressions, but upon what these expres-
sions signify, the Word that is there attested. The Church can distin-
guish between Christ, the prophets and apostles, and the resulting 
Scriptures, yet it cannot separate these aspects. Thus the Church is 
directed solely to lithe sign of this sign, 11 that is, to the recorded 
witness of those who first expected and recollected Christ the Word) 
This centrality of the canonical text through which God's Word is 
revealed has several consequences. It means that these biblical words 
must be read with 11utter loyalty, 11 a loyalty to their underlying inten-
tion which llsurely cannot end at a particular point, and certainly can-
not be exhausted by an exposure of the author's literary affinities • 114 
It also means that the exegete is absolved from trying to differentiate 
in Scripture between the divine and the human, the infallible and the 
erroneous, the acceptable and the dispensable.5 For all parts of 
Scripture are written by fallible and time-bound hands, and yet all 
parts can be used by God's grace, in a manner entirely beyond the 
l. Ibid., pp. 492-94; CD, IV/l, 320; Credo, p. 161. 
- -
2. Of. Eichholz, ~· cit., p. 62. 3. CD, I/2, 583. 
4. The Epistle to the Romans, p. 17. 
5. · CD, I/2, 531. The attempt to make such exegetical distinctions was 
the occasion for one of Barth's first public criticisms of Bultmann 
("The Preface to the Third Edition11 [1922], The Epistle to the 
Romans, pp. 15-20). 
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exegete 1 s disposal. Finally, the primacy of the text means that the 
interpreter's own degree of faith is not the basic condition for his 
encounter -vJith God's Word, i'or 11faith does not live by its mm energy," 
but is called forth by the confrontation with the Word within the 
text.1 
While Barth maintains that the revealed Word is not directly 
equivalent to the Bible (except in the moment of God 1s renewed self-
disclosure), he has so closely associated the two as to bring upon 
himself the accusation of 11biblicism, 11 of deification of the text.2 
As early as 1921, Barth responded to such criticism: 
When I am named 'Biblicist, 1 all that can rightly be 
proved against me is that I am prejudiced in supposing 
the Bible to be a good book, and that I hold it to be 
profitable for men to take its conceptions at least as 
seriously as they take their own.3 
What may seem to be biblicism here is only a refusal to subordinate 
Scripture to human criteria. In the Church Dogmatics, Barth himself 
has gone on to criticize biblicism as a failure to read Scipture 
through that which alone gives it its unity, Christ, and in its proper 
setting, the Church. In fact, the biblicist, by abstracting Scripture 
1. CD, I/2, 512. 
2. For instance Bultmann, in reply to Barth 1s criticisms of the attempt 
to distinguish among the 11 spirits11 in a Pa.uline letter [cf. supra, 
p. 113, n. 5], charges Barth with assuming that the Spirit of Christ 
is directly present in the text and therefore making the identity of 
the text with the ~vord of God into a presupposition at his own dis-
posal. Cf. R. Bultmann, "Problem einer theologischen EKegese," 
p. 356. 
3. 11 The Preface to the Second Edition," The Epistle to the Romans, 
p. 12. 
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from its proper unity and context, thereby prevents the Bible from 
~ . 
actually speaking its message., for the biblicist thereby unavoidably 
. . 
imposes his own favorite religious or cultural ideas.l Against this 
arbitrary biblicism, Barth protests. 
c. The Inspiration of Scripture 
However, a closely related concern is Barth's concept of the 
inspiration of 'Scripture. In the third edition of his R8merbrief, 
he wrote: 
From the preface to the first edition onwards, I have 
never attempted to conceal the ~act that my manner of 
interpretation has certain affinities with tl:ie old 
doctrine of Verbal Inspiration [of Calvin] •••• Is 
there any way of penetrating the heart of a document 
--of any document!--except on the assumption that its 
spirit will speak to our spirit through the actual 
written words?2 
The primacy of the text is a consequence of Barth's acceptance of 
a doctrine of "verbal inspiration." However, he insists, this doctrine 
properly means not an 11infallibili ty of the biblical word in its lin-
guistic, historical and theological character as a human word, 11 but 
rather means that 11the fallible and faulty human word is as such used 
by God and has to be received and heard in spite of its human fallibil-
ity.n3 Such a "verbal inspiration11 is thus carefully to be differen-
tiated from the view of 11verbal inspirednessll held by Protestant scho-
lasticism, in which infallibility merges into a natural attribute of 
the printed words themselves. God's inspiration of Scripture, as seen 
l. Cf. CD, III/l, 24; Qg, I/2, 607-6o9. 
- . 
2. The Epistle to the Romans, p. l8 • 3. 2£, I/2, 533. 
ll5 
in the Nmv Testament concept o£ theopneustia (II Tim. 3:16), takes 
-
place id thin the total circle formed by the Spirit 1 s disclosure of God Is 
mystery to witnesses, the apostolic commission to proclaim everywhere 
this revelation, and the further work of the Holy Spirit in bearing wit-
ness through: these words to the present hearers •1 The biblicistic vieiv 
o£ nverbal inspirednessn attempts to abstract from the totality of this 
circle only the isolated origin of the canonical words under the guid-
ance of the Holy Spirit, which results in the transformation of God •s 
grace into a bit of exceptionally higher 11nature. 11 Barth, to the con-
trary, says that his view allows the self-attesting authority of Scrip-
ture to assert itself without being subordinated to any extrinsic dem-
onstrations or deductions. The Church can do no more than affirm 
that "Scripture is recognised as the Word of God by the fact that it 
!E, th~ Word of God." 2 The unity of word and Spirit is always a free 
act of God's grace, and so 11verbal. inspirationll is not a quality or 
attribute at all, but a promise. 
The insp$ration of Scripture extends also to its scope and bound-
aries. The canonization of these w.ri tings is the basis of assurance 
that they and no others are the chosen instruments of God. The canon 
was not compiled by the caprices of historical pressures or Church 
legislation. Instead, maintains Barth, the Bible "is the canon be-
cause it has imposed itself as such upon the Church and invariably does 
so •••• The Bible is the canon just because it is so.u3 Solely 
because these writings are canonical did the Church later come to 
1. Ibid.' pp. 516-26. 2. ~., p. 537. 3. CD, I/1, 120. 
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recognize and declare them as such. If the Church were to try to ex-
plain why these particular writings are canonical, it would only be 
acting as if it possessed a criterion of Scripture and thereby a supe-
riority over it. Bu:t the canon rules the Church, and not the corrV"erse. 
The Church can only acknowledge the historic givenness of the canon and 
expect the 1vord to disclose itself within the canon in the future.l 
Since the canon is not closed absolutely, or by any extrinsic ~priori 
principle, it is closed only relatively, that is by the sheer fact that 
it imposes itself as such. Therefore it cannot be denied that in the 
future the canon might be expanded or narrowed, if it should so impose 
itself. In brief, the authority of Scripture in both its origin and 
scope can be derived from no exterior legitimation, but must be con-
fessed as self-asserting and self-attesting, through the continued 
witness of the Holy Spirit. 
4. The Nature of Dogma and Doginatics 
Barth 1 s concept of what dogma and the task of dogmatics are plays 
an indirect but important role in his hermeneutics. Dogma in its 
proper meaning is defined as a concept of relation, that is, 11as Church 
proclamation, ~ far ~ ~ really agrees with the Bible ~ ~ V.Iord £f. 
God."2 When the proclamation is in accord with the revealed Word 
(which is attested by and accessible in Scripture), dogma is said to 
exist. Since this can never be absolutely determined 't-rith certainty, 
I. CD, I/2, 473-79. 2. CD, I/1, 308; cf. 304, 331. 
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dogma is also an "eschatological concept •111 Also, it cannot be a stat-
ic deposit of truths because the biblical concept of dogma is a behest 
or decree, Which requires obedience rather than mere assent. 
Since dogma cannot be fully !mown or actualized before history 
comes to an end, there is a continual need within the Church for the 
function of dogmatics to be exercised. Dogmatics as a llscience 11 is the 
critical investigation of dogma, that is, of the extent to which the 
present proclamation of the Church may or may not agree with the re-
vealed Word found through Scripture. 2 As such, dogmatics is only the 
servant of Church proclamation, with no independent speculative inter-
ests of its own. Because the proclamation is an aspect of the three-
fold Word, it always retains the primary and positive relation to rev-
elation, while dogmatics has a secondary and critical role. Yet 
because the proclamation remains also a human, .fillible. work, it has 
need of the critical testing and guidance which dogmatics provides.J 
The task of dogmatics in evaluating Church prociamati~n claims 
the revealed Word as its criterion. Houever, the Word itself is no 
' 
longer at hand except in its p~esence.from time to time in the written 
word. In practice, therefore, dogmatics appeals to Scripture for its 
standards of measurement. llUltimately everything depends upon whether 
a dogmatics is scriptural. 114 Dogmatics is subordinate to the Bible, 
although it cannot be replaced by exegesis because dogmatics has the 
special assignment of guiding the proclamation of the Church.5 EKege-
1. Ibid.' p. 309. 2. Ibid., pp. 51, 284, 324-31; cf. p. 1. 
3. Ibid.' pp. 79-97. 4. Ibid., p. 330. 5. CD, I/2, 820-22. 
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sis and dogmatics must remain independent disciplines, even though both 
are obedient to the prior authority of Scripture. However, in addition 
to this relationship of mutual independence, Barth also mentions that 
exegesis (provided that it is a genuinely theological exegesis) is the 
criterion of all the statements of dogmatics.1 Evidently dogmatics 
(in relation to exegesis) is independent by virtue of its object, 
namely the proclamation, but is subordinate by virtue of its source, 
Scripture. 
In expounding the task of dogmatics in his Church Dogmatics, Barth 
has been accused of abandoning his earlier 11dialectical11 position in 
favor of an increasingly systematic present~tion.2 In an implicit-
reply, Barth differentiates between 11regular 11 and "irregular" dog-
matics, the former attempting to be a complete and consistent survey 
in an academic perspective, while the latter is more occasional and 
fragmentary. 3 Barth claims to be writing ·a regular dogmatics, but 
discounts the dangers of systematizing and intentionally founding a 
school of thought. 
Nothing that claims to be truly of the Church will need 
to shrink from the sober light of 1 scholastic, 1 but in 
whatever freedom and individuality it may first come to 
expression, as surely as it aims at being universally 
valid, it will itself make a push to set up a school and 
therefore to become school doctrine. The fear of scho-
1. Credo, P• 154. 
2. Ibid., p. 150. Cf. L. Steiger, Die Hermeneutik als dowatisches 
PEOblem (Giltersloh: Giltersloher Verlaghaus Gerd Mohn, 1961), 
pp. 68-69. 
3. CD, I/1, 316-21. 
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lasticism is the mark of the false prophet. The true 
prophet will manage to submit his message even to this 
test.l ' 
5. The Hermeneutical Perspective 
a. ~Theological Context ~Hermeneutics 
Barth's hermeneutical perspective may now be more explicitly 
examined. His basic concern is that the Scripture be read according to 
its ow self-attesting intention, which requires a theological exege-
sis. 11 The universal rule of interpretation is that a text can be read 
and understood and expounded only with reference to and in the light 
of its theme. 112 The Scripture thus dictates its O'Wil method of inter-
pretation and cannot be subjected to procedures and perspectives alien 
to the object of its witness. .Any 11 science11 (Wissenschaft) is a self-
consistent discipline of lmowledge in which the method is subordinate 
to and determined by the nature of its subject matter. Therefore, 
dogmatics can be called a·science,3 and if exegesis is to be true to 
its object, it too must ascertain whether its procedures are relevant. 
Barth's emphasis is upon the sheer reality of God's revelation, 
which precludes human prejudgments about whether it is possible or not 
and, if so, what its significance conceivably might be. :r-ran dares not 
try to control God by knowing in advance what revelation must or ought 
to be. liThe same judge who is satisfied with God to-day may no longer 
1. Ibid., p. 320. 
2. CD, I/2, 493; cf. 465. Cf. The Epistle to the Romans, pp. 8, 341. 
3. CD, I/1, 2-3, 7-11, 315-30; Dogmatics in Outline, p. 9. 
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be so to-morrow· .ul God, and not man 1 s careful epistemologies, is 
finally the sole standard of reality, for he alone ~ the 11real. u2 
This passionate fo9us of attention upon the object is the reason for 
Barth's customary lack of interest in discussions concerning methodol-
ogy.3 However, this does not mean that biblical exegesis is entitled 
·to the privilege of a unique hermeneutic; to the contrary, scriptural 
exegesis in fact provides the model and standard for general interpre-
tation of every literary document. In the paradigm of biblical herme-
neutics is seen for the first time the rules that are actually valid 
for all human understanding. 4 
The interpretation demanded by Scripture is a theological exege-
sis, vJhich takes place within the context of the Church and its rec-
ollection and expectation. 
Theologische EOCegese ist eine Exegese, die geschieht 
unter einer ganz bestimmten Voraussetzung, n~ich 
erstens: das der Leser des Alten und Neuen Testaments 
sich daran erinnert, dass in diesem Buch die Kirche 
bisher Gottes Wort geh8rt hat und zweitens: dass dieser 
Leser oder Forscher in diesem Buche liest in der Er-
wartung, dass auch er selber hier fUr seine Zeit 
1i.Lederum Gottes Wort h8re. Der Ort.der theologischen 
Exegese liegt in der Mitte zwischen dieser Erinnerung 
und dieser ~artung, entsprechend der Zeit d~ Kirche 
zwischen Himmelfahrt und Wiederkunft Christi. 
1. ~' I/2, 5; cf. 2-8. 
2. Note R. Ii. Niebuhr r s rubric for Barth 1 s theological method: "Pathos 
for Reality" (Resurrection and Historical Reason, pp. 42-51). 
3. For example, cf. K. Barth, 11Pr eface, 11 The Epistle to the Philippi-
ans,. trans. J. Leitsch (London: SCM Press, 1962), n. p. This lack 
Ofinterest is a common criticism of Barth (cf. F. Gogarten, 11 Karl 
Barth~ Dogmatik, 11 pp. 66-80). 
4. CD, I/2, 466-68. 5. Credo, P• 153. 
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The'creeds and confessions of the Church are to be used as the foremost 
commentary on Scripture, although they do not make superfluous other 
exegetical aids. Exegesis thus admits the presuppositions given it by 
the Church as being the assumptions most relevant to the intention of 
the text. Barth points out the folly of any so-called voraussetzungs-
lose Exegese, for such pretension of theological neutrality only serves 
to disguise the presence of other presuppositions which exclude God's 
revelation.1 Only a theological exegesis has the perspective relevant 
to the subject of the canonical writings. 
The concept of theological exegesis has alarmed some critics of 
Barth, who fear that it may mean a domination of interpretation by the 
Church, or that ~egesis may slip into 11eisegesis.n Barth readily admits 
this danger, but points out that eisegesis would only be made inevi ta-
ble instead of merely an ever potential threat if exegesis were to be 
11 safeguarded11 by the erection of an infallible method of historicism or 
a Church teaching-office. The only possible safeguard is to free 
exegesis as much as possible from extra-biblical criteria, and this is 
the purpose of a consciously theological hermeneutic. "Self-defence 
against possible violence to the text must be left here as everywhere 
to the text itself.u2 
Barth also distinguishes emphatically between his "theological 
exegesis" and a "pneumatic exegesis, 113 the latter being a term with 
1. Ibid. 2. CD, I/1, 119. 
3. Credo, pp. 153-54;. CD., I/1, 209; G. Eicbholz, 11Der Ansatz Karl 
Barths in der Hermeneutik," pp. 57-58. 
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which he was widely reproached· in his early period. A pneumatic exege-
sis, however, would attempt to ascertain spiritual truths hidden behind 
or apart from the written text of Scripture, and this is precisely the 
search that Barth repudiates. God 1 s revelation is mediated to ~an only 
through the records of his witnesses; there is no other entrance at 
which one may knock than the given texts, for the Word is present only 
in these words. The text always takes precedence over the interpret-
er r s expositions. The exegete can only turn to the text itself and 
seek, if he be permitted, to bring it to expression for the present 
day. In short, the only method which accordingly relies on the self-
exposition of the text is an obedient theological exegesis. 
b. The Three Phases ~ ~ Method 
Barth distinguishes three stages of his hermeneutical method. The 
first is "the act of observation, 11 or e?g>licatio.l This first phase is 
devoted to rigorous textual and historical criticism. Barth protests 
against the charge that he is an enemy to historical criticism, for his 
complaint is only against those commentators who restrict themselves to 
a reconstruction of the text and think that exegesis has thereby been 
fulfilled. 2 As early as 1918 he himself declared that while the doc-
trine of inspiration of Scripture is more important than any critical 
technique, "fortunately, I am not compelled to choose between the two. n3 
Indeed, why should not historical science be permitted to render its 
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1. gQ, I/2, 722-27. 2. The Epistle to the Romans, p. 6. 
3. ~., p. 1 
service, even in its radical or 11atheistic11 form, to exegesis?l His-
torical criticism is not only justified but necessary, for Scripture is 
a human document and thus must be read and exposited historically. 
Since the revealed tford is nov;r accessible only through the written 
Word, whatever critical methods that c·an illuminate these human words 
are to be welcomed. 
On the other hand, Barth makes it clear that historical criticism 
is only a preliminary task, preparatory to a theological exegesis. As 
a human document, the Bible may have no privilege which exempts it 
from ordinary critical research, but nonetheless the heart of the 
matter is reached only when the historical nature of the text has been 
established and then llput behind11 the interpreter, in favor of obedi-
ence to the theological claim of the text. Barth 1s polemic against 
historicism and an independent interest in the canonical documents as 
historical sources sometimes seems to include a polemic against the 
historical question as such. Man feels impelled to dispel the shadows 
of his existence by seeking beyond his own life and era; 11therefore he 
cannot leave history alone. He cannot accept the fact that he comes 
from non-being.n2 The question of how the death of someone two thousand 
years ago could affect a modern man has 11more the character of' a tech-
nical difficulty in thinking than that of a spiritual or a genuine 
theological problem.n3 The real obstacle is not a matter of historical 
distance, but of the scandal of the Cross, against which man tries to 
1. Credo, pp. 161-62. 2. CD, III/2, 576; cf'. 575-?6. 
3. CD, IV/1, 288; cf. 287-93. 
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protect himself by raising historical difficulties. Neither the inter-
est and rules of the historian nor the past history of Jesus are of 
final importance; what matters is instead the living presence of Christ, 
in whom men at this time are called upon to participate.1 It would 
seem that if theological exegesis does not accompany historical inves-
tigation, the latter is not only incomplete but a dangerous evasion of 
the real nature of Scripture. 
Barth nonetheless maintains that his criticism and delimitation of 
historical criticism is grounded in a positive concern not only for the 
unimpaired freedom of the lvord of God but also for the genuine meaning 
of history itself, which is the created expression of God 1 s time. 2 The 
danger of an untheological exegesis is that it approaches the text with 
the assumptions of modern historical science, applying the categories of 
relation and analogy, so that whatever part of the text that does not 
. 
conform to these categories is then promptly labeled a 11myth11 or leg-
end.3 The narrow criterion of truth in historicism, perhaps the result 
of a twentieth century llmythology, 11 thus encounters many texts which it 
must reject because they speak of an absolutely unique event of God. 
Barth defines nmythn as a story which describes the repetitive princi-
ples of general realities, both natural and supernatural, apart from any 
1. 
2.. 
3. 
Ibid., p. 320; Barth cites here II Cor. 5:16. 
Of. J. M. Robinson, The Problem of History in Mark (London: SCM 
Press, 1957), p. 16. F.or Barth's view of 11real time 11 or 11 God·'s 
time, 11 cf. CD, I/2, 45-70; CD, III/2, 437-640. 
- -
Credo, pp. 161-63. Cf. Barth 1 s criticism of Bul tmann 1 s views of 
history and myth, in CD, III/2, 442-47. 
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concrete time or place.l Such non-historical narratives are not typi-
cal of Scripture. Barth prefers the term 11 saga, 11 11an intuitive and 
poetic picture of a pre-historical reality of history which is enacted 
once and for all within the confines of time and space, 11 to describe 
that pervasive aspect of Scripture which eludes the usual view of 
11purett history. 2 
For Barth, 11 saga11 is a legitimate term within hermeneutics, for 
Scripture at almost every point is a mixture of history and saga, that 
is, of the 11historicalll and that 11non-historical11 aspect which, because 
of its immediacy to God, is actually the genuinely historical.3 The 
task of a saga is to portray the 11non-historical11 element, which_ (except 
in the creation stories) is itself always combined in the canonical 
narratives with the 11historical11 elements accessible to ordinary criti-
cal research. Rather than submit to the preconceived standards brought 
by the historian to the text, Barth thus choses to redefine the nature 
of history itself in light of the revelation of God's fulfilled time in 
Jesus Christ.4 In this more inclusive concept of history, the unity of 
historical and theological truth in the one Word can be detected. 
The explicatio, then, illuminates the form and condition of the 
text by all available methods of critical research, ·while remembering 
that history cannot fully be contained within the limits of such meth-
!' 
1. ~' III/1, 84. Of. CD, I/1, 376. 2. CD, III/1, 81. 
3. Ibid., PP• 80-82. 
4. Of. CD, I/2, 45-70. The resulting ambiguity of Barth's usage of the 
term """iihistoryll has been widely criticized: cf. F. Gogarten, "Karl 
Barths Dogm.atik, 11 p. 76, and R. Bultmann, GV, II, 234. 
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ods, and that the explicatio is not a final end in itself but prepara-
tory to the other two phases of exegesis. The function of explicatio 
is summed up in the exposition of what is in fact actually present in 
the text. 
When the foolish pursuit of an historical truth supra 
scripturam is on all sides abandoned in favour of a 
circumscribed investigation of the veritas scripturae 
ipsius, then we can and must give the freest possible 
course to critical questions and answers as demanded by 
the character of the biblical witness as a human docu-
ment, and therefore an historical quantity.l 
The second phase of exegesis is 11 the act of reflection," or medita-
tio. 2 This is the mid-point, the transition betw·een ex.plicatio and 
applicatio, in which the exegete seeks to understand the meaning intend-
ed by the text, the Word attested by these words. This involves an 
earnest personal struggle with the significance and not merely the 
historic forms or reconstructions of the biblical words. By means of 
this struggle, the gulf of the centuries between exegete and author 
fades, for both are equally confronted by the claim of judgment and 
grace within the Word of God. When faced by this awesome message, even 
the personal identities of exegete and author become fluid and begin to 
merge. 
Intelligent comment means that I am driven on till I 
stand with nothing before me but the enigma of the matter; 
till the document seems hardly to exist as a document; till 
I have almost forgotten that I am not its author; till I 
know the author so well that I allow him to speak in my 
name and am even able to speak in his name myse1f.3 
1. CD, I/2, 494. 2. CD, I/2, 727-36. 
3. The EPistle to the Romans, p. B. Cf. pp. 7-8. 
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However, Barth later emphasizes that the ~egete does not lose his 
own concrete historical identity. As has been seen, the presuppositions 
of the interpreter cannot be suspended in an effort for an 11objective" 
view of the text. God 1s Word encounters man within his historicity, and 
man's presuppositions are a part of that historicity. Therefore, in 
reflecting upon the meaning of Scripture, the mind invariably makes use 
of some philosophic framework of conceptions. This is legitimate as 
long as such a philosophy is used merely instrumentally and tentatively, 
without prejudging the intention of the text. The exegete must have a 
basic avJareness of what he is doing, so that a philosophy is used only 
' 
provisionally and as a hypothesis vJithout becoming an end in itself. 
Thus there is no essential reason for preferring one philosophy over 
another, for whatever philosophy selected continues to be f'rui tful only 
as long as it remains controlled by the text.l 
If the warning is heeded, there is no question of the 
danger of philosophy for scriptural exegesis, but only of 
its necessity. • • • If we do not commit ourselves unre-
servedly and finally to any specific philosophy, we will 
not need totally or finally to fear any philosophy.2 
The third phase of Barth's hermeneutical method is 11the act of 
appropriation,n or applicatio) If the exegete has really been obedient 
to the t~t and maintained his openness to it, its message will be 
assimilated. More accurately expressed, the exegete is grasped by the 
message, is drawn into participation in the history of God 1s dealings 
with man which has found expression in the present text. 
1. CD, I/2, 729-34. 2. Ibid., p. 735. 3. Ibid., pp. 736-40. 
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In the face of this subject-matter there can be no ques-
tion of our achieving, as we do in others, the confident 
approach 1-1hich masters and subdues the matter. It is rath-
er a question of our being gripped by the subject-matter.l 
This personal appropriation of the text by the interpreter is not based 
' upon a presupposed relatedness between author and exegete, as nine-
teenth century idealism and twentieth century existentialism claim, 
but upon the living self-exposition of Scripture itself, as acting 
subject within the surrounding mileau of world events. 2 "Instead of 
our making use of Scripture at every stage, it is Scripture itself which 
uses us--the ~ scripturae in which scriptura is not object but sub-
ject.113 Ex:egesis is possible only because the text allows itself to be 
brought to expression and expo sits itself. The applicatio occurs when 
the Word in its own way has so penetrated the lif·e of the interpreter 
that he is willing obediently to remove his center of attention from 
himself to the incomparable presence of the Word within the canon. 
Barth's hermeneutical method has been criticized as being schizo-
phrenic, as restricting historical criticism and theological exegesis 
to two levels which are never allowed to intersect. Barth of course 
welcomes historical criticism insofar as it illuminates the words of the 
text, but its contribution seems to end at the moment a theological 
exegesis begins. Barth's answer to this criticism is that this split 
1. Ibid.' p. 470. 
2. Cf. Eichholz, nner Ansatz Karl Barths in der Hermeneutik, 11 p. 67: 
"Die 'personale Begegnung mit dem Text 1 ••• ist nicht vom Horizont 
der Geschichtlichkeit der Ex:istenz her zu begreifen, sondern vom 
Wort her." 
. 
3. CD, I/2, 738. 
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between a historical investigation and a theological exposition already 
existed in contemporary hermeneutics and that it was just this unfortu-
nate circumstance'which led him to establish a theological exegesis as 
a needed corrective.1 Such a theological exegesis would make clear that 
the contemporary Zweigleisigkeit must be overcome by the exegete surren-
dering himself to the encounter with the text, and not through method-
ological considerations. A truly 11historical 11 understanding, that is, 
one in which the narrow scope of historicism is broadened to include 
11non-historical, 11 genuine history, would listen obediently to what the 
words of the text signify, which is also the specific intention of 
lltheologicalll exegesis. The methodological dualism is transcended when 
the exegete admits that his own reality is less than that of the Word 
which confronts him. Indeed, this is the underlying keynote of Barth 1 s 
hermeneutics. 
B. ~Response to ~~Diem 
l. The Context of Agreement 
Hermann Diem's response to Barth's hermeneutics takes place within 
the context of long years of personal friendship, beginning with the 
years of common endeavor among the associates of Zwischen den Zeiten, 
and continuing through the years of Diem 1 s pastorate. Many of Diem Is 
own writings have been in support of Barth against various criticisms,2 
1. K. Barth, Die Auferstehung der Toten (MUnchen: Ifuiser Verlag, 1924), 
p. v. Cf. Eichholz, £E• cit., p. 64. 
2. Cf. H. Diem, IICredo ut intelligam, 11 ZdZ, VI (1928), 517-28. 
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or to explore further the implications of Barth's thought in the life 
and doctrine of the Church,l or simply to explain a position of Barth's 
. 
in simple terms for groups which might not normally avail themselves 
' 
of Barth's own works. 2 At other times, Diem discusses Barth's contri-
butions in their relation and contrast to contemporary theplogy,3 or 
critically analyzes and modifies a Barthian position.4 
Diem praises_Barth as the founder of a renewed emphasis upon the 
context of theology within the Church to serve the pressing needs of the 
pastor, and the obedience of theology to the sheer reality of God's 
self-disclosure. In this attempt, Barth has admitted that he is but 
a beginner, working without the comfort of extensive precedents to pre-
serve theological concerns that have long been neglected; therefore, 
says Diem, easy solutions and timelessly valid formulations should not 
be expected. So it is certainly unfair to accuse Barth of Catholicism, 
just because he presupposes the reality of God 1s revelation and works 
out a concrete theological method accordingly, for theology never has 
1. 
2. 
Cf. H. Diem, Karl Barths Kri tik am deutschen Luthertum (Zollikon-
Zi1rich: Evangelischer Verlag, 1947). Also, 11Analogia fidei gegen 
analogia entis,ll EvTh, III (1936), 157-80. Also, 11 1Evangelium und 
Gesetz' oder 'Ges~und Evangelium 1? 11 EvT.h, III (1936), 361-70 
[hereafter referred to as 11 Evangelium:.u. Gesetz 11 ]. 
Cf. H. Diem, "Vertrauen und Misstrauen im Kirchenrecht, 11 ZevKR, 
V (1956), 274-81. For a brief example of a summary appreciation of 
Barth, cf. H. Diem, 11Karl Barth zum 75. Geburtstag am 10 Mai 1961, 11 
KZ, XVI (1961), 145-46. 
3. Cf. H. Diem, Theologie als kirchliche Wissenschaft. Also, 11 Theol-
ogie zwischen Text und Predigt. 11 
4. Cf. H. Diem, Dogmatik, Thr Weg zwischen Historismus und Ex:istential-
ismus. 
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the revelation at its disposal, but must itself always be obedient to 
the Word of God.l Nor can Barth 1 s 11 theology of the Word II be charged 
with a negative attitude toward everything human, for the 11 ontological 
connection" of Jesus Christ with all men offers the only sound basis for 
what God and man may have in common, a basis detected by the analogia 
fidei instead of the discredited analogia ~of Catholicism.2 
Barth's unique contribution is that he has reclaimed dogmatics as a 
legitimate Wissenschaft worthy of a place in the university, without 
sacrificing the Sache of dogmatics, God 1 s self-disclosure in Christ, by 
false justifications from extrinsic disciplines. 
In many areas of Diem's theology there is a close agreement with, 
if not an actual dependence upon, Barth 1 s thought. Diem supports 
Barth's reversal of the traditional sequence 11Larr and Gospel" into the 
Christocentric affirmation of 11 Gospel and Law. 11 Ethically this prevents 
a relapse into legalistic moralism, and politically it challenges the 
Lutheran doctrine of 11the two rea.J.ms, 11 in "Which isolation of political 
from spiritual responsibilities allow evil governments to arise unop-
posed.3 The state is grounded upon the authority and power of Christ, 
1. ttcredo ut intelligam, 11 pp. 522, 526-27. 
2. Theologie, p. 30. I~itischer Idealismus in theologischer Sicht, 
p. 6. H. Diem, IIEine kontroverstheologische Bestandsaufnahme." 
HBren und Handeln: Festschrift fiir Ernst Wolf (Mlinchen: Kaiser 
Verlag, 1962), p. 76. The last-mentioned will hereafter be referred 
to as 11Bestandsaufnahme. 11 
3. "Evangelium u. Gesetz,u pp .• 361-64; Karl Earths Britik am deutschen 
Luthertum. 
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not on an abstract secular .force.l Ethics must not be separated .from 
dogmatics, but must remain an integral part of it; this is a result of 
the fact that the Gottesdienst of the congregation includes not only its 
weekly cultic worship, but its active, daily life in ethical and polit-
ical responsibility.2 
Specifically in hermeneutics, there are also many parallels between 
Barth and Diem.3 Both are fully committed to a theological exegesis, in 
contrast to the error o.f historicism and the limitations of the histor-
ical method. Both affirm the necessity of an unrestricted historical 
criticism, but both give careful attention to the appropriate context 
for such methods. Diem and Barth agree that Scripture has a double 
nature corresponding to the concept of 11witness, 11 ,that the Word of God 
must be folllld 1vi thin the limitations of these human words. Diem does 
not utilize the Bi3,!'thian schema o.f the threefold 'kvord as revealed, writ-
ten, and preached; but the basic interrelationship remains, for Diem 
describes Scripture as the self-proclamation of Ghrist within the writ-
ten VerkUndigungsgeschichte that requires to be further proclaimed. 
Both theologians discuss the nature of dogma and dogmatics and agree 
that the latter is a legitimate Wissenschaft, a discipline separate 
from biblical interpretation and yet closely associated with the task 
1. Theologie, pp. 225-43. 
2. H. Diem, "Prolegomena zur Lehre vom Gottesdienst, 11 EvTh, XI 
(1951-52), 456-57 [hereafter referred to as 11Prolegomenatt]. Gf. 
Theologie, p. 26o.-
3. Documentation of these parallels may be noted in the succeeding 
chapter of this dissertation. 
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of exegesis. They agree that revelation has brought no unique language 
into the world, that there can be no special or privileged 11biblical'l 
hermeneutics, and that the exegete must make a conscious use of philo-
sophical conceptualization. Diem and Barth also describe the inspira-
tion of Scripture and the authority of the canon, in almost identical 
terms, as a self-attesting event. In exegesis itself, both place their 
primary reliance upon the ontic priority of the text over the exegete, 
the objectivity of God's self-proclaiming Word being the ground of the 
authentic subjectivity of the interpreter. 
2. The Points of Disagreement 
However, there is by no means a uniformity of views between Diem 
and Barth. Although Diem has great affinities to the Barthian position, 
he would also raise some important criticisms. 
a. ~ Nature of Dogmatics 
Diem would defend Barth against those who charge that the latter 
has made his own theology into a system simply identifiable with reve-
lation itself. Barth certainly does not confuse the event of revelation 
with any theological reflection about it, for God's self-disclosure 
means a "crisis" for every human thought. Furthermore, Barth's thought 
is a "system" that always remains open toward the event of proclamation 
and that closes only in the event of obedient hearing, rather than being 
an ontological system.l However, the openness of this doctrinal system 
1. "Bestandsaufnabme," p. 80; "Credo ut intelligam, 11 pp. 522, 526. 
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is after all not be,yond question. Barth defines a theological statement 
as a statement about an event that, on the basis of a scriptural consen-
sus and the preaching of the Church, claims to be an aspect of the di-
vine revelatory event itself; thereby Barth claims that his own theo-
logical statements originate in Scripture. Diem points out that this 
claim is unassailable within Barth's own presupposition, but is in 
itself pointless to those outside his presupposition. The present 
division between exegetes and theologians shows that Barth has not been 
able to convince the exegetes concerning the nature and authority of 
dogmatic statements as such.1 
b. ~ Danger ~ Biblicism 
The question concerning the closedness of the Barthian system does 
not end 1-Tith the problem of the legitimation of dogmatics. The cri te-
rion used by dogmatics in its guidance of preaching is, in effect, 
Scripture alone, since the revelation itself is accessible only in the 
text. Although Barth emphasizes the subordination of the written Word 
to the W'ord revealed, this Gef1Ule appears in fact to be lacking. The 
threefold Word actually focuses on and is controlled by its written 
form, thereby being reduced to an inner-biblical dialectic. 2 
Of itself, this might not be a liability, for Barth is here more 
consistant than Bultmann in holding that the revelatory event in both 
its historical and theological aspects occurs only within the testimony 
of the text itself. In fact, Barth admits to a "formal biblicisrn,n in 
1. Dogrnatik, pp. 90-91. 2. Ibid., pp. 90-93. 
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wmch the exclusive locus of revelation in the Scripture is confessed, 
in contrast to a nmaterial biblicism,u which he attacks as the coercive 
retrojection of a personal standpoint into the texts. But Barth is 
:impatient with 11formaln questions and wishes all attention to be given 
to the theological 11 content,tt namely, Jesus Christ. However, Diem's 
criticism is that this dominance of the 11form11 of the canon by its 
11 content" of Christ is just what is endangered by the loss of the dis-
tinct Gef!Ule between the Word revealed and the -written Word. Just as 
Bultmann has no safeguard for the irreversible relationship between 
God 1s Word and man's faith, so Barth may be asked whether his formal 
biblicism may be in peril of slipping into a material b:i.blicism.l 
The danger of b~blicism is that the texts are no longer able to 
attest themselves when they are withdrawn from the dominance of the 
Christ Who continues to proclaim him~elf. In such cases, as Barth 
himself points out, a systematic viewpoint of the exegete comes in to 
fill the vacuum, and exegesis bec.omes arbitrarily predetermined. Diem 
asks whether Barth himself does not fall victim to this procedure, since 
the biblical texts seem to be organized under a systematic viewpoint of 
"the Word of God,tt although admittecll.y this viewpoint is derivable from 
Scripture. How can Barth avoid the constant danger within this tend-
ency?2 Diem t s fears are confirmed by the fact that Barth not infre-
quently refuses to notice that many scriptural texts cannot be harmo-
nized; by leveling down their individuality, he may set an example of 
1. ~-' pp. 97-98. 2. ~., pp. 51, 92. 
136 
procedures which exegesis ought consciously to avoid.1 
c. The Historical Method 
This "leveling down11 is closely related to a grave deficiency of 
Barth 1 s historical method. Diem 1 s cri ticisrn here occurs within the con-
text of a basic agreement with Barth that Geschichte must be defined by 
its theological object and not by the closed assumptions of historicism. 
Diem t s support of the Barthian insight at this point may be seen in that 
in an early article Diem reflects the dualistic tendencies of the early 
Barth and mentions the rupturing of historical continuity by the appear-
ance of the eternal within time, 2 while later he concurs with the later 
Barth in viewing history as the gracious event of God 1s dealing with 
mankind which is attested in the text and 1-1hich thereby occurs again.3 
Diem also agrees that this Geschichte is a thorough mixture of "histor-
ical" and "unhistorical11 (that is, inaccessible to historical criticism) 
~ . 
elements, and that therefore 11 saga11 must be used if the exegete is to 
comprehend 1-rhat the Church has always understood as this 11history11 of 
the Incarnation.4 Thus, the biblical events are a unique history which 
provides the noetic and on tic basis of @:. human history. 
Despite this widespread agreement with the Barthian view of 
1. H. Diem, "Die Einheit der Schrift, 11 EvTh, XIII (1953), 4o4. Here-
after referred to as 11Einheit. 11 Cf.-also vT. Jannasch, "Karl Barth 
und die praktische Theologie, 11 .p. 5. 
2. H. Diem, "Et-be und Schuld, 11 ZdZ, X (1932), &:>. 
3. Dogmatik, PP• 87-88. 
4. Ibid.; Theologie, pp. 107-11; Grundfragen der biblischen Herme-
iiSutik, p. Li. 
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Geschichte, Diem cannot fully concur with the way in which Barth, applies 
it in a historical method. Barth no less than Bul tmann seems to be 
infected with fear of a mere fides historica which causes him to blur 
the historical framework of God 1 s self-disclosure.1 For this reason 
Barth minimizes any dependence upon a historical sequence of tradition 
in the scriptural writings. He ~sserts that the freedom of historical 
criticism must not be restricted, because historical truth means the 
significance and continuity of the canonical texts, but he himself 
does not put emphasis on critical comparison of different texts. Barth 
rightly affirms that historical and theological truth are one and the 
same, but he comes too simply to this conclusion when he implies that 
a:ny scholar who challenges the theological unity of Scripture is thereby 
an inadequate and negligent historian. g It is thus not surprising that 
biblical scholars have been unconvinced by Barth 1 s attempt to overcome 
the infamous Zweigleisigkeit between the historical and theological 
methods. 
Diem's criticism is that Barth's approach basically, if uninten-
tionally, retards the historical method., The threefold form of the Word 
of God in effect circumvents the problem of historical relationships and 
sequences of dependence. 11Diese tlberbietung und Ausklamm.erung ~ ~­
torischen Frage ~ dem Werden ~Wandel ~ Zeugnisse ~ der ~­
schehenen Offenbarung durch ~ dogmatische Setzung--die verschiedenen 
Zeiten des Wortes Gottes--ist wohl der entscheidende Punkt bei Barth;l3 
1. Dogmatik, pp. 112-13, 164. 2. Ibid., P• 91. 
3. Ibid., p. 89. 
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The canonical text is not only a historical derivation of the pr.lmary 
revelation, but is a second, new form of God 1 s address to man. Diem 
points out that the very fact that the Word revealed and the written 
1fordvere not contemporaneous should signify a historical distance and 
therefore a problem of historical understanding.l But Barth does not 
take this lack of contemporaneousness seriously, else he would not sub-
ordinate historical method to the rank of an auxiliary discipline. He 
also refuses to take seriously the problem, formulated by Lessing, of 
how historical distance can be overcome so that a past event may affect 
the present; this problem is dismissed as the effort of sinful man to 
evade a confrontation by God 1 s judgment and grace in Christ. 
Die in dem Lessingproblem enthaltene Frage der histor-
ischen Distanz wird eingeklammert durch das umfassendere 
Problem, was aus dem Menschen wird, dem Jesus Christus .1m 
Wort der Ver~digung durch den Heiligen Geist schon gleich-
zeitig geworden ist. Das Problem Lessings wird so fUr 
Barth ~ dem Problem des Petrus. 2 - - -
Barth thus has not overcome the dualism of historical and theolog-
ical exegesis at all, for he presupposes the completed canon as a uni-
fied and doctrinally closed entity, based upon a definite phase of God 1s 
Word and thereby withdrawn from historical judgments) Historical 
research only thereafter is allowed to examine the meaning and context 
of individual biblical documents. But does this not mean a dualism 
after all, based upon a restricted freedom for historical criticism? 
1. Ibid., p. 56. 
2. Ibid., p. 54. Cf. Lk 5:8, and K. Barth, CD, IV/1, 290. 
3. Dogrnatik, pp. 58-59. 
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'Has Barth really thought through the problems which historical science 
presents to dogmatics, or has he simply vaulted over these difficulties 
by his theological presuppositions? 
3. Diem's Modifications of Barth's Position 
On the basis of these criticisms, Diem would modify the Barthian 
position at a critical point. Diem readily agrees with Barth's postu-
late that truth is one, and goes on to ask whether Barth's basic proce-
dure could not thus be reversed. That is, if the historical and the 
theological questions ultimately converge, would it not be better to 
approach the theological through the historical, rather than the histor-
ical through the theological?l Barth infers the historical continuity 
of the threefold Word of God from its sachlich identity, but this pro-
cedure only serves to arouse the suspicions of the historical scholar. 
The historian might better understand 't-That Barth means by the 11histori-
cal" and "unhistorical11 elements within biblical Geschichte if Barth 
~ 
reversed this sequence and inferred the theological unity of these three 
phases from their historical relationship. This reversal could to some 
extent safeguard Barth's theological work from the dangers of scholasti-
cism w.i thout radically challenging his basic results. 
Diem finds himself in agreement with the basic framework and many 
of the conclusions of Barth's dogmatics. But he proposes a change in 
perspective, a basically hermeneutical approach to all of theology. 
This is in contrast to Barth's "revelation-positivism," whereby one 
1. Ibid., p. 97; cf. p. 89. 
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concept from Scripture, the tlford of God, is abstracted and made the 
postulate from which all else is then deduced. Instead of stopping 
short of the closed canon, Diem thus intends to examine the origin 
of the texts and to explore within Scripture itself, both historically 
and theologically, the irreversible incline between the Word of God 
and human preaching.1 As will be seen subsequently, one indication 
of how Diem implements this emphasis on historical perspective is 
his statement that the relation between the earthly Jesus and the 
One encountered in present preaching is a theological question, but 
that the relation of the preaching by the historical Jesus to the sub-
sequent kerygmatic proclamation about him is a historical question.2 
These two questions correspond to the relation in Barth's thought 
between the tford revealed and the Word preached, on the one hand, 
and the 'V'lord revealed and the written Word on the other hand; the 
difference is that in Barth's doctrine of the threefold Word, all 
relationships are basically theological only. 
Diem r s critical proposals thus are guided by a· hermeneutical 
approach. Because Barth begins with the sheer presence of a closed 
canon, he runs the risk of being unable to be questioned and exam-
ined exegetically. But it is Diem 1s intention to approach such doc-
trines as the Trinity hermeneutically and thus to be able to enter 
into exegetical discussion at every point. Instead of beginning with 
a definite concept of revelation and then attempting to reconstruct 
1. Ibid., pp. 98, 130-31. 
2. H. Diem, Der irdische Jesus und der Christus des Glaubens, p. 12. 
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the ancient dogma of the Trinity, Diem speaks of an immanent Trinity 
which is understood from the examination of the event of revelation 
itself. Using the Trinity as part of the orientation of the exegete, 
Diem thus entrusts himself simply to the self-attestation of this 
event within the Gefffie of the scriptural text.l 
Because of this hermeneutical interest, Diem also discusses the 
relati~n of dogma and dogmatics to exegesis at much greater length 
than does Barth. .Although Diem 1 s concept of dogma is essentially 
Barthian, he strongly emphasizes the function of doctrine as providing 
the proper perspective for exegetical questioning. Das Woraufhin 
of biblical interpretation should be supplied not by the exegete r s 
existential self-understanding, as Bultmann maintains, but by the 
doctrines confessed by the Church. On the other hand, moreover, 
dogmas themselves are tested and verified by exegesis. 
The hermeneutical approach of Diem, then, is a consciously Barth-
ian attempt to bridge in some manner the gulf that yawns today between 
theology and exegesis.2 He points out that Barth not only founded the 
new emphasis on the Church-context of theology, but, in the absence 
of a creative implementation of this context in biblical research, 
Barth has had to step outside his own field of dogmatics and into 
1. Of. H. Geisser,; 11Die TrinitM.tslehre unter den Problemen und in den 
Prolegomena christlicher Theologie, 11 pp. 450-51. 
2. Dogmatik, p. 6o. It may be noted that this attempt was first made 
despite the fears of Barth himself that Diem might be pursuing 
Allotria, a fruitless and perhaps suspect undertaking. After the 
publication qf the Dogmatik (1955), however, Barth personally gave 
his enthusiastic approval to Diem 1s effort. 
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the area of exegesis as a Lftckenbftsser.1 Such stop-gap measures can 
be relinquished only when biblical scholars themselves are able to 
keep in pace with this new awareness of the implications of the con-
text of the Church for all theological disciplines. Diem views him-
self as a dogmatician who has continued and developed this incomplete 
aspect of Barth's task. Therefore his critical response to Barth's 
hermeneutics must not be termed a controversy, but a Weiterffthren of 
Barth's own position. In this exacting effort, then, it is not sur-
prising that Diem himself has been criticized either as contributing 
nothing essentially new to Barth 1s hermeneutical thought,2 or as 
instead creating more difficulties than he solves) 
c. Diem's Comparison ~ Bultmann anQ. Barth 
Before Diem's own hermeneutic is examined in detail, it is impor-
tant to keep in mind not only his criticisms of Bul tmann and Barth 
individually, but also how he views the differences and similarities 
of Barth and Bultmann and what prospect he finds of a possible future 
rapprochement between the alternatives that these two leaders pre-
sent. 
1. Theologie, p. 25. Cf. K. Barth, ~ III/2, ix. 
2. G. Harbsmeier, "Theologie als kirchliche Wissenschaft: Zum Problem 
einer theologischen Enzyklopl:l.die heute," ThLZ, IXXVIII (1953), 13. 
However, this review was published before Drein 1 s Dogmatik (1955), 
in which most of Diem's criticisms of Barth appeared. 
3. w. Matthias, "Dogmatik zwischen Historismus und Ex:istentialismus, 11 
ThLZ, U:XXIII. (1958), 568, and 11Ex:egese, Dogmatik, VerkU.ndigung,n 
pp. 253-54. 
1. The Perspective Held in Co:mmo.n · 
The points of agreement between Barth and Bul tmarm fall i-Ti thin 
the boundaries of the orientation of the former Zwischen den Zeiten 
movement. Both, therefore, presuppose the revelation of God in 
Christ and the role of proclamation within the Church. Both acknm-11-
edge the fact of presuppositions in exegesis' the main difference 
bett-J"een them being that Bultmarm takes their role more programmat-
ically. Both reject the historicism current at the turn of the cen-
tury, which thr~atened to reduce all theology to general cultural 
phenomena; but as a result both Bultmann and Barth conceal an essen-
tially anti-historical bias which restricts historical research or 
foreordains its results.l Each of them insists that in principle 
there can be no essential difference between biblical and secular 
hermeneutics, although Bul tmann and Barth differ in the source from 
which they actually derive their concepts of hermeneutics in general, 
Barth here be:ing the more biblical of the wo. 2 
The object of Barth's investigation is "dogma," while Bultmarm's 
object is the 11kerygma11 ; neither one is to be identified simply with 
revelation itself, but for these two interpreters respectively dogma 
and kerygma provide the closest approximation to the lvord of God. 
Ho-vrever, Bul tmarm' s thought has the effect of reducing the Barthian 
threefold Word into only two forms, the scriptural kerygma and the 
proclamation of the Church, since for him revelation itself has en-
1. Dogmatik, pp. 112-13. 2 •. Grundfragen, p. 20; Theologie, p. 102. 
tered the kerygma as the only phenomenon actually accessible to man.l 
Both leaders affir.m the Reformation rule of sacra scriptura ~ ipsius 
interpres, but each applies this rule differently: Bultmann always 
associates the interpretation of a text with the exegete's self-exposi-
tion, while Barth views the same interpretation under the perspective 
of historia ~ ~ ipsius interpres.2 Finally, both men are pre-
vented from entering into decisive exegetical discussions, because 
Bul tmann is bound by a closed circle between his exegesis and his 
systematic presuppositions, and Barth is bound by the same circularity 
of argument in his dogmatics. Thus, in actuality, Bultmann can have 
no safeguard for the Gefille of Word and human faith, and Barth has 
no means of preventing his formal biblicism from merging into a mate-
rial biblicism.3 
2. The Division between Them 
Diem is greatly concerned about the continuing isolation between 
exegesis and theology. The continued conflict between these two disci-
plines appears to justify Diem's characteristic fear of dualism, llden 
fatalen Eindruck, • • • dass Dogmatiker und Neutestamentler ~eierlei 
1. Dogmatik, p. 68. J. Smart (The Interpretation of Scripture, pp. 
:52-53, 281) points out that both Bultmann and Barth are affected by 
the Uinfinite qualitative difference, 11 but that the former tal<:es it 
so seriously as to be unable to speak of anything but the effects in 
human existence made by the self-revealing God. This clarifies the 
motive of Bultmann•s reduction of the Wo:rd from three to two forms. 
2. 11Theologie zwisc~en, 11 p. 404 • 
. 
3. Dogmatik, pp. 96-98. 
Neues Testament vor sich haben. 111 The dreadful burden of the separa-
tion is that one is faced with the alternative of a one-sided exegesis 
that rejects any theological responsibility, or a dogmatics that 
coe~ces exegesis. Diem has selected Bultmann and Barth for 1v.idespread 
discussion in his writings because these two men are the outstanding 
. . 
contemporary exponents of the ~vo opposing disciplines. Of course, 
to discuss Barth and Eultmann is not s:Unply to deal with the split 
between dogmatics and exegesis, because Earth works also in biblical 
interpretation, and Bul tmann' s position is certainly not purely exe-
getical. 2 But the isolation be~reen the tvm disciplines was a major 
impetus that called forth the original responses of Bul tmann and Barth, 
and it also remains a basic factor within their opposing hermeneutical 
positions. 
Thus, Bultmann 1s basic interest in New Testament research has 
lead him to investigate the many cultural parallels and the literary 
setting for the canonical message, and this has brought him into con-
tact with the full range of secular academic disciplines. The ques-
tion of how this sacred document of antiquity can have relevance for 
modern civilization is answered, in Bultmann 1s opinion, thrqugh the 
critical application of rnan 1 s highest philosophic achievement, the 
categories of analysis of human existence as disclosed by modern 
existentialism. However, Barth's central concern is the theological 
1. W. · Jaimasch; IIKarl Barth und die praktische Theologie,u p. 5. 
Cf. H. Diem, Dogmatik~ pp. 38-39. 
2. Theologie, p. 110; Dogmatik, p. 40. 
message of the canon, God's self-initiated communication to the man of 
any generation or culture. Thus Barth has less regard for the multi-
plicity of questions posed by the various academic disciplines than 
for the response of man as such, the perennial evader and receiver of 
grace, to God's immediate self-impartation through these ancient texts. 
In the discu,ssion between Bul tmann and Barth, therefore, the isolation 
of exegesis and dogmatics is compounded by the issue of vJhether human 
self~understanding or the alleged self-interpretation of God should be 
normative. 
Unfortunately the rivalry between these two leaders has not di-
mini shed. Indeed, this division between dogmatic theology and exis-
- . . 
tentialist exegesis has permeated to the ultimate presuppositions of 
theology in general, so that a common basis for discussion between 
such men as Barth and Bul tmann hardly se.ems to exist now •1 For in-
stance, Bultmann scarcely replies to many importan·b criticisms of his 
thought, and Barth is too quick to hold him responsible for extreme 
consequences of his position, instead of merely placing penetrating 
. . 
questions before him.2 The di~sension between them has continued up 
until the present time, with increasingly barren results, and com-
munication has almost ceased. Diem regrets especially the fact that 
this dissension has now spread to the members of the latest theolog-
ical generation, 1-1ho in following their masters and instructors are 
1. Dogmatik, pp. 5, 74; Theologie, p. 279. 
2. Grundfragen, pp. 42-43. Cf. K. Barth, Bultmann: Versuch, pp .• 55-56. 
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all too ready to depart from one another1 and to collect into forti-
fied factions. 2 
Diem's purpose is to aid those who do not wish simply to enlist 
in one faction or the other, by opening up new possibilities for dis-
cussion between Bul tmann and Barth. This exacting task cannot be 
done merely by reducing their positions to some broad, common denom-
inator.3 Nor can unit,r be achieved by limiting the freedom of his-
torical criticism, to the advantage of the theologian, as many con-
servative thinkers seem to propose. The most desperate of all attempts 
for unity 1-vould be a resumption of heresy trials, for if there is no 
longer any common agreement concerning theological presuppositions, 
then the distinction be~reen heresy and orthodoxy is the most impos-
sible ~f undertakings. 4 Finally, Diem renounces any attempt to find 
simply a middle road between Bultmann and Barth, a compromise compiled 
from mutual concessions, for no such mediation is possible bet-v;reen 
1. 11Abschiedtt nehmen; the allusion is to the series of written fare-
wells which formally ended the publication of·Zv;rischen den Zeiten 
(XI [1933], 536-54). . 
2. Dogmatik, pp. 6, 243-44. 
3. Therefore, 'tif. Iohff (liDogmatische Grundlegung zwischen Positivismus 
und Selbstverst!!ndnis," KuD, V [1959], 59) is mistaken in his opin-
ion that Diem attempts to find a Hauptnenher, valid for all cir-
cumstances, between Bultrn~ and Barth. 
4. Dogmatik, p. 74. 
these two integral positions.1 His purpose simply is to make the two 
hermeneutical approaches comparable, so that a conversation may be re-
newed between them. Only in this way may it be asked whether tbe self-
interpreting history of God 1 s dealings with men may after all be the best 
means of illuminating man's ovm self-exposition and existence.2 
3. The Prospects for Future Conversation 
It is Diem's hope that contemporary hermeneutical discussion 'tdll 
refrain from the tendency to play off the positions of Bultmann and 
Barth against one another and will overcome its widespread resignation 
concerning the current factional divisions. If conversation is to be 
reopened between the Bultmannian and Barthian positions, it must begin 
with the framev-;rork of the relative degree of unity within the early 
Zwischen den Zeiten movement, in which both men participated, and must 
from this point seek a solution. Of course Zwischen den Zeiten itself 
offered no definitive resolutions, but this movement was a very produc-
tive "hunter's hutn along the trail, its locus pointing the way toward 
further theological creativity.3 A helpful example of the utilization 
1. Ibid., pp. 5, 97; 11 Theologie zvTischen, 11 p. 404. In 1928 Diem ivent 
so far as to say that there ivere no points of contact at all between 
the two methods ("Credo ut intelligam, 11 p. 527). So far as basic 
method itself is concerned, Diem would_still support this state-
ment, although he does admit common points within the total context 
and perspective of hermeneutics. 
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2. 11Theologie zwischen," p. 404. A similar correlation of God's sover-
eignty and human e:xistence, as based on the ln.rst Connnandment, is sug-
gested by H. Ott, 110bjektivierendes und existentielles Denken, 11 
Kerygma und Mythos, IV (Hamburg: H. Reich Evangelischer Verlag, 
1955), 131. 
3. 11Theologie zwischen, 11 pp. 398-99. 
of this early framework would be to refer back to the definitions of 
theology given by Gogarten, Barth, and Bultma:nn in 1925 and 1926,1 in 
which all agreed in affirming theology to be conceptual thinldng in the 
service of Godrs revelation, with the implication of theology being 
performed by and within the Church. 
A reopened conversation would also cease to deal 1ilth the person-
alities of the men involved and instead give its attention to the issues 
themselves, in an attempt to develop and think through further the prob-
lems involved. Special attention should be given to those Barthian and 
Bultmannian positions whiCh are not already polemically fortified against 
one another, in order to begin from. these points a more fruitful dia-
logue. 2 For instance, both Barth and Bultmann agree that the Church 
is not a historical phenomenon in the usual sense, but yet is embodied 
in history. Perhaps the consensus in this one case concerning the com-
bination of 11historical 11 and 11unhistorical" elements might be extended 
to other are;s, such as \he phenomenon of Scripture. 3 Also, it is a 
hopeful sign that the catch-word 11demythologizing 11 has faded in herme-
neutical discussion, since as a term it has always tended to attract 
fears and prejudices which only obscure the real issue of existential 
interpretation.4 
1. Of. ZdZ, III (1925), 78; ZdZ, IV (1926), 21, 59. Of. H. Diem, 
Theologie, pp. 23-24. 
2. Dogmatik, pp. 74-75; 11Theologie zwischen, 11 p. 404. 
3. Dogmatik, p. 97. 
4. 11 Theologie z~vi.schen, 11 p. 399. Of. W. Ja:nnasch, op. ~., p. 5; 
K. Barth, Bultmann: Versuch, pp. 24-25.-
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In any case, the lines of communication must be kept open between 
dogmatic theology and existentialist exegesis, if a genuinely scriptur-
al her.meneutics·is to be attained. Diem is encouraged by the cooper-
ative efforts, within the Pl~otestant theological faculty of the Univer-
sity of TU.bingen, between himself as a theologian and Ernst Illisemann 
as an exegete.1 He also detect,s signs among the net-v theological gen-
eration of those who wish to break out ot the established factional 
fronts, for the sake of further cooperative work. Diem welcomes such 
signs, for he see:s the work of the Church as a whole, in 1-vhich a rigid 
factionalism or isolation of tasks can only'be a liability.2 Not 
only theologian and exegete, but professor and pastor, Church lawyers 
and experts in ethics, must work together in the service of the one 
Church and of its proclamation in the local congregation. The duty 
of s?riptural interpretation swmmons forth all specialists to the com-
mon pastoral task of serving the one Gospel of Jesus Christ, who within 
these human efforts continues to proclaim himself. Furthermore, this 
view of the work of the Church as a v-rho1e in collective service to the 
proclamation provides the setting for Diem's own theological contri-
butions. With this background, then, the hermeneutics of Diem himself 
may now be examined. 
1. Dogmatik, p. 6. 2. Cf. Theologie·, p. 280. 
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CHAPrER V 
THE HERMENEUTICS OF HERMANN DIEM 
A. The_ Presuppositions of Hermeneutics 
Before putting into practice a hermeneutical method, the exegete 
must first examine the nature and structure of his material, namely 
Scripture. Furthermore, before even this can be attempted, prior 
consideration must be given to the question of what presuppositions 
are legitimate for the hermeneutical task. 
1. The Kirchliches Vorverst!!Lndnis 
Hermann Diem points out that presuppositions certainly cannot be 
dispensed vrlth, and ~be search for an unbiased voraussetzungslose 
Auslegung inevitably results in an exegesis prejudiced by criteria 
alien to Scripture itself. The attempts in this direction by the 
Enlightenment, pietism, and historicism illustrate the dangers of this 
. . t . l unconsc~ous ~n rus~on. Instead, the exegete at the very outset of 
his task must decide the issue of t.Vnatural theology,ur of whether or 
not his pre-understanding of the text will be predominately determined 
by any possible capacities or knoivledge outside the Christian reve-
1. Cf. H. Diem, Grundfragen der biblischen Hermeneutik, p. 13. 
152 
lation.1 
For Diem, this initial problem can be resolved only by a deter-
mination to accept as decisive the self-understanding of Scripture 
itself and the resulting theological consequences. This of course 
does not mean that the exegete will be able to avoid his ovm philo-
sophical presuppositions, which form the inevitable tneyeglassesi.IJ 
through which everyone reads a given text. 2 Such assumptions can 
and must be controlled by awareness of their existence.3 The decisive 
p~e-understanding, however, is not the philosophical, but the theo-
logical, which has already arisen out of the tradition of the Church 
as it has listened to Scriptgre itself.4 Nor must a prior understand-
'illg of the problems and possibilities of human existence be determi-
native here. Rather, a l1kirchliches 11 Vorverst§.ndnis5 is the essence 
of the e~egete 1 s presuppositions, which cannot itself be based upon 
any abstract principle, but simply upon the concrete fact that the 
1. H. Diem, ''Die nattirliche Theologie und die Predigt, tv Monatss@rift 
fllr Pastoraltheologie, XXXII (1936), 151. Hereafter referred to 
as nNatt!lrliche Theologie.w 
2. Grundfragen, pp. 14-15; cf. K. Barth, CD, I/2, 728-29. 
3. For this reason the theologian should be trained also in philos-
ophy, so that he may properly use its concepts without surrender-
ing his uniquely theological subject matter. Cf. H. Diem, Theol-
ogie als Rirchliche Wissenschaft, pp. 40-53. 
4. 11Wir gehen von der Voraussetzung aus, dass uns der Kanon der 
Heiligen Schrift immer nur im Zusammenhang mit dem Dasein und der 
Verkl:Lndigung der Kirche gegeben ist. t,w H. Diem, Das Problem des 
S'chriftkanons (ThSt, Heft 32; Zollikon-Zt!lrich.: Evangelischer 
Verlag, 1952), p. 3. Hereafter referred to as Schriftkanon. 
5. 11Nattlrliche Theologie, tlr p. 152; cf. Grundfragen, p. 4. 
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exegete works within the context of the Church,1 and that the Chur,c~ 
in fact believes itself to be constituted by having heard God's rev-
elation in precisely these writings. 
Die Bibel, die wir auszulegen haben, .ist uns von der 
Kirche gegeben. Diese hat in den biblischen Schriften 
das massgebliche menschliche Zeugnis von Gottes Offenbar-
ung in Jesus Christus geh8rt und diese darum zum Kanan 
ihrer weiteren Verkfindigung gemacht in der Erwartung, 
dass durch diese"¥erkUndigung auch weiterhin das Reden 
Gottes geschieht. 
This kirchliches Vorverst~ndnis rests upon the factual existenqe 
of the Church and upon the self-understanding of the scriptural wit-
nesses, which in turn are both grounded in the contingent historical 
fact of God's revelation in Christ. Such a presupposition may also be 
called a ~atisches Vorverst~ndnis, in that it is thus not subject to 
philosophical discussion, but is based upon the avowedly theological 
inten~ion of the scriptural writers and the Church to proclaim and 
transmit this historical revelation. Such a pre-understanding is not 
an arbitrary prejudging of the text. Rather, the exegete, knowing 
that presuppositions are unavoidable, merely chooses to read the text 
1. The significance of this emphasis, which pervades Diem's thought, 
may be inferred from the title selected for his dogmatics: ~Theol­
ogie als iirchliche Wissenschaft," G. Ebeling (Wort und Glaube 
[Tfibingen: J. c. B. Mohr, 1960], p. 115, n. 77) points out that 
Diem should not regard the Kirchlichkeit of theology as a revolu-
tionary development of the 1920 1s, since this emphasis originated 
and was widely discussed in the nineteenth century. Diem's reply 
might well be to indicate that the difference is the new insight 
into the nature of the Church as an event constituted by God's 
self-disclosure and the resulting commission to proclamation. 
2. Grundfragen, p. 4. The emphasized words of the original text are 
spaced rather than italicized. However, in this dissertation all 
emphasized words quoted will be underlined, regardless of the 
typographical means of emphasis in the original text. 
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with that pre-understanding which most nearly corresponds to the self-
understanding of Scripture as an avowedly theological witness within 
the Church. Thus,.all personal arbitrariness must be excluded, and the 
exegete must endeavor continually to place himself together with his 
pre-understanding under the continuing judgment and correction of the 
text itself.1 
2. Historical Criticism and Geschichte 
The historical nature of God's self-disclosure in Christ, however, 
leads immediately to the question of the relationship of historical 
criticism to this kirchliches Vorverst~ndnis. The exegete should not 
regard historical criticism as an embarrassing intrusion, for the 
historical question arose inevitably as the apostolic eye1iltnesses to 
the life of Jesus died out. Indeed, the development of historical 
criticism in the last century has made possible an exegesis far~exceed­
ing that of the'Reformation in depth and ability. 2 
Wenn [die Kirche] nicht behaupten will, dass der Kanan 
der Schrift als fertiges Buch vom Himmel gefallen und 
damit jeder Diskussion Uber die Geschichte seiner Ent-
stehung entzogen sei, so ist diese auf der ganzen Linie 
und ohne jeden Vorbehalt der historischen Untersuchung 
freizugeben.3 
However, historical research must itself be subject to critical 
examination of its own presuppositions. The basic rules of Troeltsch-
1. Ibid~, pp. 13-14. Cf. Theologie, p. 122. 
2. Cf. H. Diem, Dogmatik, Ihr Weg zwischen Historismus 'und Existen-
tialismus, p. 294. 
3. Schriftkanon, p. 4. 
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ian historical criticism mentioned by Diem are a fundamental historical 
critique, the law of analogy, and the law of correlation of all events.l 
Under these principles of tVhistoricism," a continuity of knowledge is 
ensured, so that no unique event could fundamentally challenge this 
axiomatic continuity and the basically 1'sgap-less11 or closed universe 
which it assurnes. 2 These rules, then,are not readily suitable for the 
study of a unique historical event which claims to be the decisive 
self-disclosure of God. Instead, such prinniples lead to a pre-judg-
ment of historical possibilities which would preclude even the ac-
knowledgment of such a revelatory event. Thus, the givenpess of the 
text confronts the historian with the choice either of maintaining_ 
that only such historical events as can be identified from his pre-
suppositions can actually have happened, or of allowing his presuppo-
sitions themselves to be called into question by this unique history.3 
No coercion can be used, of course, to force the historian to submit 
his presuppositions to such examination, and he may even continue to 
study Scripture by the widespread methods of uhistoricism~v if he so 
wishes. However, the Church must remind the historian patiently in 
such a case that his work is thereby theologically relevant only 
insofar as it is an auxiliary discipline which in itself remains 
1. H. Diem, 'DDie historisch-kri tische J3ibelwissenschaft und die 
Verktlndigungsaufgabe der Kirche,n p. 75. 
2. H. Diem, "Dogma und Existenz,ll pp. 27-28. 
3. Dogmatik, pp. 127, 211-12; Theologie, p. 59. Cf. H. Diem, Was 
heisst schriftgemHss~, p. 21. 
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questionable •1 
The reason for this important qualification is that in and of 
themselves, the methods of historical criticism are able only to in-
vestigate Historie and not Geschichte. Diem distinguishes be~~een 
these two levels of historical occurrence in the following manner: 
Unter Geschiclite verstehenwir einfach die geschehene 
Geschichte • • • in welcher sich nach deren eigener Aus-
sage Offenbarung als die Geschichte des sich selbst ver-
ktlndigenden Jesus Christus ereignet. Unter Historie 
verstehen wir(nicht die geschehene Geschichte selbst, 
sondern das usrope 'tv derselben in dem schon genannten 
Sinn des Kennenlernens und In-Erfahrungbringens und 
Berichtens ilber das Erfaii.rene. 2 -
Each Geschich·fje (or real event) that occurs holds within it the pos-
sibility of a Historie, that is, of being brought to awareness and 
reported, within the limited scope in which human consciousness and 
communication operates. But this does not mean that 1-1hat can thereby 
be historically established by human experience exhausts the possibil-
ities of what actually has happened. IIDie Geschichte geht in die 
-. ---
Historie ein, aber sie geht in ihr nicht aui' • 113 Geschichte may be 
humanly accessible only through the transcendental conceptions of 
Historie, but it must not thereby be assumed that there -vrere no accom-
panying factors perhaps inaccessible to the historian. Yet just this 
confining assumption is required by the three Troeltschian principles 
of historical criticism alreaqy mentioned. Therefore, these histori-
1. Theologie, p. 68. 
2. H. ·niem, Der irdische Jesus und der Christus des Glaubens; pp. 9.:.10. 
Cf. Bultmann's soniev~hat similar distinction (supra, p. 71, n. 4). 
3. Irdischer Jesus, p. 10. Cf. Theologie,·p. 117. 
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cal-critical presuppositions should themselves be corrected by presup-
positions more compatible with the object investigated, namely the 
richness of Geschichte itself. 
This would be true of any secular Geschichte to be examined. 
However, such refinement of critical presuppositions is especially 
necessary 1.vhen the Geschichte of God's revelation is under considera-
tion.1 This exceptional Geschichte claims to be the real, intrinsic 
Geschichte, which not only cannot be measured by the standards- of sec-
ular historiography, but also demands from the hearer the faith that 
in this very Geschichte a decision has already been made which affects 
the hearer's own personal destiny.g 
1. 
2. 
3. 
Es kann sich auch nicht darum handeln, den in diesem 
Geschehen uns begegnenden Uahrhei tsanspruch mit den uns 
abgesehen von diesem Ereignis zur VerfHgung stehenden 
Wahrheitskriterien auf seine Berechtigung zu prftfen. 
Wenn dieses Geschehen ist, was es zu sein beansprucht, 
dann ist es selbst qas Wahrheitskriterium fUr alles und 
hat sich vor keiner anderen Instanz auszuweisen. Es 
ist dann einfach dadurch wahr, dass es geschehen ist.3 
Diem notes the failure of both t11liberaP1 and "positive" historical 
criticism as being due to the neglect of the intangible nature of 
this Geschichte (Theologie, p. 62). 
Dogmatik, pp. 113-14; cf. also pp. 118, 212, and Grundfragen, 
pp. 39-41. Of. K. Barth, CD, II~/1, 78-82; CD, III/2, 446. 
Theologie, pp., 27-28. P. Biehl (~'Zu.r Frage na~h dem historischen 
Jesus; 1' p. 59l connnents that Diem, in borrowing Barth's concept of 
Geschichte, has a commendable emphasis on the unified reality of 
all Geschichte. However, Biehl insists this unity is shattered 
when an 11unhistorical~' history (inaccessible to natural means of 
knowledge) is placed beside the "historical. n Diem would reply 
that Biehl thus equates Geschichte with the epistemic results of 
Historie, which is precisely the circular assumption which Diem 
sees as the danger of historicism. The criticism of W. Matthias 
(1tDogmatik zwischen Historismus und Existentialismus, IV pp. 563-64; 
also cf. "Ex:egese, Dogmatik, Verldlndigung,w p. 253) is more per-
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Thus, the study of God's revelatory Geschichte, if it is not tg 
be distorted at man's whim, demands from the outset a dogmatic judg-
ment, a theological pre-understanding. To provide the exegete with 
the proper historical and theological presuppositions required by the 
study of this unique Geschichte is the se~vice rendered by the kirch-
liches VorverstMndnis. With these presuppositions of the theological 
intention and the geschichtlich witness of the scriptural authors, 
then, the exegete may turn to a consideration of the nature of Scrip-
ture itself. 
B. The Self-proclaiming Nature of Scripture 
1. The Origin of the Verkfindigungsgeschichte 
Hermann Diem maintains that the kirchliches VorverstMndnis is 
not an arbitrary presupposition of the exegete, but is the perspective 
that is affirmed from an examination of the self-understanding of 
Scripture itself. The New Testament alleges to proclaim the entrance 
into history of God's decree of salvation, in the form of the man 
Jesus. In view of this bistorical advent, however, it may be asked in 
what sense the scriptural authors considered their task as a historical 
report. Clearly the gospel-writers had no independent interest in a 
biography of Jesus or in historical facts as such. Instead they in-
tinent, for he asserts that Diem has not really come to terms with 
the genuine problems of historical consciousness which were dis~ 
cussed not only by Troeltsch, but more especially by W. Dilthey. 
The criticism of Diem by H. Geisser (~Die TrinitMtslehre unter den 
froblemen und in den %rolegomena christlicher Theologie,tn pp. 
452-54) is similar. 
corporated historical material as a basis for preaching about the 
crucified and resurrected Lord.1 The earlier "quest of the historical 
Jesus," including the investigations of Albert Sch~eitzer, made the 
error of using the gospels as more or less simple historical sources, 
and for this reason that school of historical criticism was doomed to 
failure. 2 It is the great service of Formgeschichte that it discovered 
the fundamental reason for this failure in the self-understanding of 
the gospels as proclamation, rather than as reporting. Thus a newer 
form of historical criticism, namely Formgeschichte, has without any 
undue theological bias pointed the way towards the transcending of the 
rigid presuppositions of the older, Troeltschian variety of historical 
criticism.3 
Thus, the basic intention of Scripture can now be clearly seen 
as Verkllndigung, or Gospel-proclamation. Furthermore, the exegete 
must remember the priority of Geschichte over the perceptions of 
Historie. Thus, as both a kirchliches VorverstMndnis and a refined 
historical criticism will confirm, the sole legitimate object of New 
Testament historical research is its VerkHndigungsgeschichte.4 With 
this concept, the popular alternative of tvtheology versus historytn 
1. Dogmatik, pp. 106-109, 78. 2. Irdischer Jesus~ pp. 6-7. 
3. Diem is not uncritical of Formgeschichte, however, for it has 
not prevented attempts to penetrate behind the present text in 
search of a "history" of the earthly Jesus or an extractable, 
pure ~ukerigma" (Dogmatik, p. 130). 
4. Irdischer Jesus, p.· 9; Dogmatik, pp. 126-27; ~W:Sibelwissenschaft, 11 
p. so. 
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is finally transcended.1 God's history which runs within world his-
tory can only be made known and transmitted in the concrete event of 
proclamation. 2 The ''historytv of the Old and New Testaments is the 
history of its preaching. 
Wir kBnnen die~e VerkHndigungsgeschichte in ihrer Eigen-
art bezeichnen als die Geschichte des Wortes Gottes mit 
den Menschen. Diese Geschichte • • • ist nacR dem Willen 
Gottes gebunden an eine konkrete menschliche Uberliefer-· 
ungsgeschichte, an die sich Gott in Christus selbst ~ber­
liefert hat im Zeugnis der Apostel und rropheten. Diese 
Zeugnis hat seinem historischen Niederschlag gefunden in 
den biblischen Texten.3 
a. The Text 1!:§. the Primary Datum of Research 
This VerkUndigungsgeschichte must be investigated through the 
medium of its historically tangible Historie, says Diem, which means 
in this case the scriptural text. To search for a Geschichte '~ehindn 
the text would be to forget that its Geschichte is manifest only 
through this Historie, and thus to reopen the sluice-gates of retro-
1. P. Lengsfeld ('fTherlieferung [Rome: Verlag Bonifacius, 1960], 
pp. 138-39) praises Diem's concept as a good point of departure. 
But W. Matthias ("Exegese, Dogmatik, Verldindigung,tt pp. 253-57) 
charges that Diem's VerkHndigungsgeschichte only obscures the 
creative dialectic of theology and history, that (in Chalcedonian 
terminology) the ltunmingled" is belittled in favor of the tnundi vid-
ed." Diem offers here only a theological position, which cannot be 
a historical-critical conclusion without also implying a systematic 
ontology of the sort that Diem himself rejects. In fact, Matthias 
continues, Verktlndigungsgeschichte is a contradictio in adjecto, 
since the writ'ten text is no longer proclamation, nor can it be 
solely Geschichte, for it has thus also become Historie, a tangible 
deposit at man's disposal. 
2. H. Diem, "Theologie zwischen Text und Predigt, tv p. 398. Of. also 
Kritischer Idealismus in theologischer Sicht, p. 83. 
3. · ~1Bibelwissenschaft, tu p. 79. 
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jection and exegetical caprice. Rather, the intrinsic nature of 
Scripture itself, as Verkllndigungsgeschichte, demands the consider-
ation of the history of the text itself and its formation.l "Die 
~extgeschichte ist se1bst das einzig historisch greifbare Stfick dieser 
Y§.rkllnditt:U.ngsgeschichte. ~•2 The understanding of this unique Geschichte 
requires that, instead of beginning with a literary-critical dissolu-
tion of the text at hand, the exegete must begin with the canonical. 
text itself and its own self-understanding as an instrument of proc-
lamation.3 
b. The Continuity of the Verldindiggg~sgeschichte· 
The specifically historical question as posed to this scriptural 
J[erkllndigungsgeschichte therefore is not a question of tnwhat actually 
happened n behind and apart from these texts, but rather the question 
of the continuity of this Geschichte, from the proclamation of the 
earthly Jesus to the manifold proclamation of the apostolic witnesses.4 
It is Diem's position that the identity of the preaching of Jesus with 
the preaching about Jesus is an identity which can properly be inquired 
about and answered only within the continued event of proclamation, 
hearing, and faith. The two phases of this comprehensive Verkfindigungs-
1. Diem's criticism of Hei1sgeschichte is that it attempts to recon-
struct a historically demonstrable series of "salvation-facts,'" 
which subordinates the text and its proclamation to tne dubious 
reconstruction of a history "behind tu the text (ibid.). 
2. Dogmatik, p. 129. 3. Ibid., pp. 131, 114-15, 212. 
4. Irdischer Jesus, pp. 11-12; 11Bibelwissenschaft, 1' p. 80; Theo1ogie, 
p. 71; Dogmatik, p. 78. 
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geschichte, which are the actions and preaching of the earthly Jesus 
himself (the Geschichte of Jesus), and the subsequent proclamation 
about his actions and preaching (the Historie of Jesus), are to be 
differentiated and yet not separated.1 They are to be different~ateq: 
the history of Jesus (which basically is the history of his own proc-' 
lamation2) is unique, and forms as such the antic and epistemic 
basis for the history of the apostolic preaching. Yet the two his-
tories are not to be separated: the same Jesus Ghrist continues to be 
the acting subject of the proclamation about himself, so that one can 
no longer differentiate between the earthly and the exalted Ghrist.3 
The distinction of Geschichte and Historie thus qualifies the relation-
ship of these two histories: 
Diese zweite Geschichte ist damit einerseits schon . 
Historie der ersten Geschichte und andererseits zugleich 
und als solche die Fortsetzung derselben, also neue und 
1. Irdischer Jesus, p. 10. W. :Matthias (11Der historische Jesus und 
der irdische Jesus," ThLZ, LXXXVI [1961], 571-74) points out that 
what past discussions have called 11the Ghrist of faithll is here 
called by Diem 11the historical Jesus," that is, the Historie Y£!! 
Jesus Ghristus, while the term der irdische Jesus is chosen for the 
actual Geschichte of the Incarnation. The reversal of terms indi-
cates that Diem means something quite different by 11history" than 
does J. M. Robinson, who thus is mistaken when he cites Diem as an 
example of a new Leben-Jesu-Forschung (A New Quest of the Histori-
cal Jesus, pp. 22-25). :Matthias praises Diem's contribution to the 
current discussion as the greatest since Reimarus 1 , because Diem 
avoids that purely epistemological issue of "historical Jesus~~ 
versus "Ghrist of :J!aith," which asks only about the relation of 
knowledge and faith (~he Kantian pure reason and pract~cal Teason)~· 
Diem places Sein above the dilemmas of Bewusstsein, since his for-
mulation basically asks about the relation of faith to the irdisch-
~ Jesus (and thus irrespective of the accessibility to this Ge-
schichte by historical reason). 
2. Dogmatik, p. 106. 3. Ibid~, p. 109. 
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zugleich mit der ersten identische Geschichte. Nun 
bezeugt uns aber die erste Geschichte nur durch die 
zweite, oder genauer in der Historie der Zi.Jeiten, d. h. 
in den Schriften des NT, in welchen diese VerkUndigungs-
geschichte als ganze ihren historischen Niederschlag 
gefunden hat.l 
Despite the noetic mediation of Historie, the Geschichte of 
Christ's proclamation of himself remains the basis of all post-Easter 
Verkffndigen. With this emphasis, Diem resists the Bultmannian posi-
tion of making the preaching of Jesus only the minimal presupposition 
of the later, post-Easter kerygma, with little continuity between the 
two. 2 The Incarnation, ministry, and Passion cannot be reduced to a 
mere preliminary, an occasion serving as impetus for the subsequent 
kerygma; and the Geschichte of the self-proclaiming Lord cannot be 
reduced to a sheer Geschichtlichkeit, an abstract call which continues 
to address the existence of modern man. 
Es ist uns vielmehr eine bestimmte Geschichte begegnet, 
nMmlich die Geschichte von dem sich selbst verkfindig-
enden Jesus Ohristus •••• Wir konnten also diese 
Geschehen nicht an Hand eines von uns mitgebrachten 
Begriffes van.Geschichtlichkeit daraufhin befragen, ob 
es sich hier um wirkliche Geschichte handel t. Viel-
mehr wurden umgekehrt wir darnach gefragt, ob wir die 
in diesem Geschehen Hber uns gefallene Entscpeidung 
anerkennen wollen oder nicht.3 
The factuality of Jesus and the significance of the kery~a cannot 
be dissociated, so that the latter may be more easily appropriated 
1. Irdischer Jesus, p. 11. All abbreviations in the original texts, 
such as 11NTit here, will be reproduced in their original form in 
quotations used in this dissertation. 
2. Of. R. Buitmann, Theology of the New Testament, I, 3-37. 
3. iDogmatik, p. 212; cf. p. 231. Of. also t>fas heisst, pp. 16-18. 
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in the present. The kerygma is what it is solely because the One who 
introduced it is and remains who he is, the Christ who continues to 
proclaim himself. Ultimately the unity of both fact (Dass) and mean-
ing (Was) in this historical revelation rests solely on the fact that 
God is God, the Unifier of all.l 
The historical question concerning the proclamation-history, tha~ 
is whether its two phases are a continuity, can be answered in the af-
firmative by careful historical study as such, in areas such as the 
relation of the earthly Jesus to the coming Son of Man. 2 The theolog-
ical question follows, then, concerning 'tvhether the Christ encountered 
in preaching today is the same as the earthly Jesus.3 This second 
question cannot be thus positively answered by the preceding historical 
studies, since the issue itself goes beyond a historical judgment. 
On the other hand, a negative historical answer to the historical ques-
tion, that is, an assertion of discontinuity in the Verkfindigungs-
geschichte, would negatively prejudice the theological question, as it 
1. Dogmatik, p. 264; cf. pp. 251, 258, 284, et passim. 
2. Irdischer Jesus, pp. 15-17. Diem's approval of TBdt's research 
on this issue has been widely acclaimed as a departure from the 
orthodox Barthian position of allowing historical criticism to in-
vestigate only the meaning and context of the scriptural texts as 
such (cf. Barth, CD, I/~, 494; cf. Diem, Theologie, p. 27; ~­
tik, pp. 130-31; cf. supra, pp. 161-62 ). Since 1957 (Irdischer 
Jesus) Diem has allowed an investigation ''behindn the text to the. 
extent of studying the earthly Jesus as the first phase of the 
Verktindigungsgeschichte. Cf. W. Matthias, ~VDogmatik zwischen His-
torismus und Existentialismus,n p. 565; J. M. Robinson, A New Quest 
of the Historical Jesus; pp. 22-25; J. L. Mays, Exegesis as a The-
ological Discipline, pp. 21-22. 
3. Irdischer Jesus, p. 12; cf. t~ibelwissenschaft,n p. 78. 
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would imply that the Christus praedicatus is but a myth. In this light, 
then, there is no t~eological guarantee of the identity of the Christ 
encountered in the present-day event of proclamation with the Jesus of 
ancient Nazareth. The Church can only venture to preach him as the 
Christ of Scripture, both Old and New Testaments, so that within this 
circle of renewed attestation he may show himself as. the One who is 
also living and present. 
Dass der Christus praedicatus als der Erh8fute identisch 
ist mit dem irdischen Jesus, konnte darum selbstverstgnd-
lich vorausgesetzt werden, weil die Fredigt auf Grund der 
Schrift erfolgt, die von ihm zeugt. Und dass sie von ihm 
zeugt, wird umgekehrt wieder dadurch best~tigt, dass sie 
sich predigen lMsst und diese P.redigt Glauben an ihn findet.l 
That Jesus of Nazareth is thus the Christ of the Scriptures is 
decisive for authenticating his preaching and establishing a continuity 
in the Verkfindigungsgeschichte. The proclamation of Jesus has not only 
its successor in the apostolic preaching, but its antecedent in the 
proclamation-history of Israel. t~as AT ist die Urkunde des Bundes, 
den der Gott Abrahams, Isaaks und Jakobs mit der Kirche Jesus Christi 
geschlossen hat. tu2 The congregation of the New Testament continues 
and fulfills the Verktlndigungsgeschichte of the Old Testament. On 
what basis is this fulfillment possible? Diem answers! 
1. Irdischer Jesus, p. 4. Diem's published writings are not consist-
ent as to whether Latin phrases are italicized or not; this disser-
tation will in each quotation follow the practice of the text 
cited. P. Biehl ("Zur Frage nach dem historischen Jesus," p. 61) 
claims that the relation of the kerygma as genuine proclamation and 
the kerygma as a historical phenomenon is -not clarified here at all 
by Diem's erection of dogmatische Warnungstafeln. 
2. Theologie, p. 76. 
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Die sachliche Identi tY.t in dieser Kontinui tHt .zwischen .. 
dem alttestamentlichen Gottesvolk und der neutestament-
lichen Gemeinde liegt in dem ffber alle Unterschiede der 
Zeiten und MOdi des Redens hinweg identischen Reden Gottes 
hier und dart. Dieses Reden Gottes liegt vor in der 
Schrift des AT .1 
Because of the continuity of God's speaking, Jesus can and must be pro-
claimed as the Christ of the Old Testament. Indeed, the task of the-
ology is to test the agreement of the apostolic preaching about Jesus 
Christ with the proclamation by Jesus himself as the Christ of the 
Old Testament.2 
The means of comparison and testing of this continuity which is 
used in the New Testament itself is the Schriftbeweis. An essential 
aspect of the apostolic kerygma is the reference to an Old Testament 
text to show that Christ is the fulfillment of Scripture.3 The histor-
ical Jesus as such is not the object of this kerygmatic preaching, but 
rather the concept of the Christ of Scripture forms the connecting link 
between the teaching of Jesus and the teaching about Jesus. Not that 
such a correlation of Old Testament anticipation with the proclamation 
of Jesus is conclusive proof or even an actual l'argument~• for the 
claims of the kerygma.4 Rather, such a reference reflects a proclaim-
ing resumption of the Old Testament Verktlndigung, now clarified by its 
Christological meaning.5 The obvious carelessness in accurate citation 
1. Dogmatik, p. 143. 2. Ibid. 3. Of. Theologie, p. 83. 
4. Therefore Diem admits that Schriftheloreis is an inadequate term 
(Dogmatik, p. 135). Further: f'Ihre ultima ratio ist deshalb nicht 
ein Argument, sondern das Faktum des Daseins der Gemeinde, ·welche 
den auferstandenen Christus als ihren Herrn bezeugt" (ibid.). 
5 • Ibid. , p. 132. 
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of Old Testament texts in the Nevi Testament is evidence for the fact 
that the main weight is laid not upon the literal wording of the text, 
such as an nargument" would require, but upon this renewed proclamation. 
The historical facts of Jesus as such prove nothing until it is shown 
through preaching that they happened Hlaccording to the Scriptures." 
Such facts receive their legitimate significance when such meaning is 
attributed to them in the event of preaching and by the appropriation 
of the Old Testament's VerkUndigungsgeschichte. 
This means that the Old Testament cannot be properly understood 
by Jewish presuppositions, but must be read Christologically. 
Ob das AT mit den Augen des NT zu lesen ist, das ist 
der Schriftauslegung nicht als Frage gestellt, welche 
sie durch das Ergebnis ihrer Arbeit erst zu beantworten 
h~tte, yondern es ist ihr die Aufgabe gestellt, das 
zu tun. 
Only within this Christological context can the admittedly difficult 
problems of the Christian Old Testament be properly approached. Such 
a use of the Old Testament is not far from typology, which method.Diem 
does not dispute as long as the pre-figuring historical fact is a per-
son or event and not a doctrine or myth. 2 In any case, the apostolic 
resumption of the Old Testament proclamation-history is the verifica-
tion of Jesus as the Christ of the Scriptures. 
1. Theologie, p. 75. 
2. l~ibelwissenschaft,n p. 76. Cf. G. von Rad (whom Diem here men-
tions favorably), "Typological Interpretation of the Old Testa-
ment," Intp, XJl (1961), 174-92; especially 190-92. 
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c. The Self-proclamation of Christ 
With this, however, the essential continuity and authority of 
the Verkfindigungsgeschichte has still not been identified. Of itself, 
a correlation, by a human witness, of the deceased earthly Jesus with 
the proclamation of the Old Testament would be subject to grave doubts. 
However, within this apostolic witness lies a more fundamental faun-
dation. liAber das sachlich und ••• auch historisch primMre Datum, 
.@:!! das wir :!:1!:!§. in dieser Frage ID! halten haben, ist die Verklindigung 
a:es sich selbst verldindigenden Jesus. n1 The risen and exalted Lord 
continues to proclaim himself, just as he did in his earthly history, 
but now through the medium· of the apostolic preaching. 
Man kann den ganzen Inhalt der neutestamentlichen 
Verldindigung zusammenfassen als: die VerkiindigU.ng 
'YQ!l Jesus Christus, der sich selbst verldlndigt. 
Dabei ist Jesus Christus sowohl der Initiator als 
der Gegenstand als auch das handelnde Subjekt dieser 
VerkEI.ndigung. Diese Verldindigung verll!uft innerhalb 
einer Geschichte, die mit dem irdischen Jesus beginnt 
und sich fiber Kreuz und Auferstehung fortsetzt in der 
apostolischen Verkllndigung.2 
Christ remains not only the object, but ultimately the acting subject 
of the post-Easter kerygma. The continuity between Christ and the 
1. Dogmatik, p. 105. 
2. Irdischer Jesus, p. 9; cf. Theologie, pp. 26-27, 164-65; 1~ibel­
idssenschaft,r.r. p. 79; Dogmatik, p. 109. Also H. Diem, Warum Text-
predigt? (Mllnchen: Kaiser Verlag, 1939), p. 207. E. Heitsch 
(WJesus aus Nazareth als Christus, 11 Der historische Jesus und der 
kerygmatische Christus, ed. H. Ristow and K. Matthiae [Berlin~ 
Evangelische Verlaganstalt, 1960], p. 63, n. 1) calls it meaning-
less to speak of the content of the New Testament as Christ's self-
proclamation, adding that if Diem's description is legitimate there 
is then nno opportunity to occupy ourselves further with Christen-
dom. tu But P. Lengsfeld \!Therlieferung, pp. 48-49), writing from a 
Roman Catholic perspective, approves Diem's present statement. 
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words of Scripture therefore is not the continuity of a correct tra-
dition which is me~ely true in its content, but is far more the con-
tinuity of the condescension of the divine Logos within the words of 
S'cripture •1 The decisive factor in the texts of Scripture is that 
the self-proclamation of Christ remains central throughout its whole 
Geschichte. 
Diem's description of Scripture as Zeugenaussagen expounds further 
this polarity of apostolic preaching and the self-proclaiming Jesus. 
The biblical documents were written by fallible men, conditioned by 
their heritage, environm~nt, and immediate problems; they uttered 
their proclamation as mere witnesses of ·God's revelation.2 However, 
their witness was given in the original two~old meaning of the word 
)J~fJ1Uj, that is, as both attestation to fact and confession to 
truth,3 which corresponds respectively to the Dass and Was of the 
revelation in Christ.4 The testimony to both the occurrence and the 
1. H. Diem, t9Est autem ecclesia congregatio· sanctorum • , 11 ~-
logische AufsMtze.: Karl Barth zum 50. Geburtstag~ ed. E. Wolf 
(MHnchen: Kaiser Verlag, 1936), p. 324. Hereafter referred to as 
lfEst autem ecclesia. t1l 
2. Was heisst, p. 35. Cf. "Die Geburt der Gemeinde in der J?redigt, ~v 
especially pp. 195-96. Of the biblical witness, Diem adds, the 
following should be noted-: "Er ist also nicht ein 1Glaubenzeuge, 1 
wie man so gern'und so gefMhrlich sagt. Nicht seinen eigenen 
Glauben will der Apostel bezeugen--was wfirde mir das helfen?--, 
sondern er bezeugt mit allem, was er sagt, die 1grossen Taten 
Gottes'" ("Geburt der Gemeinde,ur p. 196). 
3. Was heisst, p. 12; Dogmatik, p. 246; cf. the article np..fJ.piUft'l 
in Theologisches ~rterbuch zum Neuen Testament, ed. G. Kittel 
(Stuttgart.: Kohlhammer, 1939-59), IV, 477-514. 
4. Cf. supra, pp. 54-59, 162-64. 
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acknowledged claim of the revelation therefore characterizes the scriP-
tural proclamation. However, this witness cannot b~ c~rr~borated by 
universally valid criteria of thought or extrinsic principles, but can 
only refer the responsibility of verification back to the One who is 
attested.1 
Thus, the concept of witness implies not only a human limitation, 
but also a granted authority.2 For the testimony partakes of the na-
ture of the revelation and in fact becomes an aspect of it. "Die 
Zeugenaussagen des Textes sich selbst verstehen als ein MOment inner-
halb der Geschichte der Selbsterschliessung Gottes in seiner Offen-
barung, wodurch diese Geschichte bezeugt wird und zugleich geschieht. \t3 
Das bedeutet fftr die Wahrheit des Zeugnisses, dass es 
wohl von Gott aus gesehen als solches wahr ist, weil 
Gott das Wort tatsHchlich gesprochen hat, das es zu 
Gegenstand hat. Aber vom Ysnschen aus gesehen kann 
das Zeugnis nicht als solches wahr oder falsch sein, 
eben weil es nicht eine in sich selbst ruhende Wahr-
heit, sondern ein Zeugnis ist.4 
In this contingent event of the origin of the text and its continued 
visibility within the stream of history as the ~ posteriori testimony 
of prophets and apostles, the incarnate Son of God is fully present 
1. Cf. 1•Schriftauslegung,n p. 59; Dogm.atik, p. 246; Was heisst, 
pp. 12-14, 57; "Dogma u. Existenz, •• pp. 26-27. 
2. Note the influence upon Diem of K. Barth's own doctrine of Scrip-
ture as witness~ CD, I/2, 457-72, especially 463-69. 
3. Was heisst, p. 21. 
4. H. Diem, tllDas Bekenntnis in der Kirche des Neuen Testaments, t~ • 
EvTh, I (1934-35), 425. Hereafter referred to as UJ3ekenntnis. 11 
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as acting subject.1 Jesus Christ continues to proclaim himself in 
the testimony of his witnesses, who in turn can only refer back to 
him. In fact, this witnessing may even be called r.vdas Wort Gottes 
in seiner spM.teren Formen. ''2 The scriptural witness in its fallible 
humanity has become through grace an integral factor within God's 
self-disclosure. 
From the affirmation of the centrality of Christ's self-procla-
mation result important consequences for the authority of the various 
scriptural texts. First, the search for ~ ipsissima of Jesus in 
the gospels must be declared fruitless, since the apostolic preachers 
themselves made no such distinction between their own preaching and 
the words of J~sus. They £elt n£ need for such a distinction, as they 
believed themselves empowered by Christ's own self-proclamation, and 
in any case they would have been unable to make such a distinction, 
for changes inevitably occurred as they passed on the preaching of 
Jesus to fUrther situations.3 
Secondly, the authority of apostolic preaching, tradition, and 
doctrine may noi-r be clearly seen, for these are three inseparable as-
pects of the Verkandigungsgeschichte, or, as it also may be phrased, 
of the proclaiming tradition received which tests itself by doctrine.4 
1. H. Diem, Die Sichtbarheit der Kirche (TbEx, Nr. 44; MHnchen~ Kaiser 
Verlag, 1936), pp. 4, 9. Hereafter referred to as Sichtbarheit. 
2. "Est autem ecclesia,ttJ p. 324; cf. K. Barth, CD, I/1, 111-24. 
3. Irdischer Jesus, p. 13. 
4. Ibid., p. 9. Cf. H. Diem, ~VDie Einheit der Schrift, 11 p. 393. 
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Because Ghrist remains as self-proclaiming subject, the apostolic 
ministry in its tradition of preaching is actually an aspect or factor 
of the revelatory event itself.1 In fact, the New Testament image 
of Uapostolic succession" is simply the fact that the very nature of 
the apostolic paradosis demands that it be passed on from one preacher 
to another. 2 
Thirdly, the traditional division of t11Lawt11 and ''Gospel,'' 1vi th its 
dire consequences both in exegesis and in political ethics, must be 
radically reformulated. There is no "Lawtn in Scripture which is ab-
s tracted from grace, and no part of the LUQospel" is without its demand 
upon its hearers • Every text is a mixture of "Law and Gospel I'; but 
such a rubric should rather be reversed, as "Gospel and Law, rr to make 
clear the authority of Ghrist over even the most unpromising sections 
of Scripture.3 
Fourthly, the historical critic's investigation of the pr~ary 
datum of Scripture, that is, the Textgeschichte, receives here its 
proper authority. For the critical task is to examine the extent 
to which the individual canonical writings in their peculiar circum-
stances are able to witness to the Geschichte of the Jesus Ghrist 
1. Dogmatik, pp. 162-67. uwas m5!:!! empfangen hat, ist vielmehr die 
der Gemeinde YQll dem Herrn selbst durch den Dienst der Apostel 
Hbergebene Paradosis, in deren Verkfindigung der Herr sich selbst 
verktindigt 11 (ibid., p. 167). 
2. Ibid., p. 172. Of. pp. 171-7.5; 143; cf. also tvEinheit, tll p. 393. 
3. Of. H. Diem, 111 Evangelium und Gesetz' oder 1Gesetz und Evangel-
ium 1? ,,11 pp. 361-70. Of. also H. Diem, Taufverktindigung und Tauf-
ordnung, p. 21, n. 18. 
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who proclaims himself.1 Diem admits that the question of the criteria 
for the testing of this correspondence is a problem, which, however, 
unites both historian and theologian in their search for truth and 
which can find its solution only in the continued proclamation of the 
self-proclaiming Christ. 
The centrality of Jesus Christ, who did and continues to proclaim 
himself, also implies the 11inspirationtv or continuing self-evidence of 
Scripture. This inspiration is certainly not demonstrable from any 
principle, and in fact an examination of Scripture itself fails to 
discover therein any explicit doctrine of inspiration.2 The apostolic 
writers simply claimed an exclusive working of the Holy Spirit for the 
Old Testament, in its origin and efficacy, as well as for their own 
witness.3 Furthermore, the Spirit which inspired Scripture can itself 
be recognized only by the Spirit; theopneustia is the ambiguous term 
for this totality of God's self-disclosure.4 The apostolic writers 
considered Scripture as "verbally inspiredlll in the sense that the very 
words used and not merely the meanings were inspired, although this 
did not signify a denial of human authorship or an assertion of infal-
libility. The unity of man and God implied in the scriptural witness 
1. Dogmatik, p. 131 
2. Especially to be noted here are II Pet. 1:20-21; II Tim. 3:16; 
II Cor. 3:4-18 (of. Dogmatik, pp. 153-57). 
3. Ibid.' p. 177. 
4. Ibid., p. 175-79. 
IJ2, 514-17. 
Concerning theopneustia, of. K. Barth, CD, 
174 
remains conditioned by the free grace of God, so that God's Word can 
not be imprisoned or placed at man's disposal in these words of the 
text.1 The inspiration of Scripture, according to its own self-
understanding, has its reality always solely as a promise from God, 
which thus cannot be split into isolated factors or restricted by 
analyses. 
The inspiredness of the scriptural witness cannot be rationally. 
deduced from a principle, but can only rely upon the continuing self-
evidence of Scripture in the event of its being preached. tnDabei sind 
wir aber doch auf eine Begrundung des Schriftkanons gestossen, nMmlich 
auf die Selbstevidenz der Heiligen Schrift im Ereignis ihres VerkHndigt-
~rdens~~ No other doctrinal or systematic.justification can be given, 
without at the same time calling into question the very thing asserted. 
This precludes any theory of biblical inspiration ante et extra ~' 
whereby Scripture would be a storehouse of revealed truths to be drawn 
upon at will) Scripture confirms itself in that it allovlS itself . 
to be preached, and in this preaching awakens faith.4 For the self-
proclamation of Jesus Christ is the sole basis of Scripture, and this 
authority becomes self-evident to the believer in the concrete event 
of preaching. 
1. Dogmatik, pp. 177-78. Cf. K. Barth, CD, I/2, 514-26, e·~ecially 
517-18, where tVverbal inspiration" is contrasted to tnverbal in-
spiredness. u 
2. Schriftkanon, p. 23. Cf. ibid., p. 7; Dogmatik, pp. 191~94, 204. 
Also, H. Diem, I'Die Bibel als Norm der Theologie, 11 p. 33. 
3. Grundfragen, p. 5. 4. Irdischer Jesus, p. 4. 
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2. The Continuation of the yerkftndigung~geschichte, . 
In the event of present-day preaching is the context for the 
continuing encounter with the canonical Verkfindigungsgeschichte. 
Indeed, this is the very essence of the sermon~. 
Das bedeutet, dass einer an den andern sich wendet 
mit der Mitteilung, dass ihn in dieser Schrift die 
Verkftndigung von Gottes richtendem und gn~igem 
Willen getroffen habe, und mit dem Anspruch, der 
vom andern die Entscheidung daf~ verlangt, diese 
VerkHndigung ebenfalls hier und nur hier in dieser 
Schrift zu h8ren.l 
This claim to be heard is intrinsic to the nature of Scripture, for 
if the text is received as a proclamation-history, then it must be 
interpreted as a proclamation Hhich is also to happen now and in the 
future. The very "givenness" of the text already contains both the 
commission and the promise to proclaim further. 2 As long as mankind 
is allowed to read the Bible, the renewal of the proclamation and, 
with it, of the Church is possible. On the other hand, the contin-
uing norm for such proclamation is that it is to be ''according to 
the Scriptures. tv 
a. The Text of Scripture Used §:§. Predigttext 
Just as the basic nature of Scripture in its composition is 
Verkftndigungsgeschichte, so its nature in its actualization is prima-
rily Predigttext. The apostolic preaching and present-day preaching 
1. H. Diem, 111J)ie Substanz der Kirche," Bl~tter zur kirchlichen Lage, 
IV (1934), 26. Hereafter referred to as "Substanz. tv 
2. Kritischer Idealismus, p. 58; Sichtbarheit, pp. 9-10; Warum Text-
predigt?, p. 207; "Theologie zwischen," p. 398. 
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both enter into the same revelatory event of proclamation by the Jesus 
Christ who continues to proclaim himself.1 
Das Ereignis der Verkllndigung erh~lt also seine Qualifi-
zierung 1. dadurch, dass Christus selbst das handelnde 
Subjekt in ihm ist, 2. durch die Beauftragung des 
Apostels, das ihm fiberlieferte durch die Verkfindigung 
weiter zu Uberliefern und 3. dadurch, dass in dieser 
Geschichte der Verkfindigung das VerkUndigte gegen-
w&tig geschieht, indem es entweder Glauben ~d damit 
Gemeinde schafft oder aber Verstockung wirkt. 
b. The Church §.§. Constituted Ex Verldlndigung 
The event of present proclamation of Scripture occurs within a 
specific context, namely the Church, and indeed this forms the basis 
for Diem's doctrine of the Church. "Ich verkfindige im Auftrag der 
Kirche, die mir das .Amt und den Kanan der Verktl.ndigung gegeben hat.~v3 
The Church is constituted by its Verldlndigungsaufgabe, because the Word 
of God not only has happened but must co~tinually happen again in and 
with its human proclamation.4 The historical continuity of the Church 
is provided by this duty of preaching, by the unbrolten succession of 
witnesses who have come to faith through the Word of God and who pass 
1. Within this continuity of Verkllndigungsgeschichte, however, the 
apostle preaches as a direct eyewitness of God's historical rev-
elation, while the later preacher needs the mediation of a text, 
that is, the recorded witness of the apostle; cf. Schriftkanon, 
p. 12. Cf. K. Barth, CD, I/1, 98-140. 
2. Dogmatik, p. 163; cf. Kritischer ldealismus, pp. 88-89; 
tnTheologie zwischen, tTJ p. 397. 
3. Sichtbarheit, pp. 10-11; cf. ltGeburt der Gemeinde," p. 197. 
4. lfarum Textpredigt?, p. 209; 11Geburt der Gemeinde,w pp. 193, 207; 
Theologie, pp. 114, 122, 164; liJ3ibel als Norm,n p. 33. Also, 
H. Die:in., tVDie Ortsgemeinde in der Kirchenordnung, ~tr ~' VII 
(1947-48), 324; hereafter referred to as nartsgemeinde." 
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on this faith by proclamation.1 The history of the Church belongs to 
the VerkHndigungsgeschichte as a whole, for the Gemeinde is the place 
for and the bearer of the VerkHndigung, as well as the object addressed 
by it. 2 
The visible essence of the Church, then is not characterized by 
being a school of pure doctrine, nor by the faith and works of its 
pious members or of the pastor, nor by its methods of procedure. 
Rather, the visible Church essentially can be identified as the as-
sembly of God where the Gospel is preached.J This act of proclamation 
again and again sets anew the boundary between faith and disbelief, 
the Church and the world. Even if this office of proclamation is 
misused or neglected, the Church remains the Church as long as a pro-
test can be raised against such a self-contradiction and the possi-
bility remains of being allowed again to obey this divine commission.4 
For in the concrete event of proclamation, the nreal presence 11 of 
Christ is manifest and extends its rule over the Church; from this 
event is derived the "presence" within the sacraments, and not vice 
~· The worship of the congregation is truly an ~ Dei, for God 
1. "Substanz, t.u p. 29; this continuity can be identified with the con..:. 
_tinued condescendence of the Logos \~1Est autem ecclesia," ~· 325). 
2. Irdischer Jesus, p. 9; Theologie, p. 114; Dogmatik, p. 132. 
3. Of. WQeburt der Gemeinde"; Theologie, pp. 53, 112, et passim. 
This view is emphasized repeatedly, though in varying forms, by 
Diem, especially ~n the literature of the Kircherurampf of the 
1930's. Of. Sichtbarheit, pp. 6, 15-16; "Substanz,'' p. 27; and 
11Die Substanz der Kirche [II],ttr EvTh, I (1934-35), 476. 
4. Sichtbarheit, p. 15. 
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is the acting subject, creating his nnew creationtt in the response of 
the faithful. 1 
The office of proclamation, furthermore, determines not only the 
boundaries, but also the unity of the Church. Its identity within 
the flux of secular history consists of the unity and continuity of 
its confessions, of its response to the proclamation of the one Kyrios 
Christos. The Church is one, then, only so long as the one Christ in 
the one word of Scripture is proclaimed.2 A dogmatic definition of the 
canon, such as asserted by Roman Catholicism at the Councils of Flor-
ence and Trent, arises only when this unity of the Church based on the 
unity of Scripture is no longer self-evident.3 The same correlation 
of proclamation and unity may be noted from another aspect, in that 
pietism, by gathering together only small circles of 11believers,n 
marked the beginning of the decline also of the Church's office of 
preaching and thus of the proclamation itself, with the result that the 
Church itself became a sect.4 
The nature of the Church, Diem maintains, rests upon Scripture 
being used according to its own self-understanding, that is, as a 
history of proclamation \vhich demands to be further proclaimed, and 
which in its self-verification creates the unity of the congregation. 
1. 'ltiarum. Textpredigt?, p. 212; ""Geburt der Gemeinde," p. 205; Tauf-
verkllndigung, pp. 3-23. Cf. H. Diem, ttlfrolegomena zur Lehre vom 
Gottesdienst, 11 pp. 451-59. 
2. Theologie, pp. 135, 170, 261, et ~ssim; nortsgemeinde, ttJ p. 328. 
3. "Einhei t, t~ p. 405. For the consequences, cf. Theologie, pp. 263-64. 
4. 11Substanz," pp. 47-49. 
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The renewed discovery of Scripture in its proper and original meaning 
as Predigttext was the impetus of the Protestant Reformation. The 
Reformers' decisive criticism of the Roman Catholic Church was that 
it could no longer preach, because the authority of the Church's 
Lehramt had so effectively encompassed the voice of Christ that the 
latter could speak only through the Church but not to the Church. 
In contrast to the increasing dogmatic institutionalization of Scrip-
ture in Catholicism, the Reformation produced no new doctrine of 
Scripture, but instead a renewed usage of Scripture as Predigttext.1 
In this exercise of Scripture in the present event of procla-
mation, the Bible continually shows itself anew to be canonical. To 
be sure, this self-legitimation happens within the context of the 
Church, but it does not thereby derive its authority from the Church. 
Augustine 1 s famous words, tuEgo vere evangelic non crederem, nisi me 
catholicae ecclesiae commeveret auctoritasW (C. ep.Man. 5:6), could 
be readily accepted by Protestants if they vrere to mean that one can 
believe the witness of the Gospel only in that one believes at the 
same time in the Church which itself lives and f~nds its validity in 
the proclamation of this Gospel. 2 The only proper circle between 
Church and Scripture is one in which the constituting factor remains 
the canonical P.redigttext fulfilled in the event of proclamation. 
Only in this unhindered, concrete event, can "Scripturettr protect it-
1. Theologie, p. 20; Schriftkanon, pp. 10-11; t~Einheit,tl! pp. 387-88; 
Dogmatik; pp. 190-91; tS:Sibelwissenschaft, tv p. 74; tflBibel als 
Norm,n p. 31. 
2. Grundfragen, p. 7; Theologie, p. 146; Schriftkanon, p. 7. 
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self against the encroachments of tnTradi tion 11 and subsequent ecclesi-
astical criteria. 
For the present-day preacher of the Church, this means that he 
is to present himself as a witness and a mediator, through which the 
listening congregation is to be placed within the very Geschehen of 
the kerygmatic text. This constitutes the great authority and yet 
the humbling limitation of the office of proclamation. The preacher 
must not argue, convince, or try to work himself up into transmitting 
~1sparkst11 of inspiration to his listeners, whereby he unconsciously 
tends to become a priestly Wdemi-godP for the edification of his con-
gregation. The distress of modern preaching is the uncertainty by 
pastors of the nature of this authority to preach, and the resulting 
preoccupation with the efficiency of communication.1 The pastor must 
realize that he himself is not the one supposed to bring the text into 
verbal expression, but that he must allow himself to be borne by the 
text just as a swimmer relies on the bouyancy of water.2 The givenness 
of the text, and not his personal attitudes or the prospects of the 
congregation's receptivity, is the factor th~t qualifies him as a 
preacher, just as it constitutes the Church. The pastor thus has the 
commission simply to bear further witness to the canonical proclama-
1. Cf. Warum Textpredigt?; '1Geburt der Gemeinde"; also, H. Diem, 
11:1?redigthilfe, ~' Verklindigung und Forschung: Theologischer Jahres-
bericht 1941, ed. G. Dehn et al. (Mlinchen: Verlag Lempp, 1941), 
pp. 294-5.3. 
2. 'Warum Textpredigt?, p. 217; also H. Diem, 11Der Theologe zwischen 
Text und 'Predigt," pp. 295-96. 
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tion, and to do this in the presence of the baptized and unbaptized 
alike. For one of the preacher's presuppositions is the promise that 
Jesus Christ himself will work within the pastor's human efforts and 
as the acting subject of the human proclamation.l Further, the preacher 
has the promise that the Holy Spirit will create in the congregation 
the conditions and the possibility of hearing the \vord of God in this 
proclamation. 2 
:J , 
c. The Knowledge of God ~ :Based Q.!1 fA k 0 '() 
The knowledge of God through his Word, then, is bound to the 
~vent of proclamation. The term characteristically used by Diem for 
the believing knowledge received from God through the proclamation is 
. , 
tu Or}(OY).IV Only when the exegete gives himself to this obedient hearing, 
is he then able to know and experience the actual event, the Geschichte 
(and not merely the Historie) referred to by the text. In the event 
~ I 
of ()(KOYJ, God turns in grace to the hearers and witnesses with his 
~ I 
Spirit to their spirits. 'lDie 0( J<. Or} . . • ist dami t ein Moment in 
der Offenbarungsgeschichte, welches diese einerseits bezeugt und ander-
ersei ts zugleich bewirkt. tu3 As an aspect of the history of God 1 s self-
l. Ibid., p. 290; 11Est autem ecclesia, 11 p. 326; "Dogma u. Existenz," 
p. 36. Cf. also this emphasis in the theology of ~tin Luther~ 
"Dan ich hore i·Tohl die predigt, aber wer redet? Der pfarherr? 
Nicht also, du horest nicht den pfarherr. Die stimme ist wohl 
sein, aber das wortt, das ehr fhuret oder redet, das redet mein 
Gott.w WA, XLVII, 2~9. 
2. lfDer Theologe, tn pp. 290, 298; Grundfragen, p. 48. 
3. Dogmatik, p. 256; Was heisst, p. 20; 1~Schriftauslegung, n p. 60. 
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~ .; 
disclosure, arii also of the knowledge process, the CXKOQ partakes 
of a double meaning. It is both the message calling for obedient 
bearing and the self-presentation of the One beard; here the witness 
and the Witnessed meet.1 It is in the moment of faithful bearing 
that God makes himself known. 
The Christian knowledge of God, then, says Diem is an obedient 
and grateful acknowledgement of God in his continuing demands and 
action. As a mere phenomenon, a ffnatural knowledge~v of God cannot be 
denied; but this phenomenon is not an incomplete or merely partial 
kn6wledge of God, but rather a knowledge only of one 1s own existence 
under i-ll'atb arii judgement. Any actual knowledge of God himself is a 
consequence not of human noetic possibilities, but of the will of the 
triune God, who is at once Creator, Savior, and Reconciler. 2 There 
is thus no direct knowledge of God, apart from revelation. Rather, 
the human awareness of God is contingent upon the prior fact of being 
known Ez God, who is the acting subject (I Cor. 13;12).3 God not 
on,ly gives himself to be known, but at the same time creates the con-
ditions which make such knowledge possible for those chosen by him.· 
Of course human knowledge of God remains limited, and this is true 
not because of the finitude, sinfulness, or historical relativity of 
man, but because of the eschatological goal of history and because 
of the 11relativity1' of the witnesses 1 relation to God. :But nonetheless 
there is a real knowledge of God, for God bas "delivered himself overn 
1. Was beisst, p. 20. 2 •. Kritiscber Idealismus, pp. 75-76, 92-93. 
3. Was beisst, pp. 14-16. 
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to a human ''traditiontn of proclamation.1 This proclamation, then,t...is 
' " properly heard and understood only in the event of Q{ J<O 'f), which 
thus is the point of origin for the dogma, exegesis, and confess±ons 
of the Church. 
3. The Hermeneutical Circle 
Finally, the self-proclaiming nature of Scripture may be described 
in summary form and comprehensively in terms of the nhermeneutical 
circle, •• in the specific meaning given by Diem to this currently pop-
ular term. The Scripture is a Verkllndigungsgeschichte, as proclaimed 
by the witnesses of God 1s revelation in Jesus Christ. These witnesses, 
however, have a significantly double relationship to the revelation 
which is witnessed. 
Wir [ befinden] uns bei unserer Interpretation des 
Textes in dem Zirkel • • • , in dem die Zeugnisse 
durch das Bezeugte selbst auszulegen sind, von dem 
wir aber nur durch die Zeugnisse der Zeugen etwas 
wissen k8nnen.2 
The writers are only human preachers, ~posteriori witnesses, 
who do not have the truth~ priori in and of themselves, bu~rather 
refer back to and are accredited by the Witnessed, that is, God. 
Yet on the other hand, the Witnessed is known only through the testi-
mony of these witnesses. The self-understanding of the scriptural 
1. Note the deliberate use of the double meaning of 11o<.fJ,J.~orn._s. 
Of. Was heisst, pp. 31-34, and Dogmatik, Chap. 7, especially 
pp. 158-64. Cf. K. Barth, CD, II/2, 490-590. 
2. Was heisst, pp. 12-13. Cf. supra, pp. 170-72. 
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writers, then, was an awareness of being commissioned as witnesses 
whose testimony is not only verified by God's own self-disclosure, 
but is also the sole chosen medium of the same.l The witnessing is 
referred not to the insights or understanding of the listener, but .. 
to the object of the testimony.2 Thus there is a continu~ly recip-
rocal, or Wcircular, 1ll relationship between the revelation and its 
human witnesses. 
This circle of witness and accreditation was presupposed in the 
canonical wr~tings and it remains today the basis of the Church's 
continued proclamation and exegesis. Just as the original witness 
was confirmed by its object, so the modern exegete in his work can .. 
first ~ only because he has been known by God; this is the irre-
versible direction indicated by the text itself.3 Since the text 
understands itself both as a human witness of, and as an integral 
aspect of, God's self-disclosure, a proper respon~e to this text 
must be prepared and directed by a consciously theological exegesis 
~ ; 
and must find its culmination in the event of proclamation and ~KO'?. 
The exegete must not find fault with this intrinsic assumption or 
approach it with alien criteria, but instead must work within the 
1. Was heisst, pp. 11-14; tvSchriftaus.legung," p. 59; Dogmatik, 
pp. 246, 255; "Dogma u. Existenz,u' pp. 26-29. Diem often cites 
I Thess. 2:13 in this regard. 
2. The danger of over-attention to the contemporary reception of the 
witness, at the expense of the object witnessed to, is illustrated 
in the Enlightenment and subsequent pietism, and continues to be 
a major source of weakness in modern preaching (cf. Grundfragen, 
p. 13; 111Der Theola ge, Lt pp. 294-98) • 
3. Was heisst, p. 21. 
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hermeneutical circle, for it is the very essence of the self-under-
standing of Scripture itself. 
·a. The Self-attesting Unity of Scripture 
The nature of Scripture as Verkfindigungsgeschichte clearly implies 
an essential unity among the canonical documents. Since, however, 
such a unity has been called into question by histo:J;"ical criticism, 
the interrelationship of the writings within the canon must be explic-
itly discussed. 
1. The Unity of Scripture within Its Multiplicity 
a. The Variety of the Scriptural Witness 
The variety and even contradiction found among the various bib-
lical sources cannot be denied. The contrasts between Old and New 
Testaments are obvious, and even within the latter there is a great 
multiplicity. The differences between ~aul and Luke, for instance, 
can hardly be ignored, for the Lucan presentation in Acts 17, when 
contrasted to Romans 1, marks the origin of early Catholicism, with 
its reliance upon a Heilsgeschichte centered in the institutional 
Ghurch.l However, this multiplicity must be viewed within the con-
1. Grundfragen, pp. 32-34; cf. Schriftkanon, p. 18; Dogmatik, p. 205. 
Diem 1 s attitude to'Ward the Lucan 11Gatholicismtv is ambiguous. In 
the first two writings mentioned (which are also earlier in com-
position) he clearly judges it to be an unfortunate and erroneous 
development; in the Dogmatik he merely states that the specific 
needs of modern preaching may require a decision between Pauline 
and Lucan thought. 
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text of the basic character of Scripture as proclamation and 1.vitness. 
Each apostolic preacher had to bear his witness in opposition to hi~ 
surrounding world, and so new or differing situations required modi-
£ications in the statements and emphases of the proclamation.1 t~ie 
Notwendigkeit, diese Arbeit der Interpretation weiterzufHhren, ist 
sofort gegeben, ~ das Zeugnis Sill einem andern Ort oder in einer 
anderen Zeit ausgerichtet werden soll.w2 
This multiplicity, however, should not be mistaken for indif-
ferent pluralism, for the New Testament never accepts as equal au-
thorities two witnesses of exactly the same preaching-situation, such 
as Paul and his Galatian critics. This would be impossible.3 But 
because of the differences in preaching-situations encountered by 
the various scriptural writers, the humanity of the proclamation 
and the full depth of God's gracious acting is displayed wdthin the 
canon.4 
b. The Unity of the S'criptural Self-proclamation 
Amid this multiplicity in Scripture, then, there is an essential 
unity. This is not based upon a doctrinal uniformity or systematic 
harmony imposed by the later Church, but rather upon a Verkfindigungs-
einheit, upon the simple historical fact that the Church has heard 
amidst this variety of witnesses the voice of the one Christ.5 All 
1. WEinheit,m p. 393; Dogmatik, pp. ~28-29, 204-205. 
2. Was heisst, p •. 37 
4. Schriftkanon, p. 22 
3. 11Einheit, 11 :pp. 394-95. 
5. tuEinheit, 11 pp. 390-92. 
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these i-Titnesses are interrelated and cannot be isolated one from 
another, for they stand together and influence one another within 
the Verkfindigungsgeschichte. These witnesses may argue polemically 
with each other, but a limit is set to this polemic by the very fact 
of the canon, so that all of these witnesses acknowledge one another 
as inspired and even mutually protect one another.1 The boundary 
lines of the canon itself prevent any part of Scripture from being 
censored or excluded; the exegete must respect these boundaries and 
remember that hia work can only be a commentary on, and not a substi~ 
tute for, the given text. 2 The Church could only become tvconfession-
alizedll as a mere sect or denomination if it were to adopt a definite 
doctrine of Scripture instead of allowing the foundations of all 
her doctrine to rest on the entire Scripture itself.3 For if Scrip-
ture is to be able to expound itself, it must have a unity which c~n 
not be either contested or rationally grounded, but can be only ac-
knowledged. 
This unity, therefore, must not be a dogmatized harmonizing and 
leveling down of Scripture into a codex of literalistic divine laws. 
11Ein solche Reproduktion der biblischen Aussagen nach Form and I~alt 
nennen wir :Biblizismus. ~u4 Such literalism precludes the interpre-
1. Schriftkanon, p. 19. Cf. G. Eichholz, Jakoous und Eaulus (ThEx, 
N. F. Nr. 39; MUnchen: Kaiser Verlag, 1953). 
2. "Einheit,tt pp. 392-93, 396; Dogmatik, p. 205. 
3. tuEinheit, tt p. 405; Schriftkanon, p. 20. 
4. Was heisst, p. 10. 
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tation required by the text and seeks only to preserve timeless+.Y. 
valid truths, although the latter may by some biblicists be sepa-
rated as ''content 11 f'rom the t17f'orm. nl In any case, the self' -exposi-
tion of Scripture is effectively prevented by biblicism's doctrinaire 
pre-decisions. 
The Roman Catholic Church is an example of this arbitrary pro-
cedure, for it regards the Bible as a ~ veritatis revelatae, a 
deposit of God's revelation which can be used as a law book or a set 
of authoritative principles quite apart from the event of preaching. 
As such, these principles.are at the disposal of the official jurists 
of the Church. The power of' the Catholic teaching-office, which 
culminates in the infallible papacy, is only the end result of this 
legalized conception of Scripture. 2 
The same error was also committed by Protestant orthodoxy, which 
obscured the actual concerns of the Reformation by organizing Scripture 
as a doctrinal system, in a misguided attempt to guarantee its author-
ity. 
1. Ibid., pp. 9-10; Grundfragen, pp. 37-38. Aside from this indirect 
reference to existential exegesis and also the references to Ca-
tholicism or seventeenth-century Protestant orthodoxy, Diemrs us-
age of the term t1fbiblicism11 does not signify a reproach to other 
schools of' contemporary theology, but ref'ers to the pastoral prob-
lem of fundamentalism in the local churches (which is especially 
acute in the Landeskirche of WUrttembarg). Biblicism thus is no 
longer a 1.-ri.sse~schaftlich problem, but a. Gemeinde. problem. 
2. Grundf'ragen, p. 7; Theologie, pp. 144-45. That even the most 
progressive of Catholic theologians are not free from this funda-
mental error may be noted in Diem 1 s criticism of H. Kirng ( cf. Was 
heisst, pp. 69-75; also, H. Diem, "Eine kontroverstheologische 
Bestandsaufnahme,w p. 77). 
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Man kann sich nunmehr auch nicnt mehr damit begnagen, 
dass die Schrift sich selbst evident macht, indem sie 
gepredigt wird, sondern muss ihr eine Autorit~t auch 
'ante et extra usum 1 verschaffen, vms dann schliess-
lich bei der Lehre von der 1Verbalinspiration 1 endigen 
musste.l 
By trying to secure a precise, infallible point in the continuing 
event of inspiration, Jrotestant orthodoxy succeeded only in ~bsolu­
tizing the letter of Scripture into a "paper pope,u thus attaining 
essentially the same doctrine of Scripture as post-Tridentine Cathol-
icism.2 Such attempts at human guarantees for the canon allowed the_ 
event of proclamation to die out without disturbing the official doc-
trine of the Church, and at this point Church dogma became a system of 
legalized norms.3 A teaching about the Bible replaced the proclamation 
''according to the Scriptures .n Nor was this situation remedied by 
cumulative text citations. 
Aber gerade diese HMufung der Bibelzitat ist bedenklich, 
weil mit ihnen gew8hnlich nicht der gegebene bestimmte 
Text ausgelegt, sondern gerade dessen konkrete Einmalig-
keit verwischt uzd in eine allgemeine biblische 1t~ahrheit 1 
nivelliert wird. 
The freedom of the Gospel was hemmed in b~ an assent to the divin-
ity of the Bible, which became a 1'magicalt' belief to the same extent 
that it was removed from the event of preaching. the resulting legal-
istic concept of "verbal inspiration" was in effect an open invitation 
1. tU:Sibelwissenschaft, tr p. 74; cf. Dogmatik, p. 198. 
2. "Substanz, 11 p. 35; 11Bibel als Norm, tv p. 37. Cf. Grundfragen, 
pp. 12-13; Theologie, pp. 155-58; Dogmatik, p. 198. 
3. tUSubstanz," p. 36; Theologie, p. 137. 
4. Warum Textpredigt~, p. 206. 
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for refutation by historical criticism. 
The earliest point of attack on biblicism by historical research 
was to point out and clarify the differences and even contradictions 
within the canon. The monolithic legalism of biblicism could not 
withstand this disclosure. Thereafter the difficulties of the old 
Protestant orthodoxy multiplied accordingly. 
Aber man muss sich dartiber klar sein, dass die histor-
isch-kritische Bibelforschung, als sie schliesslich 
diesen Irrtum aufdeckte, nicht etwa den Schaden Israels 
anrichtete, sondlrn nur den lgngst vorhandenen Schaden 
offenbar machte. 
However, historical criticism may not, because of its sometimes 
inconvenient theological consequences, be restricted to inconsistent 
half-way measures, and Diem defends the historical method against any 
renewed attempts to limit its freedom and scope of application. 2 
There is a modern "purismn which, out of fear of a fides historica,.. 
tries to ignore the historical framework of revelation; neither Barth 
nor Bultmann is free from this error. But Diem rejects such hampering 
of historical investigation.: 11Das die Kirche begrtindende Faktum, die 
Offenbarung Gottes in Jesus Christus, war ein historisches Faktum 
und wird als solches Gegenstand der historischen Forschung.n3 
The invaluable service which historical criticism renders to 
1. Irdischer Jesus, p. 5. 
2. Ibid., p. 6; Theologie, P~ 9; ~11Einheit," p. 386. Such short-
sighted Protestant coercion is an ironic contrast to Roman 
Catholicism, which is so certain of its authoritative Tradition, 
as finally represented in the Pope, that it has allowed.increas-
ing freedom to historical criticism (Theologie, p. 144). 
3. Theologie, p. 57. 
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theology is precisely the fact that it prevents biblicistic attempts 
to harmonize discrepancies and level down all scriptural witnesses 
into a unified dogmatized system.1 The historical method2 enables 
exegesis to see why differences in the apostolic proclamation arose 
and indeed were necessary in various local situations. The first 
duty of the exegete is to strive for the most accurate historical 
profile possible of the scriptural witnesses, in all their personal 
and cultural idiosyncrasies, their mutual dependence and differences, 
their supplementation or delimitation of each other, and even of 
their polemics with one another.3 Because of the historical method, 
exegesis is spared the imposition of a false unity and the fruitless 
search for a rrpure 11 kerygma; the scriptural writers are seen in their 
humanity and even fallibility, thereby allowing the IVinspirationW of 
Scripture to be referred to its true source, namely the continuing 
gracious self-disclosure of God. 
2. The Formation of the Canon 
The unity of Scripture is closely related to the authority of the 
candnical boundaries. In what sense does the acknowledgement of the 
entire Verldindigungsgeschichte as the n·canont' substantiate its unity? 
1. Dogmatik, pp. 128-29, 207; 11Bibelwissenschaft," p. 79. 
2. In defending the value of the historical method, Diem of course 
assumes that it has abandoned the rigid prejudgments of Troeltsch-
ian historicism. Of. supra, pp. 155-59. 
3. 11Bibelwissenschaft, 11 p. 79; Schriftkanon, p. 19; "Einheit,w 
p. 395; Do~tik, pp. 204-205, 261. 
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How is the present form of the canon authenticated? 
To begin with, several false foundations for the canonicity o~ 
Scripture may be noted. The Roman Catholic Church understands the 
canon as, in effect, originated and authenticated by the inspired 
authority of the Iehramt. S'cripture is thereby not essentially dif-
ferent from Tradition, but is only the earliest part of it, and it 
is the momentous function of the teaching-office of the Catholic 
Church to transmit and interpret this Tradition. This is in contrast 
to the Reformation, which accepted Scripture alone as the given text 
for preaching and thus i~ actual practice (though not by doctrinal 
definition) subordinated Tradition as well as the entire Church to 
the continuing judgment of Scripture.1 
Another erroneous argument for the canon, used not only by Roman 
Catholicism, but also by many xrotestants, is that the canon's aut~or­
ity, in contrast to that of later Tradition, is derived from its apos-
tolic2 authorship. However, it is doubtful that II Peter, for in-
stance, is chronologically prior to other extant documents excluded 
from the canon, and furthermore the early Church left open the ques-
tion of authorship by admitting writings into the canon which were 
1. Dogmatik, pp. 191-93; Schriftkanon, pp. 7-10; t~ibel als 
Norm, ~u p. 32. 
2. The term Wapostle 11 is in this context used in the narrow sense. 
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1 
written merely by disciples of the apostles. Instead of apostolic 
authorship qualifying a document for the canon, it was far more the 
very reception into the canon which established the apostolic author-
ity of the authors.2 For example, although the authorship of II Peter 
is certainly questiona1Ue, it cannot be disputed that this writing 
represents the legitimate apostolic tradition. In short, the authen-
tic apostolic witness simply cannot be guaranteed by historical argu-
ments, and therefore such dubious procedures are better left to Ca-
tholicism. 
A third insufficient argument is the existentialist assertion 
that the acknowledgment of the canon is solely a decision of faith.3 
But with this, both too little and too much is said: too little, since 
the canonical decision of the Church cannot appear absolutely arbi-
trary, and too much, because the individual's UfaithlV is by no means 
so reliable a foundation for such authority and, in fact, cannot re-
place the element of "hope" in all exegesis.4 Instead of the believ-
er 1s faith establishing the canon, it is rather the reverse. The 
faith of the individual and the true freedom of historical criticism 
are both confirmed only when the canon's authority is independent 
from the existentiell decision of faith.5 
1. Dogmatik, p. 175. 2. Schriftkanon, p. 6. 
3. For example: E. K!isemann, ~'Zum Thema der Nichtobjektivierbarkeit, 11 
Exe etische Versuche und Besinnun en, I (G8ttingen~ Vandenhoeck 
& Ruprecht~ 1960 , 232. 
4. Was heisst, p. 22. 
5. Cf. Sichtbarheit, p. 7; nEinheit,n p. 397. 
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b. The Self-attestation of the ~ in Ver.ldlndigung 
I~ the canon cannot itself be established by any of these fals~ 
sources of authority, how then may the formation of the canon be d~-
scribed? Diem answers-: 11Es l!lsst sich nur in seiner Faktizi tMt um-
schreiben als das kontingente Geschehen, mit dem die Ilirche sich selbst 
~rbaut weiss ~ die Selbstevidenz der Heiligen Schrift im Ereignis 
ihres Verldlndigtwerdens. ul 
The sole basis for the formalized canon is simply the self-evi7 
dence of these documents which is manifest in the event of proclama-
tion.2 These writings are the ones which allow themselves to be 
preached, and in which the self-proclamation of Jesus Christ has 
been found. Thus Scripture is not a IBhreinheit, but a Verk:Plndigungs-
einheit. The word of God has been heard exclusively in these wit-
·nesses, and therefore only these ~~tnesses should be further pro-
claimed and heard.3 Thus, these selected writings alone must be 
considered in their contingent givenness as the text for preaching. 
~1Wir haben ••• die Geschichte der Kanonsbildung zu verstehen als 
die Geschichte des Predigttextes. tu4 
The boundaries of the canon are also set by this self-assertion 
1. "Einhei t, IV p. 404. 
2. Ibid., pp. 388-89; Schriftkanon, pp. 13, 23; Theologie, p. 92; 
Dogmatik, p. 204. P. IsJlT{;.sfeld says that Diem's argument for the 
self-evidence of Scripture in preachiug offers no satisfactory 
theological solution to the problem (Uberlieferung, p. 169, n. 122; 
cf. p. 104). 
3. Dogmatik, p. 204. 4. t•Einheit,n p. 393. 
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o:f certain documents when preached. The broadness and variety of 
materials within these canonical boundaries are quite amazing, so 
that no norm or principle of selection can be detected. In fact, 
it. is of the very essence of the canon's continuing self-attestation 
that it cannot be based upon any ~ priori necessity or deduced from 
any theological or historical principle.l The canon is factually 
closed, because of the circle in which the Church believes itself 
constituted by these witnesses and thus obligated to proclaim them 
anew; but the canon cannot be essentially closed or grounded on any 
necessary principle outside of itself.2 To set the boundaries of 
the canon by dogmatic definition, as did Tridentine Catholicism, is 
finally to admit that the unity of the Church on the basis of the 
unity of Scripture is no longer self-evident. Furthermore, to posit 
any type of nessential closureW of the canon, as do KUmm.el and Cull-
mann,3 is to approach the Catholic perspective of extra-canonical 
guarantees. 
In short, the closure of the present boundaries of the canon is 
not due to any principle, but to the fact that, in the process of 
formation of the canon, these particular writings simply and contin-
uaB .. y shm.;red themselves to be canonical. "Die Kirche glaubt, dass 
diese Schriften sich deshalb als kanonisch durchgesetzt haben, weil 
1. Sichtbarheit, p. 9; Schriftkanon, pp. 6, "23; IVEinheit,n p. 389; 
Theologie, p. 87; Dogmatik, pp. 192, 204. 
2. Theologie, p. 87. 3. Dogmatik, pp. 179-90. 
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. sie kanonisch 'varen und sind. r.rl 
Dass Gott selbst diese Offenbarung nichts mehr hinzu-
fUgen hatte, weil das ganze Vfort Gottes gesagt war, das 
sah ihr Glaube aus dem Inhalt des kanonischen Zeugnisses 
in seiner Einheit und Ganzheit, und sie fand diese Ein-
sicht des Glaubens umgekehrt ~eder darin best~tigt, 
dass Gott tatsMchlich nicht mehr so redete, ~e er durch 
die Apostel und Propheten geredet hatte. 2 
The factual givenness of the canon, then, must remain the basis of the 
Church and its exegesis. 
Since the canon is only factually and not essentially closed, the 
question arises as to whether its boundaries can ever be altered. 
Diem allows the perhaps unlikely possibility that a newly discovered 
writing could be added to the canon, thus 1.videning its boundaries; 
of course, any such new document would have to authenticate itself in 
precisely the same manner as the other canonical books, and further-
more would have to do so without questioning the sufficiency of the 
former canon.3 However, there is no possibility of narrowing the 
present boundaries of the canon by eliminating some books or by seek-
ing the false security of ''a canon ~thin the canon, Ul because this 
would restrict the freedom of Scripture to interpret itself and would 
thereby substitute merely a human criterion.4 
1. Schriftkanon, pp. 15-16; cf. K. Barth, CD, I/2, 473-81. 
2. H. Diem, ~11Schrift und Bekenntnis, tv ~' II (1935), 452. Here-
after referred to as "Schrift u. Beke.nntnis." 
3. 
4. 
Schriftkanon, p. 16. 
Ibid., p. 21. At this point Diem disagrees with Barth (cf. CD, 
I/2, 478), who allows the possibility of a narrowing of the canon. 
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The function of the Church, then, in the formation of the canon 
is not the active initiation, but the obedient reception of this 
collection of writings.1 The formalization of the canon was the act 
of confession by the Church in response to the self-proclamation of 
this written idtness. By this act the Church marked out its own 
visible boundaries on earth as the Church and also acknowledged that 
only where the words of Scripture are proclaimed does the Holy Spirit 
create faith and the promises of Christ find fulfillment. 2 This act 
of confession was repeated in the Reformation by the statement of. 
sola scriptura, which affirmed that only the proclamation based upon 
this canon has the promise of Christ's self-proclamation.3 Thus 
the Church attests to the self-evidence of the canon in the event of 
proclamation. 
D. The fu?k of Dogma in Hermeneutics 
1. The Nature of Dogma 
In the hermeneutical thought of Diem, dogma and dogmatics play a 
large role, so that the nature and origin of the theological state-
ments of the Church must accordingly be examined. The background 
for this consideration has already been indicated in the preceding 
discussions. tUSo ist der Kanon der Schrift nicht !11!:!: nach seinem 
1. tuEst autem ecclesia, Jt p. 324; Sichtbarhei t, p. 9; Schrift-
,lcanon, p. 13. 
2. Sichtbarheit, p. 9; cf. "Schrift u. Bekenntnis, 11 p. 451. 
3. Schriftkanon, pp. 14-15; Theologie, p. 87. 
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Gegenstand, sondern auch nach der Geschichte seiner kirchlichen 
gezeption das Urbild und Paradigma fUr alle Dogmenbildung der Kirche. nl 
a. The Origin of Dogma 
Dogma originates as the Church's response to and attempted inter-
pretation of the self-proclamation of Scripture. t1Das ~ ist 
~ntstanden als Antwort auf die VerkUndigung der biblischen Zeugen 
und enthHlt eine Aussage Hber den Heilsratschluss Gottes und dessen 
Yerwirklichung. rt2 As such, dogma arises within the post-canonical 
course of the Verkfindigungsgeschichte, both as the theological ex-
planation of the latter and as a norm for its further proclamation.3 
~ / 
Its legi t.imate origin and authority is in the moment of O{J.(O rJ , the 
event of believing knowledge in which God's resolution to disclose 
' .I himself is actualized. In this event of 0( K 0\?, the circle between 
God's revealed vrlll and man's obedient hearing and responding confes-
sion is closed. The resulting statements of dogma have their ontic and 
noetic ground in God's Word and thereby find their status as norma-
tive.4 Thus, the crystallized witness of the Church Fathers, as 
long as it does not become a replacement for Scripture itself, is 
1. l1Einhei t, 11 p. 404. 
2. "Dogma u. Existenz,tv p. 26. Also, H. Diem, LVDogma und Existenz 
im theologischen Denken," p. 107. 
3. H. Diem, "Dogma, tV Evangelisches K.irchenlexikon, ed. H. :Brunette 
and 0. Weber (3 vols.; G8ttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1956), 
I, 949. Hereafter referred to as 11Dogma.m Of. also Grundfragen, 
p. 16; Theologie, pp. 124-25. 
4. Was heisst, p. 27; Dogmatik, pp. 296, 299. 
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an obligatory guide for the modern exegete and is to be respected 
aa an auth?ritative decision which has occurred in the Church ~hrough 
the Holy Spirit. 
A dogmatic formulation is a statement sui generis, different from 
any metaphysical, historical, or mythological statement, because it 
is an~ posteriori assertion based upon the contingent event of God's 
revelation. For the same reason, it cannot be a doctrinal la'lrl in 
any legalistic sense, ~ich is an erroneous view that seems to lurk 
behind modern heresy trials.1 Dogma cannot be deduced 11biblicistical-
lyn from single texts, but is the response to the totality of the 
scriptural proclamation. For dogma originated in the actual event of 
proclamation, in concrete address and specific response, and it can 
never be separated from this proclaiming event without its author-
ity and very nature being radically altered. 2 Thus, the origin of 
dogma rests upon the God who wants to disclose himself and who thus 
has delivered himself over to a human tradition of proclamation and 
teaching. 3 
The historical origin of dogma did not begin with any post-apos-
tolic "Hellenization" of the Church, but vTas already present in the 
1. Grundfragen, p. 54. 
2. W. Matthias (11Dogmatik zwischen Historismus und Existentialismus,n 
p. 568) and W. Lohff (t1Dogmatische Grundlegung zwischen Postiv-
ismus und SelbstverstMndnis, 11 p. 63) both criticize Diem for iden-
tifying doctrine too closely with VerkUndigung. ~atthias says that 
God'~s promise extends only to the proclamation and not to doctrine, 
and Lohff maintains that the basic exegetical guidance provided by 
dogma is its negative function of delimitation against heresy. 
3. Was heisst, p. 31. 
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WQIV source of the Synoptics; it thus runs through the New Testament 
Verkffndigungsgeschichte as one of its essential aspects.l Exhorta-
tion, confession, proclamation, and theological statement all are 
interrelated and almost indistinguishable in the canon. The word 
[ ty jJ. o<. itself in the New Testament had basically the meaning of a 
published governmental edict (Lk. 2:1; Acts 16:4; 17:7), which later 
was used for God's majestic decree of salvation. The related word 
d! (,;..(]'"KG l V meant tuteachingtv both in its contents and its active 
transmission. In Scripture, it is associated with the Jewish con-
cept of-teaching as acknowledgment of God's revealed will in a contin-
gent event, rather than with the Greek concept of statements of gen-
eral truths and arguments directed to the intellect. Moreover, be-
cause the unique object of this teaching is the original witness to 
God's act of salvation in Jesus Christ, it requires a special means 
of transmission, namely a further witnessing by proclamation. Doc-
trinal teaching therefore cannot be separated £rom preaching, but 
is an aspect within, and a special function of, the event of procla-
t . 2 ma ~on. 
b. The Double Aspect of !2.Q.m M 1-li tness 
In this context it is possible to comprehend the double aspect 
1. Irdischer Jesus, p. 18. 
2. Dogmatik, pp. 145-48; 11Dogma,t~ p. 948; Was heisst, p. 31; 111libel-
i.J"issenschaft," p. 68. 
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of the meaning of doctrine.1 On the one hand, the dogma of the Church, 
as a response to the proclamation, is always an inadequate statement, 
as it is only a human deposit within the historical plane of the 
transcendent action of God.2 It cannot be infallible, since it medi-
ates between ancient and modern concepts, explicating in contemporary 
language the meaning of revelation. Such clarification is repeatedly 
necessary, since the revelation in Christ brought no new or special 
language into the world, but must always rely upon existing human lan-
guage while at the same time transcending it.3 Thus dogma must con-
tinually be confirmed and examined in the *enewed hearing of the 
scriptural Verkfindigungsgeschichte. 
Since doctrine is, in this human aspect, both fallible and con-
ditioned by its contemporary language, the implicit consequence is that 
doctrine can be modified. A dogma is the corporate work of the Church, 
and even if its first formulation is by an individual, it is always 
formed within the context of the post-canonical Verkllndigungsgeschichte, 
in which witnesses are still heard beside one another, and it always 
has the goal of leading toward a consensus of the Church. Even if 
1. This corresponds to the double aspect of "witness"; cf. supra, 
pp. 170-71. Also, note K. Earth, CD, I/1, 304-15. 
2. JlSchrift u. :Bekenntnis," pp. 445, 455; Dogmatik, p. 262; 
"Dogma," p. 949. 
3. This is the tnhermeneutische Differenz der Theologie1J11 (H. Diem, 
lecture on May 7, 1962, in the University of Tfibingen). This 
phenomenon provides the context and the impetus for the renewed 
theological and exegetical task of every generation. Cf. the 
significant dissertation by one of Diem's students, L. Steiger, 
Die Hermeneutik als dogmatisches lroblem, especially pp. 7-8. 
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I 
accepted as Church dogma, however, the statement has an author~ty 
higher in degree only, thereby retaining its fallibility and open-
ness to future correction.l But such correction can occur only 
through a renewed consensus of the Church, such as happened in the 
Reformation. If an individual exegete is led to reject a Church doc-
trine on the ground of a better insight into Scripture, he must not 
do so for the sake of "freedom of conscience, 11 or as a private judg-
ment, but is obligated to urge the entire Church'by a new consensus 
t h th d t . . t• 2 o c ange e oc r~ne ~n ques ~on. 
However, the concept of doctrine is not onlr one of a fallible 
I 
witness, but on the other hand it is also an asp!ect of God 1 s gracious 
self-disclosure. For in its eschatological meaqing, dogma is a moment 
and factor of the revelation itself. The, 1trelaijivity" of doctrinal 
statements in Scripture is not relative in cont~ast to a supra-histor-
ical, absolute truth. 
Ihre Aussagen [sind] aber in einem ganz ahderen Sinn 
1relativ 1 zu nennen; dass sie n~ich iri einer durch 
die Selbsterschliessu~ottes be"WirktM mion zu 
der Wahrheit Gottes selbst stehen.3 ' 
Doctrinal statements thus are a human witn~ssing, in which the 
triune God remains from beginning to end the active, self-disclosing 
subject.4 Or, to put it graphically, God's dec~ee_of salvation is 
. 
1. ~unogma, tv p. 949; Grundfragen, p. 42; cf. "S'~hrift u. Bekenntnis , 11 
p. 463. . 
2. Sichtbarhei t, p. 14; Grundfragen, p. 35. 
3. "Has heisst, p. 34; cr. K. Barth, CD, I/1, 308-309. 
4. Was heisst, p. 30; cf. '·~Schrift u. Bekenntnis, II p. 444. 
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itself tVthe Dogma, n which cannot be altered or revoked, and which 
unfolds itself in a multiplicity of human dogmatic formulations, 
. . 
which themselves remain inadequate and open to question.1 In this 
perspective it may be said that the Church does not itself create 
any dogma, but that it only acknowledges what \VDogma'' actually is •2 
The Church confesses to what it has witnessed. Furthermore, where .. the 
Church has come to a consensus, there the continuity of its procla-
mation with the self-proclaiming Logos becomes visible to the surround-
. 1d J ~ng wor • 
c. Some :Misunderstandings of, ~ 
The nature of dogma, as defined by Diem, is to be distinguished 
from several widespread misunderstandings. The Roman Catholic con-
cept of dogma, for instance, retrojects a later stage of early Ca-
tholicism into the New Te.stament arrl thereby makes doctrine into a 
veritas revelata. Dogma is thus falsely portrayed as both infallible, 
that is, grounded in a direct identity of human statements with re-
vealed truths, and as being a ~Wprinci ple" or axiom, where by procla-
mation is relegated to the status of a secondary consequence to doc-
l. Dogmatik, pp. 263, 295; cf. K. Barth, CD, I/1, 307-309. 
2. nEinhei t, n p. 404. Note the similarity to the concept of tV canon, 11 
supra, pp. 195-98. 
3. "Est autem ecclesia, tv p. 326. 
204 
trine instead of its living source.1 
A second misunderstanding is the prejudice of Protestant liberal-
ism ~gainst doctrine which Diem views as given classic form in the work 
of A. von Harnack, who sa1-r in lldogmatt the influence of the Greek spirit 
upon early Christianity, thus marking a benumbing congelation of the 
faith of the Church. However, continues Diem, 11 congelationtt is not a 
theological category ~d so cannot be a theological criticism; further-
more it is by no means clear why doctrinal formulations as such should 
be suspect. 2 It has already been noted that doctrine is an integral 
aspect of the original Gospel-proclamation itself, and it remains a 
cont1nuing necessity in the response to that event. The early use of 
Greek categories in this task was as necessary then for the contempo-
rary relevance of that response as is the use of modern ones for today's 
. -
response. Diem suggests that Harnack 1 s famous definition, 11Das Dogma 
ist in seiner Conception und in seine~ Ausbau ein 't-Terk des griechischen 
Geistes auf dem Boden des Evangeliums, u3 v-muld be far more accurate if 
) 
reversed: IIDogma ist in seiner Conception und in seinem Ausbau ein 
1. Theologie, pp. 20-21; Was·heisst, pp. 28-31; Dogmatik, p. 167; 
IIBibelwissenschaft,n p. 70. Speaking from a Roman Catholic per-
spective, P. Lengsfeld (tlberlieferung, p. 60, n. 91) accuses Diem 
of sticking obstinately to a really unimportant theme in differen-
tiating so strictly oetween the proclamation and any 11principlesll 
or tla.x:Loms" of truth. Diem hotly replies that Lengsfeld tries to 
make a trifle out of what actually has an essential significance 
for the concept of doctrine and thus for the relation of Scripture 
and the dogma of the Church (11Bestandsaufnahme, 11 p. 70). 
2. Dogmatik, pp. 151-52. 
3. A. von Harnack, Lehrbuch der DogmengesCliichte, ·val. I, Die·Ent-
stehung des ltir-ehlichen Dogmas (4th ed.; Tllbingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 
1909)' p. 20. 
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Werk des Evangeliums auf dem Boden des griechischen Geisteszn1 
Harnack indeed made a clear distinction between the Gospel and dog-
ma, a distinction which Diem characterizes as apparently a continual pro-
cess of defection (Abfall) from the Gospel. Diem grants thCJ,t this degen-
.. 
eration did in large part occur and may already be noted in the second-
century Apologists and especially in the Alexandrian catechetical 
' . . 
schools. But, Diem insists, this was far more a subsequent perversion 
of the Nevr Testament concept of lldoctrine11 than a fundamental taint in 
the theological task itself.2 This early congelation illustrates the 
danger which indeed constantly threatens the obligatory doctrinal task 
of the Church. The danger has always been the temptation to isolate 
doctrine from the event of Gospel-proclamation and turn it into a deduc-
ible system. This, in turn, is caused by the surreptitious substitution 
of the Greek concept of 11 teaching11 for the Jewish concept, so that ra-
tional demonstrations replace obedient hearing and erkennen overshadows 
anerkennen.3 Any arrangement of doctrinal statements degenerates into a 
"systematic principle" v-rhen it falls away from the 11systematizing eventn 
of God~s revelation as perpetuated in the continued preac?ing of the 
Church.4 Doctrine originated as, and must remain, an integral aspect 
of this proclamation, 11according to the Scriptures. n 
A third misunderstanding of dogma, -vrhich is related to the second, 
has been raised by Protestant existentialism. In this case, doctrine 
1. H. Diem, lecture on June 19, .1962, University of Tllbingen. 
2. Dogmatik, p. 149. 3. Ibid., p. 152; 11Dogma, 11 p. 950. 
4. Dogmatik, pp. 152, 268. 
206 
is attacked as a pointless speculation which has little relation to 
the demands of concrete human existence, but instead deals with un-
knowable "objectsn and mythology. Diem, however, points out that 
this type of criticism often first falsely "objectifies tV the object 
of a given doctrine, in order then to "demythologize" it into exis-
tential categories.1 A doctrinal foundation actually can neither be 
objectified into a false empirical statement nor compressed into the 
' possibilities of an understanding of human existence. Rather, a doc-
trinal statement can be evaluated only with reference to its object, 
namely the sui generis action of the God who encounters.man.2 The 
misuse of dogma through a false objectification cannot be prevented 
by eliminating doctrine in general from the event of knowing God, 
but on the contrary only by understanding doctrine properly as an 
aspect of this event.3 
When doctrine is properly so understood, it not only itself 
preven-ts such objectification, but ~so provides (without "demythol-
ogizing") the most relevant interpretation of the so-called \Vmytholog-
ical" object.4 Furthermore, human existence is by no means an alien 
concern for true dogma. tVDogmatische Aussagen tiber die Ver\drklichung 
1. Ibid.' p. 286. 
2. Ibid., p. 284; Grundfragen, p. 21; Was heisst, p. 25. 
3. Was heisst, p. 28. W. Schweitzer (review of Was heisst schrift-
gemass?, ~' LXXXVII [1962], 455) enthusias~ically praises this 
statement as one that should be read by all and which could thus 
clear away much confusion in the lecture halls. 
4. ~ndfragen, p. 39. 
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des Heilsratschlusses Gottes betreffen immer zugleich auch die Ex-
istenz des Menschen, auf welche diese Handeln gerichtet ist.wl Doc-
trinal truth actually includes existentiell truth, since in the 
existence granted the believer by the Holy Spirit the revealed will 
of God is fuJly accomplished. However, one cannot claim that the 
reverse is true. Existentiell truth does not include dogmatic truth, 
for the existentiell posture of the hearer does not authenticate the 
transcendent object of the proclaiming witness. In fact, human ex-
istence is most relevantly considered, not by existential interpre-
tations, but precisely by doctrinal statements, which have as their 
unique referent the revealed will of God, who has resolved to redeem 
this existence.2 
2. The Nature of Dogmatics 
Closely cqnnected with Wdogmatv as the formulated confession of 
the Church is the discipline of ndogmatics~~v which Diem thus defines: 
tudie zusammenhangende Entfal tung und wis senschaftliche Erklfu>ung der 
Dogmen. 1113 It is thus the task of dogmatics to examine the coherence 
of doctrines and the Wissenschaft1ichkeit of their clarification. 
1. ~~Dogma u. Ex:istenz im theo1.,"'' p. 110; ~UDogma u. Existenz,n p. 29. 
2. Dogmatik, p. 251; tVSchriftauslegung," p. 56; "Dogma u. Existenz 
im theol. ,~11 p. 117; 11Dogma u. Eristenz,IV p. 31. 
3. It. Diem, t<ll])ogm.atik," Evangelisches Kirchenlexikon, ed. H. Brunette 
and 0. Weber (3 vo1s.; G&ttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1956), 
I, 952. Hereafter ref'erred to as tVDogma tik [art.] • n 
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a. Dogmatics and Wissenschaft 
To call dogmatics a Wissenschaft signifies that its statements 
are not ~ p[iori deductions of a universal truth, but ~ posteriori 
responses to the Church's proclamation, which are intended to serve 
and to guide the continuity of the Church's further witnessing in 
relation to the Witnessed.l However, dogmatics is not a ,,~~sciencen 
simply as one among other human sciences; nor is it to be subsumed 
under a general concept of Wissenschaft, together wit~ philosophy, 
as is done by Roman Catholicism. Rather, it is a Wissenschaft sui 
generis because the dogma and proclamation prior to it are sui gen-
eris statements of the contingent event of God's self-disclosure. 
Theology does its work as a 11 stop-gaptll among the sciences, simply 
because no other discipline attempts to deal with faith in God's 
revelation as its subject matter. This special position among the 
sciences cannot be grounded or defended by general principles, but 
exists by virtue of its unique object. For in theology, as in any 
science, everything depends upon grasping the proper perspective for 
questioning, together ii.lth a careful use of the method relevant to 
the object. 2 Not that the theologian is privileged to have a perfect 
or absolute method; but he must patiently pursue his commissioned 
task with what methods he has. 
l. Theologie, pp. 21-39; Dogmatik, p. 8. Cf. K. Barth, CD, I/1, 
1-ll, 51-97, 284-335. 
2. Theologie, pp. 35, 40-42; Dogmatik, p. 216; "Dogma u. Ex:istenz,t11 
p. 28 ~ also, H. Diem, ~'Georg 1-lehrung in memoriam," ZThK, LVI 
(1959;, 186-87. 
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Dogmatics is a critical science which results from the existence 
of the Church of Christ upon earth and the Geschehen of its saving 
proclamation. 
Die Aufgabe der Theologie diesem Geschehen gegenllber 
kann also weder in dem Aufweis und der Rekonstruktion 
seiner historischen Tats~chlichkei t noch in der :Seurt.eil-
ung des in ihm enthaltenen Wahrheitsanspruches liegen, 
sondern ledig~ich in dem:SemHhen, dem Vollzug dieses 
Geschehens heute, d. h. der VerkUndigung des Wortes 
Gottes im Ereignis der Kirche heute in sachgemgsser 
Kontinuit~t mit der Offenbarung Gottes in Jesus Christus 
zu dienen.l 
In the proclamation of the Church, P.r.otestant theology finds its origin, 
its object, and its goal. It reflects upon both the relevance of the 
Church's preaching and its continuity with the scriptural proclama-
tion, thereby confronting the Church with the latter's nature and task 
as the assembly of God. As such, dogmatics is the responsibility of 
all members of the Church, for as a discipline it has no special priv-
ileges or methods. Dogmatics exists, therefore, solely for the service 
of the Gospel-proclamation of the Church, so that in the exegesis of 
Scripture the individual witnesses may be heard in what they collec-
tively wish to say, and thereby in what is required today to be fur-
ther proclaimed.2 
b. Dogmatics and the Kerygma 
The theological task finds its beginning, not in a post-canonical, 
Hellenized Church, but within the New Testament itself. As has been 
1. Theologie, p. 28; cf. lil:Sibel als Norm,m p. 34. 
2. Kritischer ldealismus, pp. 59-61; Theologie, pp. 21-39, 53-56; 
"Dogma," p. 948. 
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noted, Scripture is not a collection of historical sour.ce material, 
but is from the ve~y beginning a theological ~itne~s. Doctrine, 
tradition, and the ppoclamation together form three aspects of the 
one VerkUndigu_~gsgeschichte.1 Theology a~d the kerygma are closely 
related 'Within the canon, but it is not true (as Bul tmann maintains2) 
that theology is inferior or obscures the kerygma. .Rather, theology 
is a necessary supplement to it. Fo:t' the apostolic kerygma was brief 
and not unambiguous and therefore needed protection against the 
surrounding religious enviromnents. .Also, the kerygma as it encoun-
tered new situations needed to use new concepts and terminology. It 
therefore,·from the very beginning, has remained the task of theology 
to test the legitimacy of all commentaries and amplifications oase4 
upon the kerygma, in their continuity with Scripture.3 Since the first 
Christian Scripture was the Old Testament, the testing of this con-
tinu;i ty is through the ScJ:u:iftbev:reis, which places the new doctrinal 
formulation within the tradition of proclamation and thereby legit-
imates it.4 
Dogmatics is not a dispensable covering for the kerygma, nor 
just an occasional polemic necessity~ but is a regular task of the 
Church,. continually to be pursued for the sake. of serving the kerygma.5 
liEs dient der Verktlndigung in der doppelten Bedeutung der kritischen 
1. Irdischer Jesus, p. 9; Dogmatik, Chap. 6. 
2. ~or example, in GV, I, 176, 181-82, 186. 
3. Theologie, pr.· 84; Schriftkanon, p. 4. 
5. Was heisst, p. 23; Dogmatik, PP• 73-74. 
4. Dogmatik, pp. 152-53. 
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PrHfung dessen, ~ ~ verkHndigen ist, und der Anleitung ~ rechten 
Verst!Indnis des VerkHndigten.'''l As such, theology is never an end in 
itself, but remains a factor within the proclamation of God's self-
disclosure. 
c. Dogmatics and Systematic Theology 
The task of "dogmaticst<W in its explication of the scriptural 
Verldindigungsgeschichte is usually to be distinguished from that of· 
~v systematic theology. n2 It is the nature of dogma tics to attempt to 
clarify the self-understanding of Scripture, in the context of the 
Church and by the use of the hermeneutical circle; systematic theol-
ogy, however, when it deviates from this task, can only approach the 
same exegetical questions with the theologian's own arbitrary solu-
tions.3 Only a genuinely doctrinal approach can prevent such capri-
cious deductions about the revelatory event, by a continual harkening 
back to the locus of the event itself. 
However, dogmatics itself is in continual danger of becoming a 
deducible systematic coherence which replaces the revelation itself. 
This threat is abundantly illustrated in Roman Catholicism, which has 
dissolved the integral relation of doctrine with proclamation and made 
1. Was heisst, p. 23. 
2. "Systematic theology" is sometimes used by Diem in the classical 
sense as synonymous with "dogmatics," which as a discipline in the 
service of the Church naturally proceeds in an orderly manner. 
Usually, however, the context indicates that lllsystematic theology\n 
signifies the perversion of dogmatics by self-sufficient principles 
independent of the faith of the Church. 
3. Cf. Dogmatik, pp. 210, 243, 254-57, 260. 
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doctrine into a series of revealed tVtruths, '' which do not lose their 
resemblance to philosophical tru~hs merely by the claim to be revealed 
in origin. In Roman Catholicism (and its lame imitator, Protestant 
orthodoxy) the event of proclamation is omitted fr9m its locus between 
Scripture and theology, resulting in biblicism and an unassailable 
Lehramt. The concept of veritas ~hereby embraces both nature and 
supernature, and the Geschehen of proclamation disappears. 11Solange 
aber in der katholischen Kirche und Theologie dieses Geschehen aus-
fallen, und das 'S.Vstem 1 trotzdem g[ltig sein kann, k8nnten wir u. U. 
im einzelnen wBrtlich dasselbe sagen, und es w§re doch nicht dasselbe.n1 
The comprehensive and comprehensible relation between nature and grace 
in the analogia entis has become an independent principle in itself, 
undermining the essence of proclamation and faith. 2 Thus, a "system-
atic principle" has unfortunately replaced the "systematizing event" 
of God's act of salvation. 
Such a degeneration is possible in any dogmatics, no matter how 
its subject matter is organized. The sequence of the final form of 
the Apostles' Creed, for instance, shows the tendency to displace 
the Christological faith with a preceding "first articlen of a more 
general belief in a Creator-God.3 However, this sequence is only 
a tendency, and the crucial question for any theological statement 
1. 1J•Bestandsaufnahme, w p. 81; cf. 'U:Sibel als Norm, 11 pp. 34-37. 
2. Theologie, p. 30; "Dogmatik tart.]," p. 953; 1'Bestandsaufnahme,tV 
p. 79; cf. H. Diem, "Analogia fidei gegenanalogia entis,UJ pp. 160, 
168. 
3. tunogmatik [art.], t~ pp. 952-53. 
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is whether a systematic principle has actually usurped the position 
of God 1s lrsystematizing eventtv in Jesus Ghrist. For the unity and 
orderliness on which dogmatics as a discipline depends is founded 
solely upon the auv{r:rT'f}jJ.L of ~Vthe beloved Son,» in his active 
work of salvation, rather than upon any a-rfa'TY) JJ.rx as an axiomatic 
principle.1 The unity and comprehensiveness of God's creative ac-
tivity is in fact the only possible source of order for a conscien-
tious dogmatics. 
3. The Interdependence of Exegesis and Dogma 
a. ~ Testing of Dogma ~ Exegesis 
The degeneration of dogma into sterile systems takes place when 
dogma loses its integral relationship to the proclamation and to the 
scriptural Verkfindigungsgeschichte which is the basic source and norm 
of that proclamation. The errors and irrelevancies of Church doctrines 
have always occurred where the duty of interpreting dogmas according 
to Scripture i.ras either fully neglected or at least approached with 
criteria not received from Scripture itselr.2 Diem's fundamental 
position may be described as llhermeneutical, t.JJ for he insists that 
the problems dealt with by theology must be seen in the perspective 
of the general duty of exegesis. The task of dogma is to aid the 
1. Of. ibid., p. 952; II:Sibelwissenschaft,w pp. 75-77; and Dogmatik, 
pp. 265-68, in which Diem expounds Col. 1:9-17 (especially v. 17) 
as the basis for the distinction between systematisches rrinzip 
and systematisierendes Qeschehen. or. also supra, p. 206. 
2. Has heisst, p. 26. 
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Church's exegesis of Scripture, and dogma must therefore be subject 
to critical inspection by exegesis itself. The test of whether a 
dogmatics has already fallen into the dangers of systematic princi-
ples is to observe whether the theologian iB or is not ready with-
out any reservation to allow his statements to undergo exegetical 
discussion.1 
The confessions, creeds, and doctrine of the Church are to be 
respected as the obligatory VorverstHndnis for exegesis; however, 
they also are to remain liable themselves to exegetical criticism 
and legitimation. Dogmas can only be disputed on the basis of ~ 
better understanding of the scriptural statements, an understanding 
..) ~ 
which originates in the 0( KO t'7. Nor could such a placing of dogma 
in question be done by single scriptural passages used as dicta 
probantia, a procedure 'Hhich lapses into the biblicism of the old 
Protestant orthodoxy; but such discussion must take place in the con-
text of the comprehensive and corporate witness of the entire Scrip-
ture.2 In this context of authentication, the Church may not only 
submit its dogmas to inspection, but can confidently trust that all 
false doctrine will be exposed within the forum of Scripture, and that 
this will happen not through legalistic haggling, but through the 
promise that God's Word will attest itself there through the Holy 
Spirit.3 
l. Dowatik, p. 267. 
2. Ibid., p. 263; "S'chrift u. Bekenntnis, 11 pp. 455, 4'1)9. 
3. lnEst autem ecclesia,li p. 337. 
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The precedence of the scriptural proclamation over subsequent 
Church doctrine is shown by the fact, on the one hand, that exegesis 
acting independently of dogmatics can arrive at some of the same 
results already achieved by dogma,1 and, on the other hand, by the 
£act that the theologians might otherwise be tempted to accept a posi-
tion which no exegete has approved. 2 The theologian dares not evade 
the burdens of exegesis and its historical methods by vaulting over 
such problems with the so-called dennoch of faith, but must instead 
search the Scriptures together with the New Testament historian, 
testing doctrine according to its conformity with the canonical proc-
lamation.3 The great advantage of modern Jrotestantism, even in com-
parison with the Reformation, is that its ex~gesis is now far better 
equipped for this task of confirmation of the results of dogmatics. 
The great error in Catholicism, hm-1ever, is that its dogma is no longer 
exegetically discussable, but instead may even reverse the plainly 
literal sense of Scripture, as has happened in the doctrines of the 
Immaculate Conception, Perpetual Virginity, and Bodily Assumption of 
l. An example is the superiority of the Pauline over the Lucan 
witness, which Bultmann claims can be established on purely 
historical critical grounds (Grundfragen, pp. 36-37~. 
2. An example is H. Schlier 1s concept of "verbal inspiration of 
the Praesymbola, ~v which is unsupported by any New Testament 
historian (Was heisst, p. 29; Dogmatik, pp. 44-45). 
3. Irdischer Jesus, pp. 18-19. 
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Mary.1 
The necessity of verification of dogma by exegesis is not subject 
to qualification. Diem makes this clear by affirming that even his 
own doctrine about the nature of s-cripture as presented in the pre-
ceding pages, which alleges to be based solely upon the self-under-
standing of Scripture, is no exception to this requirement, but must 
itself be submitted to the test of exegesis. That the conscientious 
theologian has a doctrine of Scripture simply means that he has the 
courage to allow this doctrine continually to be verified by exegesis. 
For the Word of God in Scripture must always bring itself into hear-
ing and thus can only require that it be read and expounded in all 
freedom. 2 
b. The Guidance of Exegesis E.;x: £2m 
The freedom of the scriptural self-proclamation, however, takes 
place within the context of the Church, which has heard and wishes 
to continue to hear God's self-disclosure through the canonical wit-
1. Dogmatik, pp. 305, 307; Grundfragen, p. 10; "Dogma," p. 951. 
For instance, K. Rahner (Schriften zur Theologie [4 vols.; Ein-
siedeln: Benziger Verlag, 1957-60], I, 49-90; IV, 11-50) has an 
extended and stimulating discussion of the development of doctrine. 
Many topics are treated, including the apostolic experience of the 
revelation, but Scripture as such is rarely mentioned. He does 
affirm Scripture as having the status of dogma and being the indis-
putable starting point for theology (IV, 14-15). But he also warns 
against ascribing greater authority to Catholic dogmas announced in 
past eras that seem to be more closely derived from scriptural 
statements than the more recent dogmas of 1854 or 1950 (IV, 33). 
2. Theologie, pp. 68-69, 92; Grundfragen, pp. 4-5; Dogmatik, p. 314; 
Was heisst, p. 21. Cf. K. Barth, CD, I/2, 462; J. 1. Mays, ~­
gesis as a Theological Discipline, p. 28. 
217 
nesses. Of the dogmas of the Church, the following may be said: 
'tDiese sind ihrerseits ja nichts anders als im weiteren Verfolg der 
Kanonisierung der Schrift erfolgte Interpretationsversuche der Schrift-
aussagen in ihrer vorliegenden Textgestalt~l Dogma serves the present 
preaching of the Church, and it does this by aiding the interpretation 
of the canonical text, which may then be further proclaimed. It per-
forms this service, not by imposing doctrinal results upon the text, 
but by providing the proper perspective for approaching and question-
ing the text. t1Es vlird uns nicht vorgeschrieben, was die Texte sagen 
milssen, sondern nur, t1oraufhin wir sie Bll! befragen haben.n2 
To provide this perspective is an indispensable service to the 
interpretation of Scripture, for the exegete has in the past often 
been too content merely to outline the contrasts betl..reen different 
canonical witnesses as sharply as possible, leaving it to the parish 
minister to try to discover what these witnesses may have to say in 
common, :Furthermore, it is the service of dogmatics, in supplying 
this Yoraufhin, to resolve exegetical problems 1-rhich would remain 
insoluble 'Within the dimension of exegesis alone·.3 By means of dogma, 
1. Grundfragen, p. 38. 
2. Dogmatik, p. 258; cf. tnschriftauslegung, 11 p. 62; ~ll])ogma, 11 p. 949. 
Far:' examples of how dogma as das Woraufhin der Befragung des 
Textes is suited to elucidate a text, cf. Dogmatik, Chap. 13. 
Diem's contrast to Bultmann is shown by the fact that the same 
word Woraufhin is used by the latter for the hermeneutical guid-
ance given by the exegete's own existential questioning. 
3. Examples of such exegetical dilemmas are the relation of the Holy 
Spirit to human spirits, and the question whether the Holy Spirit 
is personal or a dynamic force (Dogmatik, pp. 252-55; ~las heisst, 
pp. 55-60, 67-68). 
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the Church also has the obligation to decide between two irreconcil-
ably contradictory scriptural witnesses, such as Paul and Luke; this 
doctrinal decision does not close off exegetical discussion, but 
rather sets it within its proper obligations and thereby its true 
freedom.1 
Exegesis done within the context of the Church implies the Vor-
verstMndnis that the confessions and doctrines of the Church are to 
be used confidently as an aid to the explication of Scripture. This 
does not mean a doctrinal infallibility, but it implies that the pre-
judgment must be for rather than against such dogma, at the same time 
that it is being itself critically tested.2 In this reciprocal rela-
tionship, the dogmas of the Church are to be heard beside and together 
with the witnesses of Scripture. 
Since the presuppositions of exegesis are received from dogma, 
they cannot be defended on principle or on rationalistic grounds, but 
are instead founded on the sheer fact that the ·ohurch in this manner 
has understood and confessed to the canonical witness to the revela-
tion of God. 3 This is the proper basis for authentic ~vdogmatic exe-
gesis, n as contrasted to the IV systematic exegesis~' of, for instance, 
the existentialists, which is rooted in a prior systematic concep-
1. Grundfragen, pp. 35-36. 
2. Was heisst, pp. 39-40; Grundfragen, p. 17. 1-I. Lohff (~1Dogmatische 
Grundlegung zwischen :Positivismus und SelbstverstHndnis,'v p. 63) 
criticizes Diem for ami tting the "Reformationt11 emphasis on the 
anti-heretical function of dogma as its principle guidance for 
exegesis. 
3. Grundfragen, p. 4. 
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tion and is thus not actually exegeticallY, discussable.1 For all 
exegesis that is not rooted in the perspective of the ~'dogmatic fact~' 
of the givenness of revelation must instead rely upon a systematic 
pr~nciple supplied by the exegete himself or by a non-theological 
discipline. In all such cases, however, the exegetical results are 
not discussable because no dialogue with the text itself is permitted. 
On the other hand, to allow Church dogma to supply the preunde~stand-
ing of the text is not an arbitrary forestalling of exegetical results, 
but on the contrary elucidates the text through formulations of its 
own self-understanding. 2 
Church doctrine does not of itself authenticate a given exegesis, 
however, but only guides that exegesis within the relevant perspective. 
The exegesis of a text is finally legitimated, not by a Church teaching-
office (as in Roman Catholicism), but by being preached and assented 
to by a consensus of the Church.3 This consensus is not just one of 
past official decisions, but primarily must be a consensus of the 
present Church, won through the struggle of individual pastors preach-
ing and individual congregations being led by God 1s Word to a common 
. 
correct hearing of Scripture. The congregation must respond to the 
witness of the preacher, acknowledging that the proclamation has been 
heard as one binding to faith. If this response occurs, the existing 
Church shows itself as the living assembly of God; if it does not 
occur, the existing Church remains as the greatest threat to its own 
1. Dogmatik, p. 243; cf. p. 288. 2. Ibid., pp. 275, 281. 
3. ltDogma," p. 951; Grundfragen, pp. 49-50. 
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proclamation. r.nwas wir theologisch erarbei tet haben, muss sich vor 
allem in der :Predigt bewl:Ihren. tnl 
The foremost example of how the proper Woraufhin of the text is 
provided by dogma is the doctrine of the Trinity. This dogma is not 
directly expressed in Scripture, which in itself shows the various 
ways of God's working without reflection upon the relationship of 
the oneness and variety implied within God himself. Nonetheless, 
the Church, beginning with the canonically attested opera of the 
Qpera trinitatis ad extra, has formulated the doctrine of the Trinity 
as an aid to the exposition of Scripture. This doctrine guides the 
WorwJfhin of exegesis by continually placing the following question 
to the text: 
Ob hier also nicht • • • Gott der Sch8pfer dem von ihm 
geschaffenen und durch Jesus Ohristus ihm wieder 1ange-
nehm gemachten' Menschen durch den Heiligen Geist sich 
vernehmbar gemacht und ihm als der Heilige Geist bezeugt 
hat, dass er wegen Jesus Christus ihn wieder Vater nennen 
~' und dieser Mensch ihn tiber dem ihm widerfahrenen 
Geschehen dieser opera trinitatis tats~chlich so nennen 
kann.2 
Diem's position is that the dogma of the Trinity should not be 
only a reformulation of the traditional dogma or a deduction from a 
specific concept of revelation, such as is Barth's approach. Rather, 
ihe doctrine of the Trinity specifically makes possible the consum-
mation of biblical exegesis by indicating the epistemic basis for 
the dialectical ''hermeneutical circlen which defines both the histor-
1. lfNat\lrliche Theologie,tn p. 151; cf. IWBekenntnis, 11 pp. 425-26; 
tvGeburt der Gemeinde, til pp. 210-11. 
2. Dogmatik, p. 259. 
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ical witness and the present exposition. Furthermore, the unity and 
the multiplicity of Scripture are both grounded finally in the Trin-
i ty. The multiplicity within the Bible in part reflects the modes of 
distinction within the Trinity and the ensuing divine plan of salva-
tion. For the opera trinitatis ad extra correspond to the GefMlle 
of God's self-attestation in the proclamation-history. The presence 
of a unity in the canonical witness is based simply on the fact that 
"God is God tv; far from being a logical tautology, this is a genuinely 
~ndoctrinal 11 statement that signifies that God is what he does and 
£!_oes what he is, that the Trinity ad intra is the same as the works 
of the Trinity ad extra. 
·The unique threeness in oneness and oneness in threeness can 
hardly be expressed adequately in any formulation, whether of the 
fourth or the twentieth centuries. However, there are two Grenzbe-
grif£e, which are to be used as aids in maintaining the trinitarian 
perspective in exegesis. One such concept is perichoresis, the in-
divisibility of God's three modes of existence as they permeate and 
condition one another. The other concept is "appropriation," whereby 
various actions are attributed by Scripture to individual personae 
of the Trinity, who have ttappropriated" the specific works o£ cre-
ation, reconciliation, and sanctification.1 With these two auxiliary 
concepts, the doctrine of the Trinity is able to express and safeguard 
the uniqueness of the Christian revelation, in contrast to the poly-
~ 
1. These two concepts are mentioned briefly by K. Barth (cf. CD, 
I/1, 425, 428-29), but Diem develops them extensively. 
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theism of the "natural religious mann on the one hand, and philosoph-
ical monotheism on the other hand.1 
Thus, it must not be supposed that the doctrine of the Trinity 
is a needless inference from the scriptural text. This would be to 
mistake either the unity of God or the reality of his revelation.2 
For to hold that the manifestations of Christ and the Holy Spirit 
in the biblical witness are separate from or somehow inferior to God 
would minimize his genuine presence in revelation, and thus the seri-
ousness of the exegetical task would be undermined. The Samosatan 
heresy of the early Church may be noted in this connection, for by 
the negation of the distinctions ~dthin the Trinity, Christ was made 
an unreal revelation, a mere SelbstgesprMch of God with himself.3 
If the Second and Third Persons of the Trinity become thus a self-
conversation of God.within himself, then God's self-disclosure has 
not actually happened, and revelation becomes a mere self-conversation 
of man with himself. 
Accordingly, the sacrifice of the verbum externum, which results 
from anti-trinitarian tendencies, was the danger seen by the Refor-
1. Much of the material of this exposition is unpublished and is taken 
from Diem's lectures in June and December of 1962, in the Univer-
sity of Tfibingen. Cf. also Dogmatik, pp. 257-61. For a discussion 
of Diem's doctrine of the Trinity, in comparison with the view of 
:Barth, cf. H. Geisser, "Die Trinitc!Ltslehre unter den Problemen und 
in den Prolegomena christlicher Theologie," pp. 444-54. 
2. Cf. K. Barth, OD, I/1, 404. 
3. Grundfragen, pp. 26-27; tvEst autem ecclesia, tt p. 330; tv:?role-
gomena, 11 p. 453; 't-Tas heisst, p. 54. 
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mation in both Roman Catholicism and the radical ~ectarians.1 The 
Church of Rome, though officially trinitarian in doctrine, has allowed 
the externality of the Word to be absorbed into the Church teaching-
office, so that the voice of Christ can speak only through the Church 
but no longer to the Church. In the case of the SchwMrmer, man is 
held to be uniquely spiritual and empowered with a natural capacity 
for knowing God, which results in an individualistic pietism that 
allows the l'Iord only to confirm and not to disturb man 1 s S'elbst-
2 gespr!t:ch. Thereby the Word is tuexternaln only as long as the indi-
vidual has not yet assented to and received it within himself. 
The trinitarian preservation of the verbum externum protects 
not only the reality of the revelation (which is a prerequisite for 
Protestant exegesis), but also the iustificatio impii per fidem sola 
gratia. Without the doctrine of the Trinity, the Logos is deperson-
alized, thus sacrificing the Christus extra ~ as the agent of sal-
vation.3 The Holy Spirit is also reduced to the spiritual activity 
of men, and the office of preaching becomes simply encouragement for 
the fruits of salvation. Thereby man 1 s salvation becomes a justifi-
cation by works, instead of by grace through faith. As a result, with 
this most fundamental heresy, it is hardly possible to approach Scrip-
ture relevantly. 
1. Schriftkanon, pp. 10-11. 
2. ''~Est autem ecclesia, 11 p. 331; cf. Grundfragen, p. 51; Theologie, 
pp. 19-20; Was heisst, pp. 51-54. 
3. Schriftkanon, p. 17; Grundfragen, pp. 27-28; Dogmatik, p. 260. 
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In short, the distinction between the Persons of the Trinity, 
and their ontic and noetic externality to human egocentrism, is a 
basic requisite for correct exegesis. Some of the fundamental ten-
sions within Scripture, often labeled by some exegetes as the polarity 
of indicative and imperative, actual and ideal, or ontological and 
existential, should actually be referred instead to the relationship 
that exists between the individual opera trinitatis.1 The dialectics 
of the apostolic Lnwitness,t11 the continued llself-proclamation" of 
Christ, and the present tVhermeneutical circle" are all rooted in the 
basic reality of the Trinity. The verbum externum means that Christ 
the Word and also the subsequent canonical word of witness are the 
masters and not the slaves of the believer's act of faith, confronting 
the congregation with an irreversible flow of authority. In this 
verbum, the triune God's saving will is not just imparted as a truth, 
but actually occurs through the Holy Spirit, which is the self-mani-
festation of Christ. Finally, the doctrine of the Trinity signifies 
that the event of knowledge of the 'Vlord lies in God 1 s hands and not 
in human capacities. For the condescending presence of God in his 
Word is received by man only through the simultaneous approach o£ 
the Holy Spirit, which closes the outward circle of divine revela-
tion in the same manner that the inner-trinitarian circle of divine 
action has already been closed. 2 In this way, the dogma of the 
1. Dogmatik, p. 259; Was heisst, pp. 66-67. Cf. H. Diem, »Dogmatik 
zwischen :Personalismus und Ontologie, t1l EvTh, X!f (1955), 414. 
2. "Est autem ecclesia, tv pp. 324, 326-27. 
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Trinity presents the proper perspective for exegesis. 
c. The Cooperation of Exegete and Dogmatician 
The mutual interdependence of exegesis and dogmatics shows the 
fundamental necessity for renewed cooperation between these two dis-
ciplines. This makes the present tendencies of isolation between the 
two all the greater cause for concern.l As has been noted, Diem is 
alarmed at the present-day gulf between theology and exegesis. This 
segregation is caused partly by the Harnackian opinion that doctrine 
is essentially an extra-canonical development, and partly by the tend-
ency of each faction to answer the other too readily and in the form 
of drawing extreme consequences from the other's position. 2 Such a 
split is perhaps convenient in-the academic functions of the universi-
ty, but it is intolerable for the work of the pastor. This situation 
must not degenerate into a desperate stalemate in which disciples of 
one school keep to their tendencies at the expense of reading or even 
talking to the other faction, perhaps even losing the awareness that 
1. H. J. Held (review of Was Heisst schriftgem~ss?, KZ, XIV [1959], 
255) wishes that Diem 1..rere more convincing in the assertion that 
the gap between exegesis and dogmatics not only is imp~oper but is 
able to be overcome. W. Matthias ( 11Dogmatik zwischen Historismus 
und Existentialismus," pp. 569-70, and tnExegese, Dogmatik, Verldlnd-
igung, tv pp. 250, 258-66), on the other hand, asserts that this gap 
is not at all improper, but rather must be protected. Rejecting 
Diem's call for a unity of theological and historical views as a 
philosophical prejudgment, Matthias claims that the division be-
tween them is not a b8se Kluft, but a Zeichen of God's sovereign 
freedom of action as contrasted to all human Wissenschaft in its 
diverse methodologies. Diem's synthesis is said to endanger the 
pure separation and dialectic between unhindered scientific method-
ology and faith in the divine promise given in proclamation. 
2. Dogmatik, p. 149; Grundfragen, pp. 42-43. 
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there is still a need to do so.1 
In contrast to this unfortunate rivalry today, the mutual respon-
sibilities of theologian and exegete should be clear. The exegete 
must prepare the way for the dogmatician, by presenting accurate 
historical profiles of the biblical witnesses in their concrete proc-
lamation-situation, thereby preventing the theologian from leveling 
this witness down to the common denominator of a favorite systematic 
principle. The theologian, on the other hand, provides the relevant 
pre-understanding and perspective to the exegete, and prevents him 
from disproportionately neglecting the biblical witnesses not imme-
diately under consideration, or from dissolving the actual event of 
God's revealing action by anti-doctrinal presuppositions.2 The exe-
gete must show whether and in what sense the various canonical wit-
nesses may mutually protect and represent one another, and the thea-
logian must show by means of the ensuing Church doctrine just What 
the witnesses intend to say in common and what consensus is now to be 
proclaimed further. 
What makes possible this cooperation between exegete and theo-
logian is the freedom-within-obligation that alone can arise from the 
!I " jointly heard O!l'<OY/.3 They are obligated, in that they are forbidden 
to place arbitrary questions before the text, but must instead ask 
only concerning that which is testified to by the scriptural witnesses. 
1. Dogmatik, pp. 243-44; cf. WVorwort 6 to the first and third editions 
(pp. 5-6). or. ~vEinhei t, ~' p. 387. 
2. ~inheit," p. 403; Dogmatik, p. 208. 3. Dogmatik, pp. 294-95. 
227 
They are, however, also free, in that within this obligation they 
have the freedom to question anew all previous answers and to use new 
means of expression in serving the proclamation which itself must 
ever happen anew. Each one must cease accusing the other of using 
obsolete means of expression, and both must confess that only humanly 
conditioned concepts are available to any interpreter. Neither theo-
logian nor exegete may lay any restrictions on each other apart from 
the common duty continually to call one another back to the locus of 
;; I l 
the C;i(k{)q. More or less than this cannot be required of either. 
For this event of obedient hearing is the origin of all relevant 
exegesis and theology, and in addition it is the context of the con-
tinuing proclamation which itself is the criterion of both. Within 
.) I 
the obligations set by the 0(}<0~, the theologian and the exegete 
find a mutual openness-which is in fact the freedom of the Holy Spir-
it, who is the ground of all concord and of the true exposition of 
Scripture_-;, 
E. The M3 thods of Hermeneutics 
1. The Church Context of J:l.lx:egesis 
From this. examination of the nature of Scripture and the role 
of dogma, Diem's hermeneutical approach may be more explicitly out-
lined. No predetermined degree of personal faith or inspiration can 
be required of the exegete; rather, his task is to put to each text, 
1. Wast. heisst, p. 36. 2. Grundfragen, p. 18. 
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however obscure, the question concerning its proclaimed message. 
For this work, the exegete must first ascertain whether he has sub-
mitted himself to the proper context for his task. His presupposi-
tions must continually be subject to critical review, to ensure that 
he is guided by the ~elf-understanding of S'cripture itself, as expli-
cated by the decisions of the Church. 
Es bedeutet, dass der H8rer bzw. der Exeget des Massstab 
seiner kritischen Interpretation weder dem modernen 
Geschichts- und Wissenschaftsbegriff noch seinem eigenen 
Weltbild oder Existenzverst~ndnis, sondern den Dogmen 
der Kirche zu entnehmen hat.l 
No philosophical or pseudo-theological presuppositions or schemata 
must replace the kirchliches VorverstMndnis of the Church, which has 
for ages past already heard the self~proclamation of Ghrist within 
this canonical witness. 
However, this Vorverst~ndnis does not mean a Vorentscheidung, 
an irrevocable prejudicing of the reading of the text. This would 
re?emble the Roman Catholic treatment of Scripture as basically a 
law-bpok, which must be interpreted according to the legal precedents 
established by previous generations of ecclesiastical lawyers.2 
Protestant exegesis, to the contrary, must abandon such systematic 
restrictions and indeed every attempt to establish a tvhermeneutical 
principle.n3 Diem maintains that even the worthy Reformation prin-
1. ~., p. 38. 
2. Ibid., p. 6; Theologie, p. 145; 11Bibel als Norm,tn p. 34; 
LUBe standsaufnahme, 11 p. 69, n. 10. 
3. Of. Grundfragen, p. 18; Schriftkanon, p. 22; Dogmatik, 
pp. 156-57, 314. 
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ciples of Ujustification by fai th1t and sola gratia cannot be turned 
into hermeneutical rules.l For a hermeneutical principle, used even 
with the best of intentions, can only mean a return to essentialistic 
thinking, which is in contradiction to the contingent givenness of 
the canon and which restricts the freedom of Scripture continually 
to interpret itself. 
Das bedeutet die Preisgabe jedes hermeneutischen Prin-
zips als solchem zugunsten der steten Bereitschaft, auf 
die Schrift zu h8ren, und sich von ihr selbst die Mass- .. 
stHbe fHr die rechte Auslegung geben bzw. die an sie 
herangebrachten Mas~stMbe stets aufs Neue durch sie kor-
rigieren zu lassen. 
The exegete must cease thinking llby principlesn about the event of 
revelation, in order that he may be called back to the locus of the 
event itself. 
The lack of any hermeneutical principle means that there is no 
single, clearly defined method which as a master-key could unlock all 
exegetical problems. There is no special IJbiblical hermeneutictn in 
contrast to a general hermeneutic of human language.3 However, says 
Diem, this does not excuse the exegete from searching for the best 
possible methods to allow the Scripture to come to self-expression. 
This calls for continually new efforts, for such methods must always 
be v1on anew for each contemporary situation of exegesis. Within 
this effort, the exegete has a freedom which is safeguarded from 
1. Cf. Schriftkanon, pp. 16-18; "Einheit,n p. 398; Theologie, p. 269; 
Do~tik, pp. 200-204. 
2. Grundfragen, p. 13. 
3.. Ibid., p. 20; Theologie, p. 98. Cf. K. Barth, CD, I/2, 464-66. 
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caprice only by the kirchliches VorverstHndnis, whereby he remains 
~esponsible to the present congregation, as well as to his exegetical 
predecessors in the history of doctrine and to the all-originating 
' .I 
moment of ~ ko'q. 
Since no alien criteria must intrude in the methods used, the 
exegete receives as part of his pre-understanding the "hermeneutical 
circle • 11 Only the One witnessed to makes possible and confirms the 
human witnessing within Scripture. The triune God alone in his self-
disclosure can from within open up the circle between the textual 
witness and the attested action of God.1 
Dann bleibt aber nichts anderes ffbrig, als dass sich 
der Theologe in den Zirkel hineinbegibt in der Er-
wartung, dass dieser sich ihm selbst von innen her 
aufschliesst, und ihm so Erkenntnisse vermittelt werden 
in Akten der Selbsterschliessung Gottes. 2 
In this circle, the exegete receives from the Church the doc-
trinal decisions of the past, which have themselves arisen in response 
to the divine self-disclosure. Such dogmas provide the relevant 
Woraufhin for exegesis, at the same time that they themselves are 
being exegetically reexamined. The doctrines of the Church must be 
used as a protection against systematizing, essentialistic thinking, 
for both dogma and the canon in their contingent givenness refer to 
the circle of the apostolic witness which is understood through the 
One witnessed to. Theological exegesis, Diem maintains, therefore 
is not a prejudiced reading of the text, but on the contrary is neces- · 
1. WDer Theologe," p. 292. 
2. "Dogma u. Existenz im theol.," p. 109; 11Dogma u. Existenz,n p. 28. 
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sary to prevent such arbitrary views of the text apart from its object. 
In this context provided by the Church, then, the exegete approaches 
his 1wr k. 
2. Concordance-hearing 
The exegete begins the task before him by using all critical 
methods to study the individuality of the biblical witnesses, within 
their cultural environment and their local proclamation-situations. 
Many antitheses within Scripture will thus be found, but the exegete 
must not smooth over these contrasts or reduce the text to a common 
denominator or concordance of truths. The very fact of_the canon 
itself and its boundaries is a protection against such personal 
caprice.1 
Wenn auch die Konkordanzmethode fftr die Auslegung 
der Schrift nichts taugt, so gibt es doch eine Art 
von notwendigem Konkordanzh8ren, das heisst ein 
Mith8ren der ganzen Schrift bei der Auslegung der 
einzelnen BUcher und Zeugnisse.2 
The witnesses of the canon must be heard together and alongside of each 
other, in all their mutual responsibilities and differences. Each must 
be heard in its canonical context beside the other witnesses. Only 
through careful exegetical Mith8ren can the true unity of Scripture 
become apparent. 
This unity results from the position of the canonical witnesses 
alongside one another within the VerkHndigungsgeschichte, and not 
1. Schriftkanon, p. 22; "Einheit,n p. 403; Dogmatik, p. 206. 
2. Schriftkanon, p. 22. 
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from a coercive systematic principle.1 Thus they protect and become 
mutually responsible for one another.2 The exegete therefore is 
entitled to at least the presupposition that, in their various man-
ners, they intend to witness to the same thing. For instance, says 
Diem, Paul has no doctrine of the Ascension, but Acts 1:7-11 clearly 
fills a gap implied by the ~auline concepts of Christ's Resurrection 
and Parousia.3 Also, the Descent of Christ into Hell is implied by 
comparing two different scriptural traditions.4 By llrconcordance-
hearing, tt the Witnessed is heard again through the variety of the 
witnesses. 
Diem's repeated emphasis on Mith8ren is based on the capacity 
of Scripture to interpret itself, which was also made explicit in the 
Reformation principle of scriptura scTipturae interpres. Even the 
difficult texts are nonetheless found in this one tveovenant-book~u of 
the gracious Covenant-God, and thus are to be interpreted from this 
central point. The obscure texts can then be illuminated by the clear 
ones, in a context of mutual responsibility. Furthermore, this re-
ciprocal context is shared by the dogmas of the Church, which both 
expound and are continually confirmed by Scripture. The self-proc-
lamation of Jesus Christ therefore is to be heard by the exegete 
through these various witnesses who in their multiplicity present the 
collective witnessing. 
1. Ibid., p. 19; Was heisst, p. 38. 
3. Ibid., p. 293. 
2. Dogmatik, p. 208. 
4. Ibid., p. 279. 
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3. The Continuation of the Witness 
When the exegete has critically examined the canonical documents 
in their diversity and unity, is his task completed~ or has he a 
remaining obligation? Diem's answer is characteristic: ''Ganz all-
gemein ist darauf zu antworten, dass wir hinter diese Aussagen weder 
zurfickgehen noch bei ihnen stehenbleiben dftrfen, sondern sie im Sinn 
der Z~ugen weiterzufilll.ren haben:~1l To try to \Vgo behindt~ the textual 
witness is to attack Scripture with alien criteria, as historicism 
has done. To \Vlet the text stand" in its present form, as biblicism 
does, is to neglect the duty of interpretation. But to ~'carry on the 
witness fartherW is to remain loyal to the intention of the original 
witnesses, who themselves brought the apostolic proclamation into 
ever new situations. 
The exegete in the service of the Church must place himself 
within the VerkUndigungsgeschichte, as one who hears and responds, 
not in isolation, but in company with others. He has the duty to 
hear the exchanges between the scriptural witnesses and to compare 
them, for the purpose of receiving what is applicable in still other 
concrete situations, namely his own.2 As the exponent of Scripture 
for the present congregation, the exegete must then continue the wit-
ness gained from his Mith8ren. Furthermore, the validity of his ex-
egesis must be established in the struggle for the present consensus 
of the Church, through the contemporary response of the congrega-
1. ~fas heisst, p. 35. 2. S'chriftkanon, pp. 19-20. 
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tion to the proclamation.1 
In this responsibility to continue the scriptural proclamation, 
says Diem, the exegete must t~anslate the kerygma into contemporary 
concepts, just as did the apostolic preachers. tVDer Prediger hat 
hier eine eminente fibersetzungsarbeit zu leisten, vor der er weder 
durch den Rllckzug auf die 'Sprache Kanaans' ausweichen darf', noch 
durch die Bem5hungen, um jeden Preis modern zu sein.n2 The biblical 
Weltbild is binding no more than is the biblical Wortlaut; yet, on 
the other hand, modern concepts are just as unacceptable as criteria 
f'or exegesis. The exegete therefore must transpose the biblical proc-
lamation into contemporary imagery and terms, without sacrificing 
its essence. 
The task of' translating the kerygma, therefore, must not be under-
taken as a program in and of' itself'. 3 It is a dangerous illusion to 
believe that one can translate or tvdemythologizeiV the Gospel into 
an original pure f'orm. For all human language, whether mythological 
or demythologized, is actually a 111f'oreign languagen in relation to 
the task of' transmitting God's Word; yet the miracle is that the 
Logos became f'lesh nonetheless.4 Through this act of' God's grace, 
the exegete f'inds himself' authorized to state the Gospel anew in 
contemporary terms which thus have no pretensions of' timeless valid-
1. Of'. WSchrif't u. Bekenntnis,tll pp. 443-44; Grundf'ragen, pp. 43, 50; 
tvas heisst, p. 38; 111J3ibel als Norm, 11 p. 36. 
2. "Der Theologe,n p. 296. 3. Grundf'ragen, pp. 55-56. 
4. Ibid.; ~uschrif't u. J3ekenntnis, 11 p. 444; Dogmatik, p. 296; 10Dogma 
u. Existenz,tu p. 29. 
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ity. The only theologically legitimate exorcism of mythology in Scrip-
ture is through the event of proclamation,1 and in this event is the 
goal of the exegete's work of translation. 
In his task of continuing the scriptural witness and developing 
it further, the exegete respects the previous decisions made by the 
Church between conflicting scriptural voices, although of course such 
decisions must not disrupt the continuing duty of concordance-hearing 
and are themselves always subject to exegetical review. Furthermore, 
the exegete himself must make certain choices within the canon, if 
he is to continue the Gospel-proclamation within his contemporary 
situation. 
~ie weitere Aufgabe des Verkdndigers ist die sachgemMsse · 
tlbertragung dieser Zeugnisse in die heutige VerkUndigungs-
si tuation. Dabei wird sich immer ergeben, dass um der 
heute gebotenen Konkretheit der VerkHndigung willen 
bestimmte Zeugnisse der Schrift bevorzugt und andere 
zurfickgestellt werden.2 
For the sake of contemporary relevance, one witness may even be polem-
ically emphasized against another, such as was done by Luther in the 
case of Paul and James. But this selectivity must never be based 
upon ~ priori principles or systematic viewpoints, but must only serve 
the transitory needs of the concrete proclamation-situation. In this 
sense, lla canon within the canon" is justifiable to a certain extent, 
not as a permanent restriction, but for the relevant guidance of a 
particular situation. Thereby the exegete within the Church fulfills 
1. Dogmatik, p. 287. 
2. Ibid., p. 205; cf. Schriftkanon, p. 20; "Einheit,n p. 395. 
his obligation to allow the scriptural proclamation in its fullne~s, 
yet in its concrete relevance, to speak again to the congregation. 
Nothing less than the service of this continued Verkfindigungsgeschichte 
within the congregation is the final intention of the hermeneutics 
of Hermann Diem. 
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- CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSIONS 
A. ! Critique Qf Diem's Hermeneutics 
1. The Contribution of Diem 
Hermann Diem has contributed noteworthy and enduring insights 
to the discussion of hermeneutics, both in its immediate controversies 
and in its long-term development. Few men in contemporary German-
speaking Jrotestantism can equal him in breadth of scope in the 
reading of modern theology and in his penetrating insight into the 
few actually decisive underlying issues. To this insight is added 
- an exemplary attitude of fairness toward the intentions of the various 
factions. Diem is thus singularly qualified to introduce non~scholars 
to the actual structures within the intricacies of modern theological 
discussion, and indeed this is the very purpose of his volumes of 
Theologie als kirchliche Wissenschaft. This work, the third volume 
of which soon lilll be published, has already had a great influence · 
upon German pastors, particularly in Wffrttemberg. 
Diem himself has worked conscientiously to resolve some of the 
problems and weaknesses of modern scriptural interpretation. He 
has striven to make full use of the accumulated benefits and insights 
of critical biblical research, yet he carefully refuses to allow 
these analytic methods finally to arbitrate over the self-confessed 
intention of Scripture or to restrict the possibilities of its 
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further self-proclamation through the guidance of the Holy Spirit. 
He has reinstated dogma as the legitimate expression of the living 
Church in its explication of Scripture, without thereby permitting 
an ecclesiastical coercion of the original meanings of the canonical 
text. It may be questioned whether all doctrines are so simply 
derived from the scriptural self-understanding as Diem sometimes 
implies, but this only makes all the more imperative the continual 
dialogue between dogma and exegesis which Diem so brilliantly de-
scribes. Furthermore, Diem has made the most commendable efforts 
to overcome the factionalism and suspicion which now separate bibli~ 
cal scholars from the theologians, and he has done this with a real-
istic yet reconciliatory spirit in an era in which most contemporaries 
have neglected or even despaired of such inter-disciplinal coopera-
tion. Just as a unity and yet a multiplicity is inherent within 
the canonical text, so the investigator~ of this text must include 
both theologians and historical critics, working in a context of 
mutual responsibility which is outlined with outstanding cTeativity 
by Diem. However, it still may be doubted whether the major issue 
which continues to separate biblical scholars from dogmaticians has 
yet been overcome. 
2. The Historical and Theological Methods 
Behind this division of theologian and exegete is the problem that 
forms the major source of contention in the whole unsettled history 
of hermeneutics for more than a century. This background instability 
remains the conflict between the historical and the theological 
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methods, between the demand for empirical investigation based upon 
assumptions of continuity and relativity within history and the equal 
demand for an obedient response in modern concepts to the message 
and original intention of the text. In reply to this fundamental 
issue, Diem has attempted to redefine the proper theological rap- .. 
prochement to historical criticism from his own position as a theo-
logian, but it remains questionable whether this goal actually can 
be attained without an intrinsic investigation of the claims and 
rights of the historical method itself. 
a. Historie and Geschichte 
Diem has dealt with the issue of the legitimate scope of th~ 
historical method by utilizing a Barthian form of the German dis-, 
tinction of Geschichte (the presently intangible event which actually 
llhappened 111 in the past) and Historie (that aspect of the event 
accessible to the ~ethods of the historian). This appears to be 
a most £ruitful beginning, for it prevents the identification of 
Qeschichte with Historie which characterizes every form of histor-
icism and which allows the methodological presuppositions of the 
historian, however sincere, to predetermine his results. Thus 
W. Matthias1 correctly observes that Diem passes by the secondary 
question of the relation of the object of faith to the results of 
this historical method, so that the primary question may clearly 
appear, the question of the relation of faith and proclamation to 
l. UDer historische Jesus und der irdische Jesus, ~u pp. 571-74. 
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the actual Geschichte of the irdischer Jesus himself. 
How·ever, the term Geschichte (especially in its Barthian sense) 
gives no positive guidance to the historian concerning how one properly 
should use the historical method, even though this concept may serve~ 
to remind the historian that he should not assume this method has ex-
hausted the reality of past events. But Geschichte remains the ambig-
uous sjmbol of what is unknown (except of course by the 11knowledgelt of 
faith), a term more of exhortation than of denotation and consequently 
- ' 
of little essential value for the rigorous historian until such time as 
it may be possible t~ use the concept of Geschichte to redefine the very 
methods of Historie itself. This latter task is one ·which has not been 
undertaken by Diem. 
Of course Diem has gone quite beyond Barth 1s own opinion of the 
proper scope of the historical method. Not Qnly the significance and 
consistency of the completed canon, but also the very origins of the 
texts must be investigated.1 In fact, the earthly Jesus himself must 
be investigated, to the extent that he is the first phase of the procla-
mation-history which can be detected within these texts. Diem also em-
phasizes the need for a conscientious biblical criticism which cooper-
ates with the theologian in exegesis but which is itself free from doc-
trinaire d0mination. The most important indication of the significance 
attributed by Diem to the historical method is his own reversal of the 
Barthian sequence of procedure in a hermeneutical attempt to approach 
1. H. Diem-:, Dogmatik, Ihr Weg zwischen Historismus und Ex:istential-
ismus, pp. 130-31; cf~ p. 98, and Der irdische Jesus und der 
Christus des Glaubens, pp. 15-18. 
theological truth through the historical question.1 
Nevertheless, Diem has done his work basically as a theologian, not 
as a historical critic, and he has been unable to remove the traces of a 
certain lack of sympathy with the requirements of a historical method. 
He has warned that theology must maintain a certain detachment in rela-
tion to historical science. 2 The literary form of a scriptural text is 
sometimes dismissed as of secondary importance.3 The historical question 
is conceived by Diem basically as the question of how thE!. distance be-
tween the Geschichte of the earthly Jesus and a present encounter with 
, . 
him can be overcome.4 Thus his concept of the issue of historical meth-
od is qualified by a reaction to Troeltschian historicism and by the an-
sw~r given by Kierkegaard to Lessing's problem of historical distance,5 
rather than by a consideration of th~ mature problems r4ised in a dynamic 
historical consciousness as presented by such men as 1f. Dilthey. 6 
Despite Diem's commendable efforts, then, it has been charged that 
he does not after all take the historical method seriously enough to 
l. Dogmatik, pp. 97-98, 6o. 
2. H. Diem, Theologie als kirchliche Wissenschaft, p. 60. 
3. H. Diem, 1.Varum Textpredigt?, p. 198. 4. Irdischer Jesus, p. 3. 
5. Dogmatilc, pp. 9-23, 54;· cf. H •. Diem, ttiG.erkegaards Hinterlassen-
schaft an die Theologie, 11 p. 480. 
. . 
6. W. Dilthey offeTed an influential counterbalance to historicism, for 
he emphasized the categories of meaning and purpose as central in un-
derstanding the complex systems of interaction in human lllifell (which 
in its temporal extension is 11historyll). But his fragmentary discus-
sions moved on the level of general premises concerning patterns in 
Geschichte, with any methodological implications for Historie re-
maining both indefinite and dependent on German idealistic ontology. 
satisfY the biblical scholar.1 H. Geisser claims that Diem fails 
in his attempt to alloH for environmental and non-theological aspects 
of the historical revelation, since these aspects seem to be alloHed 
only a preliminary role. Diem rejects this criticism, replying 
that the closeness of these secular aspects to the heart of the 
revelatory event cannot possibly be over-exaggerated, and that just 
because of this close interrelationship one must be careful not to 
allaH the Sache of the event to be overlooked. This reply is worthy 
of consideration as a thoughtful attempt to keep both historical 
and theological method in proper perspective, but again it may be 
noted that here no positive guidance is given the historian beyond 
the exhortation to refrain from obscuring the underlying Sache of 
the text. 
Matthias points out that Diem affirms the historical method at 
the beginning and at the end of his argument, but that the actual 
weight of his position rests upon the intervening stage of the theo-
logical self-understanding of the text. Of course this observation 
falls short of being a relevant criticism to the extent that Diem 
has no pretensions of arguing as a historical critic but is avm-1edly 
a theologian trying to allow the proper freedom to the historical 
method. But on the other hand~ this criticism does disclose' the 
embarrassing gulf that must remain between the historical and thea-
1. The relevant criticisms here are raised by H. Geisser (llDie 
Trinit~tslehre unter den P.roblemen und in den Prolegomena christ-
licher Theologie, 11 pp. 452-54) and W. Matthias ("Dogmatik zwischen 
Historismus und Existentialismus,n pp. 565-66, and "Exegese, 
Dogmatik, Verklindigung,n pp. 253, 255). 
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-logical methods until an intrinsic critique of historical reason is 
attempted, rather than simply assertions of the supplementary respon-
sibilities of these two disciplines. 
b. The Verkl:indigungsgeschichte 
That Diem has gone much further than Barth in attempting to 
bring the theological and historical methods into a rapprochement 
is shown by the fact that Diem goes beyond the sheer distinction 
between Historie and Geschichte in order to define the datum of re-
search common to both these disciplines. This datum investigated 
by both methods is the Verkl:indigungsgeschichte, the continuous his-
tory of the proclamation of God's Heilsratschluss, beginning with 
the Old ~estament, finding its fulfillment in Jesus Christ, and con-
tinuing throughout the apostolic preaching. vfuen the revelation 
entered human history, it thereby became a datum for historical re-
search. The necessity for a theological exegesis is not thereby 
diminished, but such exegesis is prevented from doctrinaire distor-
tions of the text.1 
However, Diem's concept of Verkfindigungsgeschichte has been 
criticized as being a hybrid obscuration of the actual problems of 
1. That this danger is not unreal is inadverten~~y illustrated by 
K. H. Miskotte, 11Das 'Problem der theologischen Exegese, 11 Theolog-
ische AufsEltze: Karl Barth zum 50. Geburtstag, ed. E. Wolf 
(Mnnchen~ Kaiser Verlag, 1936), p. 71. Miskotte goes so far as to 
defend the adjective "magicaltn in his description of theological 
exegesis. Such a term would be unthinkable in Diem's presentation. 
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the two methods. R. Bultmann1 asks how the canonical Geschichte can 
be investigated other than through the historical-critical method 
and charges Diem with vagueness, in that the latter goes far beyond 
this method when he posits a proclamation-history in which Jesus Christ 
is not only initiator and object but also the continuing acting sub-
ject. Diem's reply would be that the Verkfindigungsgeschichte does 
not pretend to be fully comprehensible to the methods of Historie. 
Such methods actually can only investigate the historical deposit 
of this proclamation-history, and thus can indeed go only as far as 
to maintain that Jesus is the initiator and object of this historic 
proclamation. Only through a doctrinal statement made possible by 
the Holy Spirit can it be added that he is also the acting subject of 
the ensuing proclamation, or that this astounding claim made by the 
canonical preachers is legitimate. Nonetheless, the material stud-
ied jointly by historian and theologian is called the Verkfindigungs-
geschichte instead of simply Verkfindigungshistorie, so that both are 
reminded that the significance of this history is not exhausted by 
the·methods available to historical criticism. Diem's concept of the 
proc+amation-history thus is not an attempt to posit a glib answer, 
a definitive, unambiguous datum accessible with equal facility to 
either the historical or the theological method, but rather is simply 
an effort to delimit the area within which these two separate methods 
find their common concern and task, thus assisting further discussion. 
1. Das Verh~ltnis der urchristlichen Christusbotschaft zum histor-
ischen Jesus, pp. 14-15, n. 27. 
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Because of this heuristic intention, then, Diem's Verkllndigungs-
geschichte cannot be ::f:in'ally· refuted as such by Bultmann's charge 
of lVvagueness. ur 
A more relevant criticism is raised by W. Matthias,1 who insists 
that Diem's Verktlndigungsgeschichte is not only ambiguous but also 
hinders the thoroughness and integrity of both the historical and 
theological methods. Matthias would have the self-understanding of ... 
the text and historical-critical results remain methodologically sep-
arate, so that a genuine dialectic may take place in which the position 
of each can be clearly recognized. A "proclamation-historyl.ll would 
then be an illegitimate mixture of these two integral methods. The 
scriptural Geschichte is the unfolding of God's promise, election, 
and sovereignty over man, while the canonical text can only present 
the various human forms of the resulting preaching. Matthias main-
tains that the two cannot be confused without prejudicing the value 
of both the theological and historical methods, and particularly the 
latter. In brief, Matthias goes on to charge that Diem's Verkllndigungs-
geschichte would mean a sacrificium intellectus for the historian, 
an opposition by doctrinal fiat to the realities of the historical 
consciousness. 
If this were true without qualification, it would perhaps signify 
the failure of Diem's careful attempt to modify Barthianism in a 
manner that would achieve a common exegetical basis of discussion. 
1. "Dogmatik zwischen Historismus und Existentialismus, 11 pp. 565-66, 
and VIE:x:egese, Dogmatik, Verkllndigung, 11 pp. 253-57. 
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However, it 1-rould appear that this, accusation is in part the result 
of a failure of Matthias properly to understand the delimited func-
tion of this conception in Diem's thought, as well as a failure of 
Diem himself to clarify adequately what actually is signified by the 
11proclamation-history.n Diem in reality does not claim that the his-
torical and theological methods should or even could be fused into a 
. - . 
tertium quid, a nondescript, common perspective,1 nor even that he 
himself can approach the hermeneutical problem from the direction of 
the historical critic, 2 althoug~ both of these false ~pressions 
can be derived from some of his own vaguely phrased statements. But 
as a Geschichte, the proclamation-history cannot pretend to be a 
datum inferable from or even fully congenial to the integral methods 
of historical criticism. 
Diem's purpose in defining the presence of a canonical Ver-
kUndigungsgeschichte therefore is to express a theological approach 
to the revelatory event that is at least comparable and discussable 
with the corresponding perspective of the historical critic. This 
concept should not be used as a theological axiom, to be wielded 
facilely "Wi. th an air of conclusive certainty (although again Diem 
must share some of the responsibility for this misunderstanding), 
but an auxiliary concept v-rhich intends only to circumscribe the tex-
tual datum sought by both historian and theologian and thus to further 
l. cr: Diem Is criticisms of w. Kfunmel and 0. Cullmann (Dogmatik, 
pp. 179-90), whom he charges with just such an illegitimate 
mixture of historical and theological arguments. J 
. I 
1 
2. Cf. ibid., p. 6o. 
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in some measure a mutual discussion of the presuppositions andre-
quirements of each discipline. One might even say that in this effort 
Diem has gone as far to meet the historian as a theologian ~' that 
is, as one is able who nevertheless consciously remains a.dogmatician 
instead of seeking some kind of hybrid method of Heilsgeschichte. 
This is at least the intention of Diem. 
However, the question still remains whether the concept of Ver-
.ktindiggngsgeschichte ever re.ally could denote a field of investigation 
common to both theology and historical criticism. Diem sees no final 
problem here, since he insists that any historical datum. is of it-
self fundamentally ambiguous and capable of conflicting interpreta-
. 
tions and, furthermore, that such a datum. becdmes -vrhat it actually 
llisll only when it is preached. Thus the search for the Verktlndigungs-
geschichte would be just as imperative for the historical critic of 
Scripture as for the biblical theologian. This may be true from the 
viewpoint of theology, but the historical critic would reply that so 
long as he is committed to the discipline of Historie he cannot agree 
to the final arbitration of the event of preaching. For theology, the 
Verkllndigungsgeschichte may be a helpful term, of course, for it in-
traduces a historical perspective into theological investigation. 
But it can only be an ambiguous concept for the discipline of histor-
ical criticism, whose methods as presently established allow after 
all an actual investigation-only of a Verktlndigungshistorie. 
Thus, Matthias' criticism concerning theological obscuration 
of historical consciousness is justified, to the extent that Diem 
has failed to appreciate the necessary integrity of the present his-
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torical method and has concentt~ated upon exhortations and descrip-
tions of the indeed necessary cooperation between exegete and dog-
matician, instead of taking up the task of a penetrating critique 
of what the presuppositions and methods of historical criticism 
should be. The corollaries of continuity, development, and relativ-
ity which presently guide the methods of research may be inadequate 
to grasp a revelatory occurrence, and certainly have been widely 
criticized as such, but the dominance of research by these assump-
tions has not fundamentally been shaken. No thorough modification 
of the approach of ,Troeltsch has yet been suggested w~ch has been 
able to win any noticeable acquittal from the general and rather 
well-deserved suspicion of predetermined results or of arbitrary 
restrictions placed upon the freedom of research. Are there meth-
ods which seriously can study Geschichte (not to mention a revela-
tory Geschichte) without forfeiting the p~oven sobriety and general 
applicability of the methods of Histor~e?1 
This is not to say that Diem should be condemned for writing 
about that aspect of the hermeneutical problem which he feels qual-
ified and called upon to discuss. But it is to say that his goal 
of close cooperation between exegete and theologian, ~s well as the 
1. This has been the subject of much contempo_rary discussion, which 
thus far has yielded some penetrating criticisms, but disappoint-
ingly meager positive results. Most influential have been 
R. G. Col;Lingwood, The Idea of History (New· York: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, [1946] 1956), and R. R. Niebuhr, Resurrection and 
Historical Reason. However, the conclusions of the former are 
lacking in theological adequacy to the same extent that those 
of the latter are in intelligibility. 
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resolution of the underlying problem of historical and theological 
. . 
methods, seem unlikely to be attained fully until such a fundamental 
critique of the nature of historical reason itself is undertaken. 
This remains a task for the future. 
It may be added that in view of these difficulties in bridging 
t4e gap between Geschichte and Historie in modern research, a gap that 
never can be completely overcome, it therefore seems best for the fore-
seeable future that the historical and theological methods· ,incfeea ... 
be kept ca;refully distinct. Hov;rever, a clear distinction need not, 
and in fact must not, widen into a full separation, much less an iso-
lation such as was exemplified in A. Schweitze~. For this reason, 
Diem 1s concept of the Verkllndigungsgeschichte should be used tenta-
tively and 1f.Lth a clear delimitation of its heuristic intention and 
methodological scope. But his descriptions of the reciprocity of 
doctrine arid exegesis, and the corresponding interaction of theolo-
gian and exegete, should be given close attention by all Protestant-
ism, as the most immediately promising approach to the enduring prob-
lem of Geschichte and Historie. 
3. The Hermeneutical Circularity 
A second area of criticism which should be raised concerns a 
tendency of Diem 1s thought which is partially responsible for the mis-
understandings alluded to previously. In the descriptions of the 
biblical origins of central theological terms Diem employs a certain 
ambiguity, which at times leaves the reader uncertain regarding the 
extent to which this ambiguity reflects the actual dialectics of the 
- ' 
biblical concept under consideration, or whether it is perhaps a con-
venient vagueness on the part of the author. There can be little 
dispute concerning the outlines of the words didache, paradosis, and 
homologia,1 all of which signify both a certain content and the corre-
sponding action of communicating this content. The double meanings 
imputed to ~sterion (as an event both secret and ¥et disclosed)2 
and martus (as a witness to bQth fact and m~aning)3 can be ably de-
fended but deserve a more explicit discussion than has yet appeared 
among Diem's published works. The same may be said for the intriguing 
and~ for Diem's argument~ determinative concept of theopneustia.4 
However, the several pairs of double meanings attributed to the term 
0< KOr} 5 stagger the comprehensi~n, if not the imagination. Would 
.l ./ 
it not be better simply to describe 0( KO'Q as the moment of obe-
dient hearing and believing knowledge? Such clarification could 
well simplify Diem's argument without forcing an essential change 
. 
upon it. 
Else-v;rhere this type of vagueness appears at crucial points in 
Diem's theological position. For instance, all ecclesiastical and 
epistemological questions are referred to the Verkftndigungsgeschehen. 
1. Cf. DogmatiR, pp. 147, 162, 296 respectively. 
.. . 
2. H. Diem, 1vas heisst schriftgem~ss?, p. 34. 3. ~., p. 12. 
4. Dogmatik, pp. 175-79. 
5. Ibid., pp. 255-56; 1vas heisst, p. 20. 
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Here Diem shares the presupposition connnon to all those influenced by 
the Zwischen den Zeiten generation, that the event of preaching pos-
sesses a unique epistemic quality as the medium for the perception of 
God's self-disclosure. Since this is a presupposition which is very 
widespread in contemporary continental theology, Diem does'not attempt 
to explain or justify this crucial aspect of his position. In support 
of Di~~'s intention, of course, it should be pointed out that just as 
the biblical events expressin~ God 1 s saving purp~se viere first manifest 
in the biblical proclamations, so these events were extended into sub-
sequent generations precisely through a similar proclamation of God's 
saving decree. The experience of the Church has confirmed that God's 
self-disclosure finds its most receptive and unhindered medium of con-
tinuation in every era and culture through the present event of proc-
lamation. This event stands in contrast to every form of legalistic 
bil;ll=i;.cism, whether Roman Catholic or sectarian, and to every human 
circumscription or coercion. For the Gospel as 11the good nevis" con-
tains an intrinsic urgency to be proclaimed, regardless of the prob-
able climate of its reception. This is a fact especially note-vrorthy 
in an age of analytical dissection and sophisticated introspection. 
Hmrever justified Diem may be in relying upon the Verktlndigungs-
geschehen as the epistemic doorway to his position, it may be objected 
that he attempts to relate too many aspects of his s.ystem directly to 
this crucial event. If the proclamation is to retain its basic sig-
nificance as 8: ~evelatory medium, it should not be diluted by being 
forced to include a multitude of other relationships. Diem thus may 
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be justly criticized for too easily granting authority to various 
aspects of his thought by connecting them somehow to the overworked 
word Verktindigung. This procedure has the unfortunate circular effect 
of at once obscuring the meaning of 11proclamation11 and of tending to 
- . 
undermine the foundation of the remainder of his position. 
For instance, it may be asked whether ltproclamation-historyn 
really describes the basic nature of those canonical writings aside 
from the prophets, Paul, and John? The Pentateuch, the Synoptics, 
and James are rarely mentioned by Diem. Are there not interests and 
intentions in Scripture in addition to the admittedly basic motif. of 
proclamation? Furthermore, does the continuity of the canoni~al 
VerlP.indigungsgeschichte connect the Old Testament vdth the New in any 
way that differs essentially f'rom typology? If so, the question is 
certainly worthy of more explicit consideration, and if not, Diem 
ne'eds to def'end himself' against the general suspicion of the histor-
ical critics. 
Another example of' the tendency toward circularity is Diem's 
description of doctrine as not only originating in the proclamation 
but remaining an aspect (ein Moment) of proclamation an¢!. thereby 
of the continued self-disclosure of' God. But this close identif'i-
cation contains the danger of' blurring ill lines of' distinction be-
tween proclamation, revelation, and dogma. Thereby doctrine might 
lose its historic function of' testing the present preaching or be 
elevated beyond its clearly subordinate status in comparison to the 
single revelation in Christ. It should always be made clear that 
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the proclamation alone has the promise of being the medium of God's 
present self-impartation, and that doctrine is simply the historical 
precipitation thereof, which has the function of guiding future 
preaching. This often seems to be Diem's view also, but with his 
characteristic, over-used term of das Moment he often runs the danger 
of (to use a favorite phrase which he shares with Barth) creating r,va 
night in which all cats are grey." 
The same criticism can be applied to other ambiguous areas of 
Diem's thought. Not only does it seem difficult to distinguish be-
tween proclamation and doctrine, but also between canonical Scrip-
' 
ture and later Church dogma. Both of the latter arise from the event 
l ~ 
of o<KOT}, both are 11an aspect1' of the Verldindigungsgeschichte, both 
are human and fallible, yet a chosen witness and continued instru-
ment of God. Both dogma (in the eschatological sense) and the canon 
impose themselves upon the Church. These descriptions by Diem are 
in themselves penetrating and stimulating, but there is lacking a 
clear demarcation of authority or even an essential distinction be-
tween the canonical and the post-canonical witness. 
Diem's reply to such a criticism of his circularity or ambigu-
ity may be gleaned from a couple of his early writings. In 1934 he 
explicitly stated that each aspect of the biblical l1witness 11 (which 
is one of the most significant and effective of Diem's group of am-
biguous terms) is incapable of being analytically isolated and held 
fast, as long as the ~tnessing remains within history, that is, 
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until the Church finally is taken up into the Kingdom of God.1 
Thus the ambiguities of history itself were said to be responsible 
- . 
for the impossibility of rigid categorical analysis. In 1935 Diem 
sta·t.ed: 
Im,menschgewordenen Wort Gottes fallen Gottes Reden 
und des Menschen Antworten, das Zeugnis von diesem 
Reden·und das Bezeugte, das Lehren und der Inhalt der 
Lehre, die Wahrheit und"ifrt'e Wirklichkeit zusammen: 
hier ist •erftlllte Zeit.' 
From this "fulfilled time'' the paradox of the incarnate Word is ex-
tended as the ground for the circularity or II doubleness" of so many 
of the words which theology must use. 
Diem understandably is seeking here to defend theology against 
the fragmenting influence of positivistic analysis which too easily 
allows a revelatory significance to evaporate, and he justifiably 
appeals to the original non-analytic meanings of many biblical terms. 
But in doing this he has not been anaiytical enough in lrl:s own use 
of language. To be sure, God 1s self-disclosure bursts apart all hu-
man terms and definitions, but this must not be taken id th undue 
license as an opportunity for needless obscurity. The dialectic 
which characterizes any Chri·stologically-oriented theological lan-
guage is indeed inevitable, but for that very reason it must not be 
blurred by additional ambiguities which are not directly needed to 
. . 
express the central paradox of the Incarnation. Indeed, in several 
l. H; Diem, "Das Bekenntnis in der Kirche des Neuen Testaments,n 
p. 429. 
2 • H. Diem, II Scbrift und Bekenntni s, n p • !~2. 
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respects Barth himself is more conscientious concerning this prob-
lem than is Diem. The unavoidable risk in dialectical language is 
that the suspicion is aroused that cr~tical problems are evaded; such 
· risks should not be unduly compounded. 
As has previously been noted, Diem has already incurred this 
suspicion by his response to historical-critical problems "With the 
concept of Verkllndigungsgeschichte. At least some of these criti-
cisms could be resolved by a less equivocal use of certain terms 
and concepts, 1dth?ut necessarily impos~?g a fundamental change up~n 
his basic position. Furthermore, if (as is quite likely) Diem novr 
bases his circular use of terms upon the interrelationsbi ps within 
the Trinity, he would do well to give this topic in itself an extended 
and careful exposition. 
B. ! Critique of Diem's Renewed Dialogue 
If the background of the present hermeneutical impasse is caused 
by the unstable relation between historical and theological method, 
the foreground is occupied by the continued antagonism between the 
exegete and the theologian. This latter rift has been the focus of 
Diem 1 s hermeneutical efforts. Thus his critique of Bul tmann and 
Barth, ~s the leading contemporary representatives of exegesis and 
dogmatics, must be examined. 
1. Diem r s Criticism of ·Bul tmann 
Diem presents an extensive and relevant critique of the exis-
tentialist exegesis of Bul tmann, a critique vJ"hich is at once more 
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sympathetic and more pertinent than the parallel criticisms produced 
by Barth.1 Diem has correctly seen that the basic issue within 
Bultmann 1s hermeneutics is the interchangeable relationship between 
man's understanding and the Word of God. This covert loss of the 
irreversible GefMlle means that the path toward a ~'pure faith 1~ is. 
carefully prepared by a number of prejudgments ·Hhich tend to abso-
lutize the understanding characteristic of man in an educated West-
ern culture of the twentieth century. The prejudgments occur despite 
the fact that Bultmann defines them cautiously as having merely the 
role of a Vorverst~ndnis, or ein nichtwissendes Wissen. 2 Thus a 
"pre-understanding111 of historical possibilities that is derived 
from secular sciences arbitrates over the scriptural events. An-
other ''pre-understandingn of the possibilities of human existence 
demands an artificially antiseptic variety of faith, which remains 
strangely isolated from its historical object and content and which 
is evoked by Bultmann 1s highly idiosyncratic view of the Christian 
kerygma. 
By means of such perspectives, the 11modernfll understanding is 
in serious danger of replacing the scriptural self-understanding that 
actually forms both the context and the guide for interpretation of 
1. For instance, cf. K. Barth, Church Dogmatics,, III/2, 446. Bultmann 
has correctly replied to Barth that existentialism cannot simply be 
reduced to the subjectivism of the Winner life of man, tv ~ecause ex-
istence includes relations to entities, persons, and powers that 
are actually encountered (Glauben und Verstehen, II, 233-34; ~uA 
Chapter in the Problem of Demythologizing," p. 4). 
2. For this latter phrase, cf. GV, I, 128. 
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all kerygmatic statements. Because of the supremacy of' this "under-
standing" (as conditioned by existentialism), the claim is made that 
the factuality of Jesus is basically separable from his significance, 
that Geschichte may be neglected in favor of Geschichtlichkeit, th~t 
a call to authentic existence must be abstracted from every (other-
wise valueless) doctrinal or mythological context. 
From these criticisms by Diem it might be inferred that in 
Bultmann Verstehen has finally circumscribed Glauben, since the 
"understanding" that is informed by existentialism proceeds to.seg-
gregate and truncate the organic whole of the scriptural self-procla-
mation, to prepare the 1-my for a type of ~'fai thtu which the existential 
. . 
understanding has alre~y deemed to be the only pure faith. However, 
Diem has nowhere explicitly drawn quite such an extreme or summary 
conclusion. In fact, despite the penetration of his criticisms and 
the harsh tone of' some of the~, Diem in general tries to present his 
remarks in a ,ra:tb:e:i~ conciliatory manner, often in the form of ques-
tions which imply a potential danger but which do not categorically 
equate the view under consideration with the fullest realization of 
that danger. In a recent work, 1 Diem even refrains from mentioning 
Bultmann by name, lest factional controversy be once more aroused, 
which only obscures the real issues. Thus Diem has managed to pre-
sent some of the most balanced and yet sharply relevant critiques 
that have been offered in the contemporary controversies aroused by 
J3ultmann. 
1. H. Diem, Irdischer Jesus (1957); cf. p. 8. 
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However, some further comments on this critique deserve~ to be 
.made. Diem correctly notes the skeptical bias of Bultmann in histor-
ical research, which is probably caused by the latter's theological 
position rather than the converse. Bultmann 1s attention to Geschichte 
is simply subordinated to his consuming interest in the Geschichtlich-
keit of present existence, and Diem ably points out the distorting 
effect this displacement has upon a historical method as we~l as 
upon the theological attitude toward a historical revelation. How-
ever, Diem has not recognized the full intricacies or potential 
value of an analysis of the Geschichtlichkeit of human existence. 
Indirectly he has appropriated some of its aspects, when he alludes 
to the ambiguities or dilemmas of man's life, but he has not ac-
cepted the pressing challenge either explicitly to reject or to elu-
cidate the epistemological significance of revelation as known by 
a creature bound to the sequences of temporality. Can the question 
of how the self-proclamation of Christ relates to the structures 
of the human ability to perceive and to comprehend be discussed at 
all? 
Diem presents an incisive vieiv of the role played by "demy-thol-
ogizing11 in Bultpm.nn's thought and of the latter's characteristic 
technique of needlessly projecting the entity or event described 
"my-thologically" into an empirical absurdity, 1..rhich then can be ruth-
lessly stripped of any reference beyond the existence of the believer. 
Bultmann thereby incurs the justified suspicion that he may too fac-
ilely dismiss as irrelevant those aspects of Scripture which for 
some reason are not congenial to modern (existentialist) thought. 
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Diem's provocative suggestion is that th~ only legitimate means ?f 
allowing the context of an ancient world-view to sink to its proper 
perspective is through the event of preaching. Luther is quot~d as 
finding such clarification within the context of geschehen, ~­
predigt, and geglaubt,l and Diem explains that mythical powers are 
to be believed in insofar as they are already overcome in Ghrist 
and affect the believer's existence. 
However, if Bultmann 1s program of demythologizing is to be 
countered, a greater clarification is necessary here; indeed, such 
an elucidation would be of great value in expounding Diem's own her-
meneutical approach. ?erhaps he intends to say that in the moment of 
being preached the essen~ial message of Scripture is uniquely ex-
pressed without the distraction or disruption of an explicit exclu-
sian of what appears to be non-essential. Such direct exclusions 
of "mythical I' elements would render the biblical statement in its 
original entirety unstable and would pose the threat of exegetical 
prejudgment; even the most successful instances of demythologizing 
contain the potential danger of diverting the hearer's attention 
from the primary intention of the text and into the controversies of 
this technical issue. ~ether these inferences correspond to Diem's 
underlying meaning is not certain, but in any case his suggestion 
of the perspective achieved through the event o~ preaching is worthy 
of more explicit and extended discussion. 
1. Dogmatik, pp. 283-87; ~11Dogma und Existenz, tu pp. 32-36; t1Dogma 
und Ex:istenz im theologischen Denken, 11 pp. 113-16. 
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Finally; Diem's concluding accusation is that Bultmann's herme-
neutic has hardened into a closed system, an unassailable circle of 
presuppositions and exegesis. This would be perhaps the final re-
sult of the ominous structure of tvpre-understandings''" which Diem has 
already'charged 1.Jith dissolving the irreversible Gefl!llle between God 
and man. Certainly a reading of Bultmann's biblical researches does 
arouse the suspicion that, despite many scholarly and brilliant in-
sights, his work is indeed firmly dominated by a prior, systematic 
view. However, Diem should take note of the fact that Bultmann at 
least intends to be quite modest about his existential-historical 
method, which is viewed basically as a perspective of 11asking 11 rath-
er than a normative criterion.1 Furthermore, Diem himself has been 
charged with having a closed system impregnable to any exegetical 
discovery and accessible only to a theological leap of faith. 2 To 
an ex~ent, this latter accusation is justified, for both Bultmann 
and Diem may seem committed to a definite hermeneutic structure 
which, although in part derived from exegesis itself, finally deter-
mines all subsequent exegetical results. However, the danger of a 
''closed system" is at least as much of a human failing as a theo-
logical fault, a danger which is present to every interpreter. For 
this very reason, a continual- dialogue among exegetes and theolo-
gians is imperative. However, it must finally be stated that the 
1. Of. R. Bultmann, "Chapter in the :Problem,n p. 9; GV, III, 148-50. 
2. Cf. W. Matthias, llDogmatik zwischen Historismus und Existential-
ismus, II p. 568, and W. Lohff, 11Dogmatische Grundlegung zwischen 
Posi ti vismus und Selbstverst~ndnis, tv p. 62. 
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danger of an exegetical closed circle is less serious in Diem than 
in Bultmann, both because only Diem specifically encourages such an 
inter-disciplinal dialogue and because his ovm presuppositions would 
seem to be markedly closer than Bultmann's to the self-understanding 
of Scripture. 
2. Diem's Response to Barth 
Diem's criticisms of Barth are more occasional and much briefer 
than those made of ]ultmann, and sometime~ the former must be in-
ferred from an oblique statement. As has already been noted, Diem 
finds himself in widespread agreement with Barth's fundamental posi-
tion. Thus he shares most of the more stimulating and creative as-
pects of Barthian theology, including the "incarnational" double 
aspect of the biblical witness, the spontaneous origin and boundaries 
of the canon, the necessity of a soberly theological exegesis which 
can use Church doctrine to elucidate the intention of Scripture, and 
the priority of the text over the perspectives and assumptions of 
the interpreter. In doing this, however, it may be asked whether 
Diem at times has been too slavishly dependent upon the insights 
o:f Barth, and in particular whether he does not devote too much 
printed space simply to referring to or quoting extensively from 
Barth.l This criticism may be made, d.espite the fact that Diem 
would reply that he has not pretended to be anything other than a 
disciple of Barth, and that Barth's own gift of expression often 
1. Cf. especially Diem's Theologie (1951). 
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far exce~ds that of any of his followers. 
Of course since 1955 Diem has made some criticisms of Earth, 
and furthermore these carefully selected points of difference are 
quite relevant, avoiding the many popular misunderstandings of Earth 
and touching instead upon the several key weaknesses in the Earthian 
position. For instance, Diem points out that Earth's theology re-
mains avowedly dialectical and thus supposedly is an open system 
centering on the Word of God in Christ. However, it is doubtful 
that Earth's position is really as dialectical as he would assert. 
Thus the same reproach of having a "closed system''11 that was directed 
at Eultmann may justifiably be directed also at Earth. Qf course 
Diem himself is not free from this common failing, as has already 
been mentioned, but it seems probable that Diem's position is less 
susceptible than the other two to this danger. 
Diem's other two criticisms, that of biblicism and of a restric-
ed historical method, are both related to the first. The threat of 
biblicism hangs over the Earthian view for the same reason that his-
torical criticism is relegated to an auxiliary capacity: the irre-
versible Gef§lle between the Word of God and the human words of the 
scriptural witness has been greatly weakened if not dissolved. 
Thereby the dominance of the scriptural content (Jesus Christ) over 
the biblical form (the canon) is undermined and in danger of being 
replace~ by a theological concept of revelation. A consequence 
of this tvrevelation-positivismR and the system deduced therefrom 
is that historical criticism can be courteously acknowledged and 
effectively bridled. Earth's doctrine of the threefold Word is not 
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used to presen~ the historical problems involved in the GefMlle of 
God's Word entering a human life and the subsequent apostolic preach-
ing, but on the contrary is used to circumvent precisely such problems. 
It may be noted that in these criticisms Diem has indeed indicated 
essential weaknesses of the Barthian position without at the same 
time damaging the basic concern of Barth to present a thoroughily 
Christocentric theology which relies upon God's irrepressible grace 
instead of human cleverness and upon the priority of the scriptural 
text over any methods used to approach and analyze this text. 
More questionable, however, are the modi£ications which Diem 
proposes. Does he actually reverse Barth's sequence and approach 
theological truth through historical truth? Certainly he cannot, if 
this were to mean that the methods of the historical critic as such 
are simply to be used to attain a theological position. As has been 
noted, Diem's position is still that of a theologian and not a his-
torical scholar, so that it would be wrong to expect that his approach 
is encompassed by the techniques of Historie. But Diem's Ureversalu 
of Barthianism may be declared a qualified success if it is under-
stood that he seeks simply to begin from a theological position that 
parallels and is as closely associated as possible with the proper 
requirements of a historical (and especially a formgeschichtlich) 
method. 
Thus Diem attempts a theological approach which will nev.erthe-
less give the fullest possible scope for the contributions of his-
torical criticism. He criticizes Barth for beginning with the sheer 
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fact of a closed canon and announces his own intention to investigate 
the origins of the texts and the relationship within them of God's 
Word and the human proclamation. It may be noted that both Bultmann 
and (more recently) Diem go beyond Barthianism by seeking '~ehindU 
the text as it presently stands, although Bultmann does so for a 
negative purpose and Diem for a positive one. However, Diem's ven-
ture is still not enough to satisfy the historical critics, for the 
investigation he authorizes is limited solely to the first phase of 
the VerkUndigungsgeschichte, which took place in the earthly Jesus 
but is not equivalent to a study of this Jesus or of his contempo-
rary conditions and influences. 
Also, it maybe doubted whether Diem has indeed fulfilled his 
intention to trace the admittedly nebulous relationship between the 
~furd of God and the historical apostolic preaching. The concept of 
the self-proclaiming Christ within the various historic witnesses 
is most fruitful and a decided advance over the Barthian doctrine 
of the Word, but Diem's historical delineation can only be traced 
back as far as the theologically-significant Easter event. ~ior 
to this event, the Gef~lle between God's Word and man's words can 
not be examined, but the question must abruptly be switched to the 
broader issue of the first phase of the (whose?) proclamation. This 
is not to advocate a renewal of biographical or psychological stud-
ies concerning Jesus of Nazareth, but it is simply to point out that 
the meager scope here permitted to historical studies prior to the 
apostolic witness may not suffice to satisfy the rigorous historical 
critic. 
2$ 
The strengths and weaknesses of Diem's combination of histor-
ical and theological methods have already been pointed out. In re-
lation to his modifications of Barthian hermeneutics it will suffice 
merely to add that Diem has appropriated the Barthian view of ~­
schichte without questioning it. This view has indisputable merits 
in guiding the broad perspective of the exegete who would avoid his-
toricism and be obedient to the intention of Scripture, but this 
concept also has a notably vague relation to the concrete methods 
of Historie and for this reason it deserves to be closely scruti-
nized by all those who would use it. Just as Bultroann has never 
satisfactorily explained what he means by ein nichtwissendes Wissen, 
so has Barth never adequately clarified what is meant by Jla non-
historical history~;1 yet these concepts are in fact the crucial 
foundations respectively of the hermeneutics of these leaders of 
existentialist exegesis and dogmatic theology. There is certa~nly 
the possibility that a central ambiguity may finally be necessary 
for any creative hermeneutics, but this does not excuse an uncrit-
ical and even effortless acceptance of such a crucial point. The 
Barthian view of Geschichte is certainly worthy of intensive discus-
sion, but through negligence it could become a facile evasion of 
critical problems. 
1. Gf. R. Bultmann, GV, I, 128, and K. Barth, CD, III/1, 80. 
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C. Conclusions and Prospects 
In brief, Diem has presented quite relevant and generally rath-
er well-balanced critiques of Bultmann and Barth. In some respects 
he has gone too far in his criticisms of Bultmann and not far enough 
in his criticism of Barth, but this does not negate the great value 
of his discussions of each and his comparisons of both. 
The strength of Diem's position in relation to those of both 
Barth and Bultmann is that Diem has a keen awareness of the presence 
in the biblical text of an indissoluble Gef!ille between man and God. 
This means, in contrast to Bultmann, that Diem insists that the ex-
egete must consciously mold his human presuppositions accoraing to 
the divine self-disclosure w·hich is the avowed intention of the 
scriptural witness. In contrast to Barth, this means that Diem 
maintains a more conscientious awareness of the continued distinc-
tion and separation between the divine and human "natures" of Scrip-
ture, for the self-proclamation of Christ within his witnesses can 
not as easily be taken for granted as can the identity of the ttwri t-
ten'' with the "revealed" form of the Word. Furthermore, iri contrast 
to both Bultmann and Barth, Diem's emphasis on the GefHlle signifies 
a readiness to pursue the historical sequences which are the direct 
expression of this distinction between God's self-disclosure and the 
) I 
multiple human responses of CXkO'f). 
Therefore Diem presents a creative theological position which, 
despite its deficiencies and ambiguiti~s, offers a wider freedom to 
historical criticism, as well as an increased opportunity for dialogue 
between historian and theologian. It may thus be concluded that he 
has thereby provided a needed setting for the fUture discussion of 
the basic problem of hermeneutics, the conflict of historical and 
theological methods. However, no solution to this conflict can be 
expected until the complex and rigorous task of a thorough critique 
of historical reason itself is accepted and performed by some future 
scholar. In this respect Diem has offered a helpful but preliminary 
circumscription of the problem at hand. 
Concerning the problem in the immediate foreground of herme-
neutics, the isolation of exegete and theologian, Diem accordingly 
sets forth a position which is consciously theological but which to 
a commendable extent is exegetically discussable. A common basis 
for cooperation between the two disciplines is exemplified and an 
outstanding discussion of their supplementary functions is provided. 
Has Diem thus been successful in renewing a dialogue between dogmat-
ics and existentialist exegesis? 
Regrettably the fact of the matter seems to be that this at-
tempt thus far has not succeeded, for the simple reason that it has 
largely been ignored. The response to Diem's writings, notably the 
Dogmatik, has been generally quite favorable and even enthusiastic; 
but this response has been limited almost entirely to the adherents 
of dogmatic theology, especially the Barthians. A disappointing si-
lence has been the sole answer from those whom Diem has primarily 
addressed, the existentialists, with the exception of the meager ref-
erences to him in the few footnotes byBultmann and Ebeling which 
have already been noted. Thus the tragic stalemate is continued, 
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largely through no fault of Diem himself. Rather, Diem may be said 
to have been as conciliatory toward existentialist exegesis as a 
Barthian theologian can be. Thus the primary responsibility for ful-
filling a renewed conversation now rests upon a corresponding effort 
and open 'good will on the part of the existential exegetes. 
In brief, it may be concluded that Diem's own theological posi-
tion is worthy of further study and of much more widespread attention 
than it nO"t'T has • Diem has seen that the most essent'ial aspect of 
relevant exegesis is beyond the endeavors of the interpreter, namely, 
the self-exposition of the text itself through the action of the tri-
une God. Yet Diem has also devoted himself to the responsibility 
of.the exegete to prepare for this event of self-disclosure by a 
sober theological exege,sis which draws upon the perspectives offered 
by the Church and her doctrines but which also dares not evade the 
insights and rigorous integrity of historical criticism. Despite 
some misunderstanding of Diem's delimited objectives and also the 
unfortunate presence of equivocations and obscurities in both his 
literary style and his content, his work remains an outstanding con-
tribution to the current discussion of hermeneutics. The completion 
of a renewed conversation between theology and exegesis must now be 
undertaken by responsible exegetical colleagues. 
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·ABSTRACT 
The problems of contempor~ biblical interpretation are·largely 
rooted in the instability caused by an inadequate response by the Church 
to the challenge reaised by historical criticism, and this uncertain-
ty has now been compounded by the embittered divisions between two con-
temporary responses to the hermeneutical impasse, namely existential-
ist exegesis and dogmatic theology. This dissertation undertakes 
to examine the hermeneutic~ reaction to this situation by an out-
standing continental theologian, Hermann Diem. 
The scope of this dissertation is l:i.mi ted to the realm of German-
speaking Protestantism, and further to the debate aroused by the alter-
natives currently presented by Rudolf Bultmann and Karl Barth in her-
meneutics, and to Diem's response to these alternatives. The method 
used is descriptive and comparative in nature. 
The dissertation begins with an examination of the historical 
backgrounds of the hermeneutic problem and the rise of the modern 
responses of existentialist exegesis and dogmatic theology. Two chap-
ters are then devoted to a comparative discussion of these two alter-
natives, in the persons o.f Bultmann and Barth. Diem criticizes Bult-
mann for his systematic prejudgments, for extracting the kerygma from 
its context in the scriptural self-understanding, and for the subjec-
tive circumvention of the verbum externum. Diem objects also to the 
biblicistic tendencies of Barth 1 s 11revelation-posi ti vism" and indeed 
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proposes to reverse the Barthian deductive sequence frem the Word, so 
that theological truth may be approached through the historical ques-
tion. 
Diem thus defines Scripture as a Verklindigungsgeschichte, which 
began -vrl.th Jesus as the proclaimed Christ of the Scriptures, extended 
throughout the apostolic preaching, and continues in the present preach-
ing of the Church. Christ is not only the initiator and object of the 
Gospel-proclamation, but its continuing, self-proclaiming subject. In 
Scripture is seen the "hermeneutical circle, 11 whereby_ the mortal wit-
nesses both attest and are confirmed by the Witnessed; this circle is 
still maintained in preaching, in -vrhich the Church .is constituted ever 
anew. FUrthermore, there is a self-attesting unity to the canon, even 
though there is a great variety among the prophetic and apostolic 
TrJri ters. This unity is perceived when there is a II concordance-hearing II 
of these many1~tnesses in their interaction and mutual responsibility 
for one amther. As a guide to this hearing, the Church has formulated 
doctrines, which both provide the necess~ perspective and pre-under-
standings for exegesis and are themselves continually tested anew by 
exegesis. Thus, dogmatics and exegesis have a vital ·reciprocal func-
tion, w·hich makes imperative the unceasing cooperation of theologian 
and exegete and which enables the Church to continue and· carry further 
the biblical id tness in each concrete present situation. 
The conclusion may be drawn that Diem has pre~ented a creative 
basis for approaching the hermeneutical task, by his discussion of the 
history of God's self-proclamation through the canonical witnesses. 
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Xt is noted that the concept of Verklindigungsgeschichte is intended to 
be a theological approach to cooperation with historical criticism, 
although some of Diem's vaguer statements seem to imply an illegiti-
mate mixture of theological and historical methods which, at best, 
would be unacceptable to the conscientious historical critic. There 
is also a needless circularity and ambiguity in aspects of Diem's style. 
' . 
His criticisms of Bultmann and Barth are just, ~d he pr?vides some 
guidance for a renewed dialogue between the two factions. But the 
effectiveness of his conciliatory, modified Barthianism will remain 
limited as long as the unfinished task remains of critically restating 
the very methods of Historie as. legitimately redefined by a revela-
tory Geschichte. The dialogue will also remain unfulfilled as long as 
there remains the strange lack of response to Diem's theological ef-
forts on the part of his exegetical colleagues. 
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